Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,153 detections
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Detects execution of the MovieReaper initial loader binary. This malware employs advanced anti-analysis techniques, specifically manual PEB-walking to resolve APIs and evade detection by standard library loading hooks. The rule alerts on known file hashes and specific masquerading filenames.
This rule detects system calls originating from unbacked, private, or unknown memory regions, which is a common indicator of reflective code loading or process injection techniques. It also flags suspicious call stacks where standard processes like PowerShell, rundll32, or .NET execute system calls on ntdll.dll from non-standard module memory.
This rule detects the creation of named pipes commonly used by Cobalt Strike beaconing payloads (e.g., those starting with 'nb_', 'pivot_', or 'beacon_'). The detection excludes known system processes that might otherwise generate similar traffic, focusing on suspicious inter-process communication.
Detects potential exploitation attempts against Microsoft Exchange Server, specifically targeting the ECP (Exchange Control Panel) through VIEWSTATE parameter tampering related to CVE-2020-0688, and correlates this with suspicious behavior in the w3wp.exe process, such as unauthorized module loading (e.g., clr.dll, system.web.dll) and abnormal child process creation which may indicate the deployment of in-memory backdoors like GhostContainer.
Detects forged thread call stacks by identifying processes that spoof legitimate thread entry points such as RtlUserThreadStart and BaseThreadInitThunk in kernel32.dll, a technique commonly associated with advanced thread execution hijacking methods like SilentMoonwalk or StackMoonwalk.
Detects instances of process call stack spoofing, specifically techniques like SparroWocky (hooking CreateThread to report fake start addresses such as AnimateWindow) or SilentMoonwalk (forged call stacks masking API call origins as RtlUserThreadStart or BaseThreadInitThunk) used to evade EDR behavioral monitoring.
Detects WriteProcessMemory or CreateRemoteThread operations targeting csc.exe or chrome.exe. This activity is often associated with process injection techniques used to execute code within the context of a legitimate or compiler-related process.
Detects WriteProcessMemory or CreateRemoteThread operations targeting csc.exe or chrome.exe. This activity is often associated with process injection techniques used to execute code within the context of a legitimate or compiler-related process.
This rule detects suspicious process injection activity directed at Chrome or Edge browser processes, followed immediately by file access to sensitive browser data files like 'Login Data' or 'Cookies'. This pattern is indicative of an adversary attempting to steal credentials or session cookies from a user's web browser memory and disk storage.
Detects PowerShell instances performing suspicious memory operations like thread injection (e.g., VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread) targeting common processes such as csc.exe, browser processes (chrome.exe, msedge.exe), and system processes like SearchIndexer.exe. This activity is indicative of malicious code injection often used in stealth execution and credential harvesting campaigns.
Detects PowerShell attempts to perform remote process injection into potentially suspicious or sensitive processes (csc.exe, chrome.exe, msedge.exe, SearchIndexer.exe) by searching for command line arguments indicating the usage of Windows memory allocation or thread context manipulation APIs such as NtAllocateVirtualMemoryRemote and NtSetContextThreadRemote.
This rule detects PowerShell script execution patterns indicative of the StealC 'ClickFix' infection chain. It specifically looks for the reflective loading of an obfuscated .NET assembly from memory, involving common .NET cryptographic and compression classes such as AesCryptoServiceProvider, GzipStream, and assembly loading methods like Assembly.Load. The rule uses markers and script length heuristics to identify payloads characteristic of this malware delivery technique.
Detects anomalous behavior within a Chrome renderer process involving the acquisition of SeDebugPrivilege, preceded by ALPC, WNF, or reflective DLL loading activities. This pattern is indicative of the BlueMoon (CVE-2026-85880) kernel privilege escalation exploit chain, where a compromised low-integrity renderer leverages kernel vulnerabilities to gain elevated privileges.
Detects a suspicious multi-step process injection sequence originating from an obfuscated PowerShell process. The rule identifies PowerShell executing with common obfuscation flags (e.g., -enc, -nop, IEX) and performing multiple API calls (such as NtAllocateVirtualMemoryRemote, NtSetContextThreadRemote, CreateRemoteThread, or OpenProcess) targeting specific executables like csc.exe, chrome.exe, msedge.exe, or SearchIndexer.exe.
Detects a suspicious multi-step process injection sequence originating from an obfuscated PowerShell process. The rule identifies PowerShell executing with common obfuscation flags (e.g., -enc, -nop, IEX) and performing multiple API calls (such as NtAllocateVirtualMemoryRemote, NtSetContextThreadRemote, CreateRemoteThread, or OpenProcess) targeting specific executables like csc.exe, chrome.exe, msedge.exe, or SearchIndexer.exe.
Detects a suspicious PowerShell process lineage spawned by explorer.exe that exhibits characteristics of a 'ClickFix' social engineering lure (using obfuscated command lines) and proceeds to inject code into legitimate Windows or browser processes such as csc.exe, chrome.exe, msedge.exe, or SearchIndexer.exe. This activity is often associated with malware attempting to evade debugging.
Detects a suspicious PowerShell process lineage spawned by explorer.exe that exhibits characteristics of a 'ClickFix' social engineering lure (using obfuscated command lines) and proceeds to inject code into legitimate Windows or browser processes such as csc.exe, chrome.exe, msedge.exe, or SearchIndexer.exe. This activity is often associated with malware attempting to evade debugging.
Detects a suspicious PowerShell process lineage spawned by explorer.exe that exhibits characteristics of a 'ClickFix' social engineering lure (using obfuscated command lines) and proceeds to inject code into legitimate Windows or browser processes such as csc.exe, chrome.exe, msedge.exe, or SearchIndexer.exe. This activity is often associated with malware attempting to evade debugging.
Detects instances where the legitimate Windows Character Map utility (charmap.exe) is spawned by suspicious processes or PowerShell, and subsequently loads clr.dll. This behavior is indicative of potential DLL sideloading or process injection techniques used by malware to execute arbitrary code within a trusted system process context.
Detects the use of the undocumented NTAPI function EtwpCreateEtwThread within a thread creation call trace. This function is often abused by shellcode loaders to execute malicious code within a target process while attempting to evade standard EDR detection mechanisms.
Detects instances where specific suspicious or known-malicious processes load 'ntdll.dll' from the 'System32' directory. This behavior is indicative of potential DLL side-loading, process injection, or evasive execution patterns where an attacker leverages legitimate system binaries to load malicious code.
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