Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
667 detections
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Detects network connections or DNS queries to known malicious domains identified as being used for Cobalt Strike C2, data exfiltration, and secondary payload delivery during the Notepad++ supply chain attack. This rule specifically targets the domains 'cdncheck.it.com', 'safe-dns.it.com', 'self-dns.it.com', 'api.wiresguard.com', 'api.skycloudcenter.com', and 'temp.sh'.
This rule looks for the GUP.exe process (the legitimate updater) spawning unexpected child processes like cmd.exe or the known malicious AutoUpdater.exe.
Detects a behavioral sequence where an AI agent runtime (e.g., Node.js, Python) spawns a shell to execute a web request utility like curl or wget. This pattern is a strong indicator of automated data exfiltration, often resulting from a successful prompt injection attack that instructs the agent to steal and send data to an attacker-controlled server.
This rule detects behaviors associated with HoneyMyte post-exploitation scripts. Specifically, it looks for `curl.exe` or `curl` being used to download executables or files into 'Libraries' or 'Public' directories. It also identifies executables named `getlogindata.exe` or `getlogindataedge.exe` when their command line arguments contain 'Login Data' or 'Local State', indicating browser credential theft. Additionally, it detects `powershell.exe` or `cmd.exe` command lines that include keywords related to HoneyMyte's exfiltration methods (e.g., 'pixeldrain', 'PIXELDRAIN', '113.23.212', 'log.dat', 'nbtscan').
This rule detects potential network beaconing activity by analyzing network connection events. It identifies repetitive outbound connections from a device to a remote IP and port with a consistent time interval (low jitter). The rule filters out known legitimate processes and domains to reduce false positives. It calculates the average time delta between connections, standard deviation, and interquartile range to identify beacon-like patterns. The rule also considers the number of unique devices connecting to the same remote endpoint to identify potentially compromised infrastructure.
This rule detects network connections and DNS queries to command-and-control (C2) domains associated with malicious Chrome extensions. These extensions are known to steal sensitive data such as ChatGPT and DeepSeek conversations, as well as other browsing data. The rule specifically targets known malicious domains to identify C2 communication and potential data exfiltration.
Detects data exfiltration activity by Turla's Kazuar v3 loader. After performing system reconnaissance, the VBScript loader sends collected information to the C2 server via HTTP POST requests. The exfiltration process collects system information including OS version, boot time, processor architecture, computer name, username, domain, running processes, and file listings, formats the data as plain text, and sends it via HTTP POST to the requestor.php endpoint on the C2 server. The loader uses WinHttp.WinHttpRequest.5.1 with SSL certificate validation disabled and sets User-Agent to "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; Trident/7.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)" to appear as legitimate browser traffic. The requestor.php endpoint is a specific indicator of Kazuar v3 C2 communication. This rule detects POST requests to this endpoint targeting any internet-routable IPv4 address, as Turla may use different C2 servers across campaigns. The combination of the specific endpoint name and POST method is a strong indicator of Kazuar v3 data exfiltration.
This rule detects network connections to the Telegram API endpoint (api.telegram.org) from processes other than common web browsers like Chrome or Edge. This activity could indicate the use of Telegram for command and control, data exfiltration, or other malicious purposes by malware or threat actors.
Mythic C2 over SMB Detection
Cortex XDR
This rule detects potential Mythic C2 activity communicating over SMB. It identifies network traffic using the SMB protocol with a total upload size greater than 360 bytes, originating from and destined for private IP address ranges. The rule then groups these connections by agent hostname, local IP, remote IP, and process image name, flagging instances where three or more such connections occur within a 7-day timeframe, indicating potential beaconing behavior.
Detects outbound network connections to a known PCPcat C2 server IP address on specific ports used for API communication, reverse tunneling, and payload distribution. This rule identifies potential command and control activity and data exfiltration attempts by monitoring network traffic to a hardcoded malicious IP and associated non-standard ports.
SantaStealer (formerly BluelineStealer) C2C connections.
This rule detects PowerShell processes that are initiated by a LOLBAS binary and subsequently establish an outbound network connection to a public IP address. It leverages an external LOLBAS JSON data source to identify suspicious parent processes. This behavior could indicate an adversary using a Living Off The Land Binary or Script (LOLBAS) to execute PowerShell for malicious purposes, such as command and control or data exfiltration.
This rule detects the presence and activity of the ShadyPanda malware campaign, specifically focusing on malicious Chrome extensions and their associated command and control (C2) and data exfiltration domains. It identifies the creation of files with known malicious Chrome extension IDs (ending in '.crx') and network connections to hardcoded C2 and exfiltration domains linked to the ShadyPanda campaign.
This rule detects command and control (C2) beaconing activity associated with the SHADOW-VOID-042 malware family. Specifically, it looks for HTTP POST requests containing the string "get_module_hello" in the request body, which is indicative of a C2 communication pattern used by this malware.
This rule detects the presence and activity of the ShadyPanda malware campaign, specifically focusing on malicious Chrome extensions and their associated command and control (C2) and data exfiltration domains. It identifies the creation of files with known malicious Chrome extension IDs (ending in '.crx') and network connections to hardcoded C2 and exfiltration domains linked to the ShadyPanda campaign.
Detects network connections to a specific webhook.site URL known to be used by the Shai-Hulud worm for data exfiltration. The rule specifically looks for the URI path 'bb8ca5f6-4175-45d2-b042-fc9ebb8170b7' on webhook.site, which is a strong indicator of this particular threat.
This detection rule identifies hosts where data archiving using 7-Zip is closely followed by network traffic to the temp.sh file-sharing service. This correlation suggests a potential data staging and exfiltration sequence, a TTP observed in the Lynx Ransomware campaign.
Detects HTTP/HTTPS POST requests to known Lumma Stealer C2 domain
Detects activity associated with the Hannibal Stealer, a .NET info-stealer known for targeting cryptocurrency wallets, VPN configurations, and browser data.
When, for example, a printer, camera, IoT appliance, or other device suddenly makes outbound connections to countries such as China, Russia, or Iran, this may not be noise. The following detection helps identify connections from these specific device groups that we were not previously aware of and that could be exfiltrating information.
Detects large HTTP responses for URLs containing keywords associated with F5 BIG-IP configuration or archive files. This could indicate an attacker exfiltrating sensitive system configurations.
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