Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

379 detections

Detects unauthenticated GET requests to GitLab CI/CD job artifact download endpoints on a public repository, which can expose leaked secrets bundled into build artifacts.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
002
Detects instances where an Artifactory process or user accesses highly sensitive configuration files (system.yaml, join.key) or API endpoints containing configuration data, followed closely (within 15 minutes) by an outbound network connection to a non-standard or external destination. This pattern is indicative of a potential credential theft attempt targeting the Artifactory join key, which is used to authenticate Artifactory nodes in a cluster, followed by potential data exfiltration or C2 communication using these credentials.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
001
Detects instances where an Artifactory process or user accesses highly sensitive configuration files (system.yaml, join.key) or API endpoints containing configuration data, followed closely (within 15 minutes) by an outbound network connection to a non-standard or external destination. This pattern is indicative of a potential credential theft attempt targeting the Artifactory join key, which is used to authenticate Artifactory nodes in a cluster, followed by potential data exfiltration or C2 communication using these credentials.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
Detects instances where an Artifactory process or user accesses highly sensitive configuration files (system.yaml, join.key) or API endpoints containing configuration data, followed closely (within 15 minutes) by an outbound network connection to a non-standard or external destination. This pattern is indicative of a potential credential theft attempt targeting the Artifactory join key, which is used to authenticate Artifactory nodes in a cluster, followed by potential data exfiltration or C2 communication using these credentials.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
001
Detects network connections to known JeetBot infrastructure domains and IP addresses. The rule specifically identifies potential exfiltration of Twitch OAuth tokens via URL parameters or interaction with known token-collection proxy endpoints, which are associated with the JeetBot/Twitch Enhanced Viewer credential harvesting campaign.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
000
Detects unauthenticated GET requests to GitLab CI/CD job artifact download endpoints on a public repository, which can expose leaked secrets bundled into build artifacts.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
001
Detects unauthenticated GET requests to GitLab CI/CD job artifact download endpoints on a public repository, which can expose leaked secrets bundled into build artifacts.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
Detects unauthenticated GET requests to GitLab CI/CD job artifact download endpoints on a public repository, which can expose leaked secrets bundled into build artifacts.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
001
Detects network activity from infrastructure provisioner tools (Terraform, Coder) or shell processes attempting to connect to suspicious domains (e.g., coder-infra.com) that resemble legitimate infrastructure domains. This activity is indicative of credential theft, specifically targeting OIDC tokens, SSH keys, or authentication tokens during automated provisioning processes.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
003
Detects unauthenticated GET requests to GitLab CI/CD job artifact download endpoints on a public repository, which can expose leaked secrets bundled into build artifacts.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Hunters
2 months ago
000
DNSExfiltrator allows for transferring (exfiltrate) a file over a DNS request covert channel
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 months ago
205
Detects the FTP STOR command uploading a file with a .pcap extension to an external host on port 21 or 20 — consolidated from three overlapping detections (generic server, router-specific, and capture-file variants). Indicates an adversary (e.g. Fire Ant/UNC3886) exfiltrating captured network traffic from a compromised network device via FTP.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
004
Detects network activity from infrastructure provisioner tools (Terraform, Coder) or shell processes attempting to connect to suspicious domains (e.g., coder-infra.com) that resemble legitimate infrastructure domains. This activity is indicative of credential theft, specifically targeting OIDC tokens, SSH keys, or authentication tokens during automated provisioning processes.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
Detects network activity from infrastructure provisioner tools (Terraform, Coder) or shell processes attempting to connect to suspicious domains (e.g., coder-infra.com) that resemble legitimate infrastructure domains. This activity is indicative of credential theft, specifically targeting OIDC tokens, SSH keys, or authentication tokens during automated provisioning processes.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
001
Detects network activity from infrastructure provisioner tools (Terraform, Coder) or shell processes attempting to connect to suspicious domains (e.g., coder-infra.com) that resemble legitimate infrastructure domains. This activity is indicative of credential theft, specifically targeting OIDC tokens, SSH keys, or authentication tokens during automated provisioning processes.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
001
The following analytic detects excessive usage of the nslookup application, which may indicate potential DNS exfiltration attempts. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 1 to monitor process executions, specifically focusing on nslookup.exe. The detection identifies outliers by comparing the frequency of nslookup executions against a calculated threshold. This activity is significant as it can reveal attempts by malware or APT groups to exfiltrate data via DNS queries. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to stealthily transfer sensitive information out of the network, bypassing traditional data exfiltration defenses.
Splunk Security@SplunkSecurity
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Splunk Security Content
2 months ago
0010
Detects FTP STOR commands associated with the transfer of files with a .pcap extension, which may indicate the exfiltration of captured network traffic from a network device or server.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
000
Detects unauthorized, non-browser processes accessing sensitive Chromium-based browser credential files (e.g., 'Local State', 'Login Data', 'Cookies') followed by suspicious outbound network connections. This pattern is characteristic of credential-stealing malware (infostealers) like Amatera, Lumma, and Remus.
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Duo Tech@duotech
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
7117
A host repeatedly queries the same DNS domain within a short period, which may indicate automated command-and-control beaconing.
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Vashrith Vinodh@Vash
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
4016
This rule monitors Netskope cloud application events to detect potential data exfiltration. It triggers if there is a significant volume anomaly (z-score >= 2) for any cloud application activity, or if a 'Share' or 'Upload' activity occurs that is only configured to 'Alert' rather than being blocked. This helps identify unusual spikes in data movement or sensitive operations that bypass formal enforcement controls.
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KQL Cowboy@KQLCowboy
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Netskope Detection Engineering
2 months ago
006
Detects the use of curl.exe or curl to communicate with the malicious domain 'i.apee.my.id', initiated by a VS Code integrated terminal process. This behavior is indicative of malicious VS Code extensions exfiltrating data via a hidden terminal session.
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Ethan Andrews@eandrews
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Federal Signal Detections
2 months ago
519
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