Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects suspicious scheduled tasks that execute binaries from the AppData\Local folder, which is a common location for user-specific applications and can be abused by adversaries for persistence. Such behavior is often used by Infostealer Malware. The rule specifically looks for processes initiated by 'svchost.exe' or 'taskeng.exe' with command lines indicating scheduled task execution, and then filters out a whitelist of known legitimate applications that operate from this directory. It also incorporates a global prevalence check to further reduce false positives.
Detects the execution of a malicious JAR file, a technique used by the Bloody Wolf APT group to download and execute NetSupport RAT components.
Detects the creation or modification of scheduled tasks that execute Python scripts or masquerade as legitimate system processes. This behavior is used by threat actors in the 'Contagious Interview' campaign to establish persistence.
Detects a Python process creating a scheduled task or adding a Windows Defender exclusion, a technique used by malware like InvisibleFerret for persistence and defense evasion.
This rule detects the 'Get-ScheduledTask' PowerShell cmdlet within the HTTP response body, specifically when the HTTP status code is 200. This could indicate an attacker enumerating scheduled tasks on a compromised system via a web-based command and control channel or data exfiltration.
This rule detects the presence of the 'schtasks /change' command within the HTTP response body. This could indicate an attacker modifying scheduled tasks on a compromised Windows system, potentially for persistence, privilege escalation, or lateral movement. The detection specifically looks for 'schtasks' and '/change' followed by '/tn' (task name) in a case-insensitive manner within HTTP responses with a 200 status code.
This rule detects the 'Stop-ScheduledTask' PowerShell cmdlet within the HTTP response body, indicating that a client on the internal network is receiving a command to stop a scheduled task. This could be part of an adversary's attempt to disable persistence mechanisms or disrupt system operations.
This rule detects the presence of the PowerShell cmdlet 'Set-ScheduledTask' within the HTTP response body. This could indicate an attacker using a web-based mechanism to deliver or execute commands related to scheduled task creation or modification on a compromised system, potentially for persistence.
This rule detects the presence of the 'schtasks /query' command within the HTTP response body. This could indicate an attacker enumerating scheduled tasks on a compromised system, potentially as part of reconnaissance or lateral movement activities. The rule specifically looks for 'schtasks' and '/query' (case-insensitive) in HTTP responses with a 200 status code.
This rule detects the presence of the 'schtasks /create' command within the HTTP response body. This could indicate an adversary attempting to schedule tasks on a compromised system by delivering the command via an HTTP response, potentially for persistence or execution.
This rule detects the presence of the PowerShell cmdlet 'Start-ScheduledTask' within the HTTP response body. This could indicate an attacker attempting to establish persistence on a compromised system by creating scheduled tasks, potentially delivered via a web-based command and control channel or during an exploit.
This rule detects the presence of the PowerShell cmdlet 'Disable-ScheduledTask' within the HTTP response body. This could indicate an attacker attempting to disable scheduled tasks on a compromised system, potentially to remove persistence mechanisms or hinder forensic analysis. The rule specifically looks for a successful HTTP status code (200) and the 'disable-scheduledtask' string, optionally preceded by '-taskname' or '-taskpath'.
This rule detects the presence of the PowerShell cmdlet 'Enable-ScheduledTask' within the HTTP response body. This could indicate an attacker using a web server to deliver or instruct a client to enable a scheduled task, potentially for persistence or privilege escalation. The detection specifically looks for 'enable-scheduledtask' case-insensitively, optionally preceded by '-taskname' or '-taskpath', within a successful HTTP 200 OK response.
This rule detects the string "schtasks" followed by "/end" and then "/tn" within the HTTP response body. This pattern indicates that a client is receiving a response that contains a command to end a scheduled task using the `schtasks` utility. This could be part of a command-and-control communication or a lateral movement attempt where an adversary is managing scheduled tasks on a compromised system.
This rule detects the presence of 'schtasks' followed by '/delete' and '/tn' (task name) in the HTTP response body with a 200 status code. This could indicate an attacker attempting to delete scheduled tasks on a compromised Windows system, potentially to remove forensic evidence or disrupt legitimate operations. The detection is case-insensitive and uses a PCRE to match the specific command structure.
This rule detects the presence of the PowerShell cmdlet 'Register-ScheduledTask' within an HTTP response body. This could indicate an attacker attempting to establish persistence on a compromised system by creating a scheduled task, potentially delivered via a web-based command and control channel or a malicious download.
This rule detects the presence of the PowerShell cmdlet 'New-ScheduledTask' and related parameters ('-action', '-trigger', '-taskname', '-settings') within the HTTP response body. This could indicate a system receiving instructions to create a scheduled task, potentially for persistence or execution of malicious code. The detection specifically looks for successful HTTP status code 200 responses.
This rule detects HTTP responses (status code 200) that contain the string 'schtasks' followed by '/run' and '/tn' (case-insensitive) in the response body. This pattern indicates the potential for a client system to receive instructions to execute a scheduled task, which could be used for persistence, lateral movement, or other malicious activities.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks by user accounts via the "schtasks" utility.
Monitor the creation of a new key under 'TaskCache' when a new scheduled task is registered by a process that is not svchost.exe, which is suspicious
CyberSecurityNews has reported a raising case about a new wave of phishing emails masquerading as breach notifications from LastPass.
To summarise, these emails claim that the recipient’s account has been compromised and urge them to download a “security patch” to restore access.
In reality, the attached file is a sophisticated malware loader built to steal credentials and deploy additional malicious payloads onto the victim’s system.
Each phishing message includes a ZIP attachment named 'LastPass_Security_Update' that contains an executable disguised as an MSI installer. When executed, the fake MSI installs a PowerShell script into the user’s AppData folder and schedules it to run via a scheduled task. The script then contacts a remote command-and-control server to download a second-stage payload capable of keylogging, taking screenshots, and moving laterally within corporate networks.
This following KQL Query is based on the IOA where the emails arrive with a .zip file attached and it content is a msi file. Using IOA instead the IOC (LastPass_Security_Update .zip) is more feasible because the malicious actors could easily change the zip name and the detection would not detect the mentioned threat.
To summarise, these emails claim that the recipient’s account has been compromised and urge them to download a “security patch” to restore access.
In reality, the attached file is a sophisticated malware loader built to steal credentials and deploy additional malicious payloads onto the victim’s system.
Each phishing message includes a ZIP attachment named 'LastPass_Security_Update' that contains an executable disguised as an MSI installer. When executed, the fake MSI installs a PowerShell script into the user’s AppData folder and schedules it to run via a scheduled task. The script then contacts a remote command-and-control server to download a second-stage payload capable of keylogging, taking screenshots, and moving laterally within corporate networks.
This following KQL Query is based on the IOA where the emails arrive with a .zip file attached and it content is a msi file. Using IOA instead the IOC (LastPass_Security_Update .zip) is more feasible because the malicious actors could easily change the zip name and the detection would not detect the mentioned threat.
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