Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
774 detections
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The analytic detects the execution of a process by `WmiPrvSE.exe`, indicating potential use of WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation) for process creation. This activity is significant as WMI can be used for lateral movement, remote code execution, or persistence by attackers. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands or scripts, potentially leading to further compromise of the affected system or network.
The following analytic identifies the use of the WMIC command-line tool attempting to uninstall applications non-interactively. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific command-line patterns associated with WMIC. This activity is significant because it is uncommon and may indicate an attempt to evade detection by uninstalling security software, as seen in IcedID malware campaigns. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to disable security defenses, facilitating further compromise and persistence within the environment.
Detects the clearing or configuration tampering of EventLog using utilities such as "wevtutil", "powershell" and "wmic". This technique is used by threat actors and ransomware strains to evade defenses by removing forensic evidence.
Detects the execution of WMIC to enumerate installed firewall, antivirus, and antispyware products. Adversaries often perform this discovery to understand security controls, plan evasion tactics, or disable protection mechanisms.
Detects attempts to query the contents of the event log using command line utilities such as `wevtutil.exe`, `wmic.exe`, and PowerShell cmdlets like `Get-WinEvent` or `Get-EventLog`. Attackers use this technique to find sensitive information in logs, such as credentials, usernames, or IP addresses.
Detects the execution of a binary that has been renamed from its original name, often used by attackers or malware for defense evasion. This rule leverages the Sysmon 'OriginalFileName' datapoint to identify instances where common Windows utilities or attacker tools are executed under a different filename.
Detects the use of the WMI command-line (WMIC) utility to identify and display various system information, including OS, CPU, GPU, disk drive names, memory capacity, display resolution, baseboard, BIOS, and GPU driver products/versions. This activity is often performed by adversaries during the discovery phase to understand the compromised environment.
Detects potential SquiblyTwo attack technique where WMIC is used to execute remote XSL files. This rule specifically looks for WMIC execution with command-line arguments indicating a format specifier and an HTTP URL, combined with checks for the original WMIC executable name or known WMIC ImpHashes, even if the binary is renamed.
Detects the modification of the 'AllowAnonymousCallback' registry value to '1' (0x00000001) within the WMI CIMOM path. This registry setting enables remote connections between computers that do not have a trust relationship, which can be abused by attackers for lateral movement or remote execution without proper authentication. This modification can indicate an attempt to weaken security controls related to WMI remote access.
Detects lateral movement activity using various Impacket tools such as wmiexec, dcomexec, atexec, and smbexec. The rule identifies specific parent processes and command-line arguments indicative of these tools, which often involve `cmd.exe` executing commands with output redirection to a local loopback address.
Detects a specific PowerShell command line pattern used by the UNC2452 threat group (also known as APT29 or Nobelium) for execution. The rule looks for PowerShell commands that use 'Invoke-WMIMethod win32_process -name create -argumentlist' or 'wmic /node: process call create' in conjunction with 'rundll32 c:\windows'. This pattern was observed in the SolarWinds Compromise.
Detects the creation of suspicious child processes by 'scrcons.exe' (Script Event Consumer). 'scrcons.exe' is a legitimate Windows component used for WMI event handling, but its spawning of common scripting interpreters, proxy execution binaries, or task schedulers can indicate malicious activity, often related to persistence or execution techniques leveraging WMI.
Detects suspicious child processes spawned by WmiPrvSE.exe, which is often abused by adversaries for execution and defense evasion. The rule specifically looks for common Living Off The Land Binaries (LOLBINs) and scripting interpreters being launched by WmiPrvSE, including certutil, cscript, mshta, msiexec, regsvr32, rundll32, verclsid, wscript, and cmd.exe with specific command-line arguments related to scripting or LOLBINs.
Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario. This is identified by monitoring Windows Security Event ID 5145 for file creations ending with `\wbem\wbemcomn.dll` and filtering out legitimate system accounts (those ending with '$').
Detects the creation of a PowerShell process (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe) as a child of WmiPrvSE.exe. This activity is indicative of potential lateral movement or execution via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), where WMI is used to spawn a PowerShell process on a system.
Detects the creation of new processes using the 'wmic.exe' utility with the 'process call create' command-line arguments. This is a common technique used by adversaries for execution.
This rule detects suspicious execution of WMIC (Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line) by Microsoft Office applications. Adversaries often leverage Office applications as an initial execution vector and then use LOLBINs (Living Off the Land Binaries) like WMIC to proxy execution, break parent-child process chains, and evade detection. Specifically, this rule looks for Office processes (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, etc.) spawning `wmic.exe` with command-line arguments indicative of process creation and execution of other suspicious LOLBINs such as `regsvr32`, `rundll32`, `msiexec`, `mshta`, `verclsid`, `wscript`, or `cscript`.
Detects WMIC executing "process call create" with suspicious calls to processes such as "rundll32", "regsrv32", "bitsadmin", "certutil", "cscript", "wscript", "mshta", or commands involving 'cmd.exe' or 'powershell', or paths like 'Users\Public', 'Windows\Temp', 'AppData\Local', and common temporary/program data environment variables. This indicates potential malicious execution or persistence.
This rule detects potentially suspicious child processes spawned by PowerShell. It specifically looks for PowerShell (powershell.exe, powershell_ise.exe, pwsh.exe) launching a set of common Windows utilities that can be abused for malicious purposes, such as 'bitsadmin.exe', 'certutil.exe', 'mshta.exe', 'regsvr32.exe', 'rundll32.exe', 'schtasks.exe', and 'wmic.exe'. The rule includes filters to reduce false positives, such as specific command lines for AWS Workspaces, certutil's '-verifystore' option, and common benign wmic queries.
Detects threat actors proxy executing code and bypassing application controls by leveraging wmic and the `/FORMAT` argument switch to download and execute an XSL file (i.e js, vbs, etc). This rule specifically looks for `wmic.exe` loading scripting libraries like `jscript.dll` or `vbscript.dll`.
This rule detects PowerShell scripts that query WMI for service information, specifically looking for the 'Win32_Service' class and requesting 'Name', 'DisplayName', 'PathName', and 'StartMode' properties. This activity is often associated with reconnaissance for unquoted service path vulnerabilities, a common technique used by penetration testers and attackers for privilege escalation.
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