Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a suspicious multi-step process injection sequence originating from an obfuscated PowerShell process. The rule identifies PowerShell executing with common obfuscation flags (e.g., -enc, -nop, IEX) and performing multiple API calls (such as NtAllocateVirtualMemoryRemote, NtSetContextThreadRemote, CreateRemoteThread, or OpenProcess) targeting specific executables like csc.exe, chrome.exe, msedge.exe, or SearchIndexer.exe.
Detects a suspicious PowerShell process lineage spawned by explorer.exe that exhibits characteristics of a 'ClickFix' social engineering lure (using obfuscated command lines) and proceeds to inject code into legitimate Windows or browser processes such as csc.exe, chrome.exe, msedge.exe, or SearchIndexer.exe. This activity is often associated with malware attempting to evade debugging.
Detects a suspicious PowerShell process lineage spawned by explorer.exe that exhibits characteristics of a 'ClickFix' social engineering lure (using obfuscated command lines) and proceeds to inject code into legitimate Windows or browser processes such as csc.exe, chrome.exe, msedge.exe, or SearchIndexer.exe. This activity is often associated with malware attempting to evade debugging.
Detects instances where the Windows Search Indexer service process (SearchIndexer.exe) performs suspicious process-related API calls such as memory writes, remote thread creation, or opening processes against common web browser executables (chrome.exe, msedge.exe). This behavior is characteristic of malicious process injection where a legitimate, high-privileged system process is abused to inject code into a browser process.
Detects instances where the Windows Search Indexer service process (SearchIndexer.exe) performs suspicious process-related API calls such as memory writes, remote thread creation, or opening processes against common web browser executables (chrome.exe, msedge.exe). This behavior is characteristic of malicious process injection where a legitimate, high-privileged system process is abused to inject code into a browser process.
Detects instances where the Windows Search Indexer service process (SearchIndexer.exe) performs suspicious process-related API calls such as memory writes, remote thread creation, or opening processes against common web browser executables (chrome.exe, msedge.exe). This behavior is characteristic of malicious process injection where a legitimate, high-privileged system process is abused to inject code into a browser process.
Detects instances where the Windows Search Indexer service process (SearchIndexer.exe) performs suspicious process-related API calls such as memory writes, remote thread creation, or opening processes against common web browser executables (chrome.exe, msedge.exe). This behavior is characteristic of malicious process injection where a legitimate, high-privileged system process is abused to inject code into a browser process.
Detects instances where the Windows Search Indexer service process (SearchIndexer.exe) performs suspicious process-related API calls such as memory writes, remote thread creation, or opening processes against common web browser executables (chrome.exe, msedge.exe). This behavior is characteristic of malicious process injection where a legitimate, high-privileged system process is abused to inject code into a browser process.
Detects code injection attempts targeting the Windows Media Network Sharing Service (wmpnetwk.exe), specifically monitoring for the loading of suspicious or common networking-related DLLs into this process. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to mask malicious activity within a legitimate system process.
Detects the activity of the PIVOTPIPE .NET loader, which involves writing specific artifacts (core.pak, agent.json, pk.der, or sleepmask.o) to a temporary directory with the 'nb_' prefix or the creation of debug files containing strings associated with in-memory reflective loading of a remote access tool (RAT).
Detects thread creation events where the initiating module is ntdll.dll, bypassing the conventional CreateThread path originating from kernel32.dll. This is a common behavioral indicator of process injection techniques used to hide malicious thread execution.
Detects memory allocation operations in processes where the protection mask is set to PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE (0x40). This behavior is often associated with code injection techniques, where an adversary allocates memory with write and execute permissions to load or execute malicious payloads in memory.
Detects suspicious thread injection activities (CreateRemoteThreadApiCall, NtCreateThreadEx, or RtlCreateThread) or the loading of 'ntdll.dll' by specific potentially unauthorized binaries (e.g., RuntimeSSH.exe, smqdservice.exe, etc.) or within the 'ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Telemetry' directory. This often indicates reflective code injection or process tampering, excluding known legitimate Windows system processes.
Detects sophisticated process injection behavior where malicious shellcode is mapped into RWX memory. The payload utilizes a Vectored Exception Handler (VEH) and deliberate 0xCC (breakpoint) instructions to intercept execution and redirect it into raw syscall stubs (e.g., NtProtectVirtualMemory). This technique is designed to bypass security product API hooking by avoiding standard calls to memory protection functions.
Detects in-memory modification of the ntdll.dll module to patch EtwEventWrite or EtwEventWriteFull functions, a technique used by adversaries to evade Windows event tracing and suppress telemetry. The rule specifically targets activities originating from w3wp.exe, consistent with behavior observed in IIS-hosted deployments like GhostContainer.
Detects in-memory modification of the ntdll.dll module to patch EtwEventWrite or EtwEventWriteFull functions, a technique used by adversaries to evade Windows event tracing and suppress telemetry. The rule specifically targets activities originating from w3wp.exe, consistent with behavior observed in IIS-hosted deployments like GhostContainer.
Detects in-memory modification of the ntdll.dll module to patch EtwEventWrite or EtwEventWriteFull functions, a technique used by adversaries to evade Windows event tracing and suppress telemetry. The rule specifically targets activities originating from w3wp.exe, consistent with behavior observed in IIS-hosted deployments like GhostContainer.
Detects potential exploitation of PostgreSQL via logical decoding plugins, specifically targeting CVE-2026-6471. The rule monitors for the PostgreSQL server process spawning suspicious shell utilities or loading modules from locations outside of the expected PostgreSQL library or plugin directories, which is a common indicator of unauthorized code execution.
Detects the invocation of the undocumented ntdll function 'EtwpCreateEtwThread', which is used as an alternative to standard thread-creation APIs like CreateThread or CreateRemoteThread. This technique is often associated with advanced shellcode execution, such as MovieReaper, designed to evade common thread-creation monitoring sensors.
Detects the invocation of the undocumented ntdll function 'EtwpCreateEtwThread', which is used as an alternative to standard thread-creation APIs like CreateThread or CreateRemoteThread. This technique is often associated with advanced shellcode execution, such as MovieReaper, designed to evade common thread-creation monitoring sensors.
Detects evidence of the MovieReaper loader technique. This behavior involves registering or rewriting Vectored Exception Handlers, allocating memory with EXECUTE_READWRITE protection, and triggering debug-break exceptions to redirect execution into raw NtProtectVirtualMemory syscalls, effectively bypassing user-mode API hooks often used for monitoring.
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