Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential lateral movement activities by monitoring for the execution of 'psexec', 'wmiexec', or 'schtasks' commands within a short timeframe on the same computer. A count of 2 or more such command executions within an hour is flagged as suspicious, indicating potential adversary activity.
Detects GreenBlood ransomware attempting to establish persistence by creating a new Windows service. This rule identifies suspicious 'sc.exe' commands that include 'green' or 'blood' in the service name, or 'sc.exe' commands creating services from common temporary/application data paths. It also looks for direct registry modifications to the Services key with 'green' or 'blood' in the key name.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task via schtasks.exe that executes a command interpreter or script engine (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, wscript) where the parent process is not signed by Microsoft. This behavior is often associated with the execution of malicious payloads, persistence mechanisms, or lateral movement.
This rule detects the creation or registration of scheduled tasks that involve the 'PerfWatson2.exe' utility or execution paths originating from within the local AppData directory. These patterns are often associated with persistence mechanisms used by malware or malicious scripts to maintain execution after reboots.
This rule detects the creation of scheduled tasks using the 'schtasks.exe' utility with command-line arguments indicating persistence triggers ('onlogon', 'onstart') or elevation to the 'SYSTEM' account. Adversaries commonly use these methods to ensure malicious code executes automatically upon system startup or with high privileges to facilitate further exploitation.
This rule detects a multi-stage loader chain behavior. Stage 1 identifies PowerShell spawning mshta.exe or wscript.exe, which is commonly used to execute malicious scripts or loaders. Stage 2 detects mshta.exe or wscript.exe subsequently executing schtasks.exe or wmic.exe with command-line arguments indicative of establishing persistence via scheduled tasks or WMI event subscriptions.
Detects persistence attempts by the Amadey infostealer. The rule monitors for unauthorized creation of .job files directly in the Windows Tasks directory or the execution of schtasks.exe from suspicious locations such as TEMP or APPDATA folders.
This rule detects persistence mechanisms associated with BeepRAT (a DcRAT variant) by correlating the creation of suspicious files (DLL, EXE, or C files) in user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp, ProgramData) with the subsequent execution of 'schtasks.exe /create'. It specifically monitors for task creation commands referencing these suspicious paths, known loader binaries (rundll32, regsvr32, tcc.exe), or specific naming conventions like 'WindowsUpdateTempFileCleanUp'.
This rule detects persistence mechanisms associated with the SHARDLOADER threat activity, specifically monitoring for the creation of suspicious Registry 'Run' keys using the 'MediumNetMonIt' value or via scheduled task creation referencing known staging paths under 'C:\ProgramData\IDM\logs\'.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms by monitoring for the creation of specific, suspicious scheduled tasks or the modification of registry values. The patterns flagged include known indicators of malicious activity such as specific directory paths (e.g., \ProgramData\IDM\logs\ or \Microsoft\VaultCache\) and known malicious file names associated with unauthorized background execution.
Detects malicious use of PowerShell cmdlets to modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) for ransomware distribution. The rule monitors for execution of GPO management cmdlets in conjunction with specific ransomware indicators, such as disabling Windows Defender real-time monitoring, modifying GPO machine extension names, or targeting SYSVOL/NETLOGON network shares.
Detects multi-stage cryptojacking campaign: autorun.dll sideload, silent msiexec install, and post-exploitation .NET binary process hollowing
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe that exhibit indicators associated with StrikeShark SharkLoader or Cobalt Strike persistence. Indicators include task actions that reference rundll32 with a DLL, execution from user-writable directories (AppData, ProgramData, Temp), the use of base64-encoded command lines, or specific task names mimicking OneDrive updates.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe initiated from potentially suspicious parent directories (C:\Users\Public\ or C:\Windows\Temp\) or parent processes containing 'win_guard_'. This behavior is often associated with malware attempting persistence.
Detects the creation of a Windows scheduled task using 'schtasks.exe' that triggers on system startup or login, while simultaneously referencing specific keywords ('RageGuard', 'win_guard_', 'RageCore_') in the command line, suggesting the persistence of a specific malicious utility.
Detects a coordinated persistence effort by a single process, involving the creation of a scheduled task, modification of the HKCU Run registry key, and modification of the Active Setup registry key within a 5-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a complex persistence mechanism typically associated with malicious software.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using the schtasks utility that masquerade as legitimate update services (MicrosoftEdgeUpdate or GoogleUpdaterTaskSystem). These tasks are configured to run at logon with highest privileges, specifically aiming to persist the TinyRCT backdoor (associated with files such as vmwared.exe or vmtools.exe) in ProgramData directories.
Detects the creation of a 'MasterPackager.Updater' scheduled task by a suspicious instance of RegAsm.exe (hollowed process). The task is configured to execute a VBScript located in C:\Users\Public every two minutes, a known tactic associated with AsyncRAT delivery chains.
This rule detects a multi-stage loader chain behavior. Stage 1 identifies PowerShell spawning mshta.exe or wscript.exe, which is commonly used to execute malicious scripts or loaders. Stage 2 detects mshta.exe or wscript.exe subsequently executing schtasks.exe or wmic.exe with command-line arguments indicative of establishing persistence via scheduled tasks or WMI event subscriptions.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe where the task action executes a scripting engine or living-off-the-land binary (LOLBin). This behavior is often indicative of adversaries attempting to establish persistence or execute code using native system tools to evade detection.
Detects the creation of specific scheduled tasks associated with LoaderClient or WeedHack malware. These tasks, named 'JMonitoringTask' or 'JavaSecurityUpdater', are used for persistence and recurring execution of malicious code.
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