Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation of scheduled tasks at 1-minute intervals using 'schtasks.exe' that employ masqueraded names (e.g., MicrosoftUserInterface) or execute known suspicious payloads associated with the NarwhalRAT malware (e.g., python scripts or .cat files). This behavior is characteristic of persistence mechanisms used by APT37.
Detects the creation of suspicious scheduled tasks by monitoring Windows Event Logs (EventCode 4698) for task XML content and process creation events (EventCode 1) for the 'schtasks.exe' utility. The rule identifies tasks created in user-writable paths (like AppData or Temp), tasks containing suspicious keywords like 'hidden' or specific Mozilla update patterns, tasks configured to run as SYSTEM, and tasks spawned by non-standard parent processes.
Clipboard hijacking malware for cryptocurrency address substitution
Open-source derived remote access trojan with plugin architecture
Detects the creation of a scheduled task masquerading as a legitimate Mozilla maintenance task (UpdateTask or ElevateTask). The rule specifically flags when such tasks are configured to run as SYSTEM, triggered on system start, and are created via a command line executed by a parent process of cmd.exe, which is indicative of Payouts King ransomware persistence activity.
Detects BQTLock ransomware (BaqiyatLock) establishing persistence by creating scheduled tasks via schtasks.exe. The detection monitors for scheduled task creation commands initiated by the ransomware payload (BQT.exe) or its loader (start.exe), specifically targeting tasks that execute files from high-risk paths like AppData or Temp, or directly reference BQT.exe.
This rule detects the creation of scheduled tasks that are configured with high-privilege execution levels (SYSTEM or highest) or that reference suspicious file paths and filenames commonly associated with persistence mechanisms or VM image masquerading (e.g., QEMU files, .qcow2, vault.db). It monitors both command-line execution of schtasks.exe (Sysmon Event ID 1) and Task Scheduler configuration events (Windows Event ID 4698).
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe that reference specific QEMU binaries, the 'TPMProfiler' task name, or suspicious disk image file extensions (vault.db, bisrv.dll, custom.qcow2). This activity is associated with GOLD ENCOUNTER, STAC4713, and STAC3725, who use QEMU-based virtual environments for defense evasion and persistence.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks designed for persistence, typically used by Operation Poisson (e.g., Demon agent, Python keyloggers). The rule identifies tasks that execute script interpreters (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, python.exe, pythonw.exe) with indicators of suspicious intent, such as hidden windows (/WindowStyle Hidden, /c) or elevated privileges (HighestAvailable, HighestPrivilege, AtLogon).
Detects the creation of a Windows scheduled task using 'schtasks.exe' with the 'Highest' run level, configured to execute either 'powershell.exe' or 'wscript.exe'. This pattern is consistent with persistence mechanisms observed in Operation Poisson, where attackers establish elevated, automated execution of scripts.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe that point to high-risk directories (Temp, AppData, ProgramData) or utilize obfuscated PowerShell commands (encoded parameters). This behavior is often associated with adversary persistence or initial execution.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using 'schtasks.exe' with specific command-line arguments that indicate an attempt to establish persistence. The rule looks for 'schtasks.exe' creating a task named 'Runtime Broker' that executes a program from a suspicious path within 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Runtime\'. This pattern is often used by adversaries to maintain access to a system.
This rule detects the creation or modification of scheduled tasks (EventID 4698 or 4699) where the command line for the task contains references to scripting languages like PowerShell, cmd, or VBScript. It then groups these events by computer and user, flagging if two or more such tasks are created by the same user on the same computer, which could indicate malicious activity.
Detects multi-stage cryptojacking campaign: autorun.dll sideload, silent msiexec install, and post-exploitation .NET binary process hollowing
This rule detects the creation of scheduled tasks using the 'schtasks.exe' utility with command-line arguments indicating persistence triggers ('onlogon', 'onstart') or elevation to the 'SYSTEM' account. Adversaries commonly use these methods to ensure malicious code executes automatically upon system startup or with high privileges to facilitate further exploitation.
This rule detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe that exhibit characteristics associated with the SharkLoader malware. Specifically, it identifies tasks using suspicious names like 'OneDrive Standalone Update Task' or those referencing components dropped in %APPDATA% directories (e.g., \xwreg\, \xgdf\), or tasks masquerading as 'SystemSettings.exe' or 'KasperskyLab' directories.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe that exhibit suspicious characteristics. This includes tasks referencing external URLs, those containing base64-encoded or obfuscated command strings, and tasks pointing to binaries or scripts in user-writable paths (e.g., AppData, Temp). The rule specifically targets tasks intended to run with SYSTEM privileges or those using common persistence triggers, while excluding known legitimate administrative software.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks named 'RageGuard' or utilizing 'win_guard' binary paths in suspicious directories (Temp, AppData, ProgramData), correlated with concurrent registry modifications to Winlogon (Shell/Userinit) or Image File Execution Options (Debugger) using the same binary, indicative of the TrymeLocker ransomware persistence mechanism.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe that point to the ProgramData directory, which is a common persistence location for malware like SystemBC. The rule excludes common, benign software installers and updaters that frequently use this directory to avoid false positives.
This rule detects the creation or modification of scheduled tasks (EventID 4698 or 4699) where the command line for the task contains references to scripting languages like PowerShell, cmd, or VBScript. It then groups these events by computer and user, flagging if two or more such tasks are created by the same user on the same computer, which could indicate malicious activity.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks (schtasks.exe) spawned by common scripting or social engineering-related parent processes (PowerShell, Cmd, WScript, MSHTA). The rule specifically looks for payloads associated with common attack patterns, such as downloading remote content or executing encoded commands, which indicates potential persistence or payload delivery activities.
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