Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,212 detections
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Monitor the creation of a new key under 'TaskCache' when a new scheduled task is registered by a process that is not svchost.exe, which is suspicious
Detects potential exploitation of the BearLPE exploit using Task Scheduler ".job" import arbitrary DACL write\par
OilRig APT Activity
Sigma
Detects OilRig activity as reported by Nyotron in their March 2018 report
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using the "-XML" flag with a file without the '.xml' extension. This behavior could be indicative of potential defense evasion attempt during persistence
Detects the creation of a scheduled task via file creation.
OilRig APT Activity
Sigma
Detects OilRig activity as reported by Nyotron in their March 2018 report
Detects scheduled task deletion events. Scheduled tasks are likely to be deleted if not used for persistence. Malicious Software often creates tasks directly under the root node e.g. \TASKNAME
Detects potential persistence behavior using the windows telemetry registry key.
Windows telemetry makes use of the binary CompatTelRunner.exe to run a variety of commands and perform the actual telemetry collections.
This binary was created to be easily extensible, and to that end, it relies on the registry to instruct on which commands to run.
The problem is, it will run any arbitrary command without restriction of location or type.
Windows telemetry makes use of the binary CompatTelRunner.exe to run a variety of commands and perform the actual telemetry collections.
This binary was created to be easily extensible, and to that end, it relies on the registry to instruct on which commands to run.
The problem is, it will run any arbitrary command without restriction of location or type.
Detects the creation of a schtask via PowerSploit or Empire Default Configuration.
'The query detects a scheduled task, created/updated remotely, using the Schtasks process.
Threat actors are using scheduled tasks for establishing persistence and moving laterally through the network.
Ref: https://blog.menasec.net/2019/03/threat-hunting-25-scheduled-tasks-for.html'
Threat actors are using scheduled tasks for establishing persistence and moving laterally through the network.
Ref: https://blog.menasec.net/2019/03/threat-hunting-25-scheduled-tasks-for.html'
'This query could identify critical user management operations like user registration(Microsoft Entra ID Multi-Factor Authentication & self-service password reset (SSPR)) authentication by admin account followed by attempts to stop System Restore activity. Stopping system restore prevents from recovering data by going back to a restore point. The operations could be an indication of attackers trying to maintain persistence, move laterally with attempts to stop system restore point that could point to a potential ransomware attack.'
This query identifies common processes run by ransomware
malware to destroy volume shadow copies or clean free
space on a drive to prevent a file from being recovered
post-encryption. To reduce false positives, results are
filtered to only actions taken when the initiating
process was launched from a suspicious directory. If
you don't mind false positives, consider removing the
last where clause.
Special thanks to Captain for additional inputs
malware to destroy volume shadow copies or clean free
space on a drive to prevent a file from being recovered
post-encryption. To reduce false positives, results are
filtered to only actions taken when the initiating
process was launched from a suspicious directory. If
you don't mind false positives, consider removing the
last where clause.
Special thanks to Captain for additional inputs
Original Sigma Rule: https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/win_susp_schtask_creation.yml.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, SQL Server abuse.
SQL Server offers a vast array of tools for automating tasks, exporting data, and running scripts. These legitimate tools can be repurposed by attackers. Because there are so many powerful commands an attacker might exploit, hunting for malicious activity involving SQL Server can be complicated.
This query detects instances of a SQL Server process launching a shell to run one or more suspicious commands.
Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/sql/relational-databases/security/securing-sql-server?view=sql-server-ver15
SQL Server offers a vast array of tools for automating tasks, exporting data, and running scripts. These legitimate tools can be repurposed by attackers. Because there are so many powerful commands an attacker might exploit, hunting for malicious activity involving SQL Server can be complicated.
This query detects instances of a SQL Server process launching a shell to run one or more suspicious commands.
Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/sql/relational-databases/security/securing-sql-server?view=sql-server-ver15
Detects OilRig schedule task persistence as reported by Nyotron in their March 2018 report
Detects the creation of a schtask via PowerSploit or Empire Default Configuration.
'This query detects lateral movement using GPO scheduled task usually used to deploy ransomware at scale.
It monitors whether a scheduled task is modified within the Sysvol folder in GPO.
Ref: https://bogusecurity.com/2019/12/26/persistence-and-execution-at-scale-via-gpo-scheduled-task/'
It monitors whether a scheduled task is modified within the Sysvol folder in GPO.
Ref: https://bogusecurity.com/2019/12/26/persistence-and-execution-at-scale-via-gpo-scheduled-task/'
Detects OilRig registry persistence as reported by Nyotron in their March 2018 report
Detects activity mentioned in Operation Wocao report
Detects Kapeka backdoor scheduled task creation based on attributes such as paths, commands line flags, etc.
Detects when an attacker tries to modify an already existing scheduled tasks to run from a suspicious location
Attackers can create a simple looking task in order to avoid detection on creation as it's often the most focused on
Instead they modify the task after creation to include their malicious payload
Attackers can create a simple looking task in order to avoid detection on creation as it's often the most focused on
Instead they modify the task after creation to include their malicious payload
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