Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects when an attacker tries to modify an already existing scheduled tasks to run from a suspicious location
Attackers can create a simple looking task in order to avoid detection on creation as it's often the most focused on
Instead they modify the task after creation to include their malicious payload
Attackers can create a simple looking task in order to avoid detection on creation as it's often the most focused on
Instead they modify the task after creation to include their malicious payload
Detects Schtask creations that point to a suspicious folder or an environment variable often used by malware
Detects scheduled task creations that have suspicious action command and folder combinations
Detects creation of a scheduled task with a GUID like name
Detects the creation of new scheduled tasks via commandline, using Schtasks.exe. This rule detects tasks creating that call OpenSSH, which may indicate the creation of reverse SSH tunnel to the attacker's server.
Detects manual execution of the "Microsoft Compatibility Appraiser" task via schtasks.
In order to trigger persistence stored in the "\AppCompatFlags\TelemetryController" registry key.
In order to trigger persistence stored in the "\AppCompatFlags\TelemetryController" registry key.
Detects suspicious powershell execution via a schedule task where the command ends with an suspicious flags to hide the powershell instance instead of executeing scripts or commands. This could be a sign of persistence via PowerShell "Get-Variable" technique as seen being used in Colibri Loader
Detects scheduled task creations or modification to be run with high privileges on a suspicious schedule type
Detects potential persistence behavior using the windows telemetry registry key.
Windows telemetry makes use of the binary CompatTelRunner.exe to run a variety of commands and perform the actual telemetry collections.
This binary was created to be easily extensible, and to that end, it relies on the registry to instruct on which commands to run.
The problem is, it will run any arbitrary command without restriction of location or type.
Windows telemetry makes use of the binary CompatTelRunner.exe to run a variety of commands and perform the actual telemetry collections.
This binary was created to be easily extensible, and to that end, it relies on the registry to instruct on which commands to run.
The problem is, it will run any arbitrary command without restriction of location or type.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named "MicrosoftsUpdate" which is used to execute a malicious batch file as part of the HrServ web shell infection chain.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task by a process named 'lsassa.exe', a .NET backdoor used by Lunar Spider. The malware masquerades as the legitimate 'lsass.exe' process and establishes persistence by creating a task that runs on startup.
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code
This rule detects scheduled tasks that execute unsigned binaries. It specifically looks for processes initiated by 'svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule', which is indicative of a scheduled task, and then filters for binaries that are not signed and have low global prevalence. This can help identify malicious code executed via scheduled tasks that attempts to evade detection by using unsigned executables.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task designed to run with SYSTEM privileges and terminate common AV/EDR processes. This technique is used by kkRAT for persistence and defense evasion.
This rule detects activities associated with the SmartLoader malware, including the creation or renaming of specific files (ODE3.exe, Module.class, Lua51.dll) in suspicious user application data directories, the creation or update of scheduled tasks with a specific name ("SecurityHealthService_ODE3"), and the DLL sideloading of "lua51.dll". These activities indicate potential execution, persistence, and defense evasion by the SmartLoader malware.
This rule detects XWorm persistence mechanisms. It looks for the creation of scheduled tasks, registry run keys, or startup folder shortcuts that execute suspicious payloads from the AppData\Roaming directory. The malware is known to use filenames like "WmiPrvSE.exe" (masquerading as a legitimate system file) and "Soundman.exe").
Detects various activities associated with the AppSuite PDF Editor backdoor, a trojanized application with extensive backdoor capabilities. This rule looks for specific command-line execution, persistence mechanisms, and network communications.
Detects scenarios where an attacker creates a privileged task to establish persistence.
Detects command line patterns associated with the threat actor Bonadan (also known as APT27, Emissary Panda, Lucky Mouse, Bronze Union, G0065). This rule identifies the use of certutil for decoding payloads, wmic for process creation, and schtasks for persistence in suspicious directories.
Detects scenarios where an attacker creates a scheduled task via commmand line.
Detects scenarios where an attacker remotely creates a scheduled task on multiple hosts over named pipes to execute commands or elevate privileges.
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