Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
164 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
77
32
13
10
9
Contributors
55
38
13
9
8
Categories
104
95
87
64
61
Platforms
155
16
9
5
4
Products / Services
99
49
27
14
11
MITRE Techniques
18,123
15,639
12,581
8,394
6,215
CVEs
3
3
1
1
1
IDS Classtypes
2
1
IDS Protocols
2
1
Detects persistence activities initiated by Postgres-related processes or users involving scheduled tasks and system services.
Detects modifications to the 'crond' daemon binary followed closely (within 5 minutes) by a restart or start command via common system management utilities. This behavior is highly indicative of potential persistence mechanisms where an adversary replaces a system binary with a malicious version.
Detects when the Postgres service process or account attempts to modify system-level persistence mechanisms, such as scheduled tasks (cron/schtasks) or system services (systemd/startup folders), which are typical behaviors for an adversary using database service context to maintain persistence.
Detects when the Postgres service process or account attempts to modify system-level persistence mechanisms, such as scheduled tasks (cron/schtasks) or system services (systemd/startup folders), which are typical behaviors for an adversary using database service context to maintain persistence.
Detects when the Postgres service process or account attempts to modify system-level persistence mechanisms, such as scheduled tasks (cron/schtasks) or system services (systemd/startup folders), which are typical behaviors for an adversary using database service context to maintain persistence.
Detects evidence of persistence mechanisms associated with the StyleSmuggler implant. The rule monitors for malicious crontab entries and file system activity related to gvfsd-user, .gvfsd, and /tmp/.kw_ artifacts.
Detects evidence of persistence mechanisms associated with the StyleSmuggler implant. The rule monitors for malicious crontab entries and file system activity related to gvfsd-user, .gvfsd, and /tmp/.kw_ artifacts.
Detects evidence of persistence mechanisms associated with the StyleSmuggler implant. The rule monitors for malicious crontab entries and file system activity related to gvfsd-user, .gvfsd, and /tmp/.kw_ artifacts.
Detects enumeration of installed applications via .desktop files by a process outside known desktop-environment binaries, correlated with a subsequent persistence-related file write, matching the botking implant's discovery-then-persist behavior.
Detects creation of new scheduled tasks (cron), systemd services, or startup entries that reference the reverse_ssh tool, consistent with attacker persistence established after vCenter compromise.
Detects SleeperGem RubyGems supply chain artifacts: hardcoded Forgejo C2 reference in gem Ruby source, the git-credential-manager binary dropped under the hidden gcm path, and supporting deploy.sh/persistence indicators (ping6 backdoor, systemd/cron service under the git-credential-manager name)
Detects crontab modifications referencing hw_probe.pyc, the cron-based persistence mechanism used by the mrmustard stealer.
Detects the mrmustard supply-chain implant establishing persistence by writing a crontab entry that invokes the compiled stealer 'hw_probe.pyc' every 15 minutes, or direct crontab command invocation referencing the file.
This rule detects various common methods of achieving persistence on Linux and macOS systems. It monitors file system changes to systemd unit files and macOS LaunchAgent plist files, as well as the execution of commands related to managing systemd services and user crontab entries.
Detects crontab modifications referencing hw_probe.pyc, the cron-based persistence mechanism used by the mrmustard stealer.
Detects the creation of a crontab entry configured to execute a Python one-liner that performs a network connection to a specific remote IP address on port 4444. This behavior is indicative of a persistence mechanism and a C2 (Command and Control) beaconing attempt.
Detects the creation or modification of cron jobs initiated by processes associated with the OpenClaw or ClawHub platforms. This behavior is indicative of a persistence mechanism being established by these applications, which may be leveraged by attackers if the processes themselves are compromised or malicious.
Detects the execution of cron jobs that utilize file transfer utilities (curl, wget) piped directly into a shell (sh, bash). This is a common "living off the land" technique used by attackers to fetch and execute remote malicious payloads for initial staging and persistence.
Detects post-compromise persistence techniques, including crontab modifications, SSH authorized_keys updates, and systemd service creation, when performed by child processes of AI agentic tools like Claude, Node.js, or Python. This activity suggests malicious persistence establishment following an indirect prompt injection or supply-chain compromise of the AI agent environment.
Detects suspicious command-line patterns on Linux systems commonly associated with post-exploitation activity, including the establishment of reverse shells, encoded payload delivery via DNS, and manual modifications to crontab or SSH authorized_keys for persistence.
Detects instances where the Claude Code AI agent or its subprocesses are used to establish persistence. This is achieved by monitoring for crontab modifications or direct writes to SSH authorized_keys files, which are common indicators of post-exploitation activity following an Axiom-style indirect prompt injection.
Page 4 of 8