Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects cross-process injection activity targeting Internet Explorer related processes (iexplore.exe, ieinstal.exe, ielowutil.exe). The rule monitors for unauthorized processes that are not signed by trusted publishers (Microsoft, Google, Mozilla) performing injection-like behavior, typically associated with Remcos RAT and its use of techniques such as process hollowing or thread execution hijacking.
Detects suspicious behavior associated with Remcos RAT, including UAC bypass techniques using ICMLuaUtil, process injection into system binaries, and persistence mechanism creation in the Windows registry.
This rule detects anomalous process execution patterns associated with Remcos RAT, specifically monitoring for the spawning of 'rmclient.exe', unauthorized spawning of 'fsutil.exe', or 'svchost.exe' being launched by processes other than system-critical services. These patterns are characteristic of Remcos RAT deploying its watchdog or performing process injection.
Detects suspicious access to the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (lsass.exe) process memory, indicated by Sysmon Event ID 10 with an 'UNKNOWN' call trace. This pattern is characteristic of direct syscall usage or memory injection techniques used to bypass standard Windows API hooking and security monitoring, common in credential dumping attempts.
Detects anomalous activity associated with information stealing malware, including unauthorized access to browser credential files (Login Data, Cookies), remote thread injection into browser processes, outbound connections to the Telegram API by non-browser processes, and rapid bulk access to multiple sensitive credential or crypto wallet files.
Detects instances where a non-browser, non-updater process attempts to perform process injection into common browser executables (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, IE). This behavior is consistent with process hollowing techniques used by Remcos RAT, particularly observed in campaigns such as FortiBleed, to masquerade malicious activity under legitimate browser processes.
This rule detects command line patterns associated with Cobalt Strike Beacon injection, specifically looking for indicators of 'beacon.dll', 'beacon.exe', or 'injection' strings being executed by suspicious parent processes such as explorer.exe, svchost.exe, or winlogon.exe. This activity is indicative of post-exploitation behavior and potential lateral movement or persistence attempts.
Detects attempts to inject code into browser processes (Chrome, Edge, Brave) using various API calls associated with process injection techniques. This rule specifically looks for calls like QueueUserApcRemoteApiCall, NtQueueApcThreadApiCall, CreateRemoteThreadApiCall, and WriteProcessMemoryApiCall, especially when combined with specific functions like CryptUnprotectMemory or NtQueueApcThread, within a short time frame.
Detects malicious process injection behavior attributed to Operation DragonReturn, where an illegitimate executable named 'Mixed Reality.exe' located within a 'Windows Media Player' directory spawns 'svchost.exe'. This activity is indicative of a DcRAT payload attempting to inject fileless .NET code into a legitimate system process using techniques such as VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread.
Detects cross-process injection (Process Injection) from a specifically identified 'Mixed Reality' process into svchost.exe, followed by suspicious module loads (non-system32 DLLs) within that svchost.exe instance. This behavior pattern is consistent with DcRAT and XenoRAT deployment activities using masquerading or hijacked processes.
Detects potential DcRAT activity characterized by a process spawning under a svchost.exe parent, subsequent loading of GDI display libraries for screen capturing, and outbound network communication on non-standard ports, which indicates data exfiltration.
Detects instances where the svchost.exe process is associated with multiple occurrences of indicators categorized as 'Misc', potentially indicating malicious activity or process abuse that bypasses standard detection signatures.
Detects the execution of LuaJit.exe with a config.ini script, which acts as a Lua-based shellcode loader for BeepRAT. The loader uses Lua FFI to call Windows APIs such as VirtualAlloc and CreateThread to execute shellcode stored in temp.bin directly in memory. This pattern is indicative of fileless execution techniques employed by the BeepRAT remote access trojan.
Detects indicators of Mustang Panda activity, specifically identifying the loading of known malicious side-loaded DLLs (SolidPDFCreator.dll, ctxmui.dll) or anomalous process behavior originating from staging directories (e.g., \ProgramData\IDM\logs\) and binaries (MediumInstStart.exe, pct2bmp.exe) that interact with common system or browser processes.
Detects Log4Shell JNDI injection attempts
Identifies the creation of named pipes matching standard Cobalt Strike malleable C2 profiles (\pipe\msagent, \pipe\postex, \pipe\status, \pipe\spoolss) that are associated with network activity, indicating advanced C2 deployment.
Detects potential Remcos RAT loader activity involving process hollowing or injection into browser processes. This rule specifically looks for common browser executables (iexplore.exe, chrome.exe, firefox.exe) where the initiating parent process is 'Optimax.dll' or contains 'SystemOptimizer', which are indicators associated with the Remcos RAT loader.
Detects Vidar Stealer cloning a browser process (Chrome/Edge/Brave) using NtCreateProcessEx with a NULL SectionHandle to snapshot the browser address space for v20_master_key scanning as part of its Chrome Application-Bound Encryption (ABE) bypass chain.
Detects Reynolds ransomware's technique of ntdll loader hijacking for process injection, bypassing userland API hooks. This rule identifies suspicious activity by looking for the loading of GDI32.dll alongside ntdll internal loader routines, combined with API calls such as WriteProcessMemory, NtCreateSection, NtMapViewOfSection, and RtlEncodeRemotePointer, which are consistent with loader-level injection techniques. It also filters out common legitimate processes to reduce false positives.
Detects suspicious API calls related to remote thread creation, memory allocation, and screen capturing, along with image loads of GDI32.dll from unusual paths and specific file activity. This rule also identifies processes associated with known malicious software product names.
Detects the SHEETCREEP RAT (vaultsvc.exe) creating the 'Global\WinSync_' mutex, often from non-standard locations. This rule correlates process image paths with named object events to identify suspicious activity.
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