Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,153 detections
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Detects Vidar Stealer's characteristic behavior of spawning a suspended Chrome instance with specific command-line arguments (--no-first-run --disable-gpu about:blank) followed by APC (Asynchronous Procedure Call) injection. This technique is often used by Vidar to inject malicious code into the suspended Chrome process, potentially after bypassing security product checks.
This rule detects suspicious process injection activity where an untrusted process attempts to inject code into common trusted Windows processes (svchost.exe, explorer.exe, notepad.exe, rundll32.exe, dllhost.exe, taskhost.exe, taskhostw.exe) using a combination of VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread API calls. This behavior is often associated with malware, such as StealC, attempting to evade detection and maintain persistence.
Detects Vidar Stealer scanning the memory of a forked browser process for the Chromium KeyRing 32-byte pattern using NtReadVirtualMemory and NtQueryVirtualMemory to locate the v20_master_key across MEM_COMMIT and MEM_PRIVATE regions.
Detects writing to /proc/self/mem for in-memory code injection on Linux
Detects behavior patterns associated with the SharkLoader malware, specifically monitoring for anomalous thread creation, potential modification of primary tokens, and suspicious loading of SystemSettings.dll from non-standard directories (e.g., AppData, ProgramData). This rule aims to identify evasive techniques used to bypass Windows Loader Lock detection.
Detects potential SharkLoader shellcode injection patterns, where a suspicious executable (e.g., sideloaded SystemSettings.exe) from specific non-standard directories initiates cross-process memory operations like VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread into critical system processes such as svchost.exe or explorer.exe.
Detects abuse of native Windows API calls for process injection and execution
This rule detects potential attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by monitoring memory protection changes (VirtualProtect) targeting the AmsiScanBuffer function within the amsi.dll module. Attackers often modify this function's memory permissions to PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE to inject code or patch the function, effectively disabling AMSI scanning capabilities.
Detects the loading of ntdll.dll or amsi.dll by the Windows Update Service (wusvc.exe). This pattern is often observed in the context of advanced techniques like SNOWLIGHT, which uses direct syscall table enumeration to bypass security controls. Monitoring for these modules in this specific process context can indicate memory-resident malicious activity or evasion attempts.
Detects execution and suspicious memory operations by 'wusvc.exe', a known dropper for the SNOWLIGHT malware. The rule monitors for direct syscalls (NtAllocateVirtualMemory, NtProtectVirtualMemory) and remote thread injection attempts (CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserApc) typical of evasion techniques used to bypass EDR hooks and execute payloads. It further filters for anomalies based on execution path (e.g., Temp, Downloads) or specific process file hashes.
Detects potential Asynchronous Procedure Call (APC) injection by monitoring for processes running from user-writable directories that request broad access (PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS) to other processes, or by detecting the initiation of QueueUserAPC or NtQueueApcThread remote thread creation.
Detects the use of specific Windows API functions or terms commonly associated with process hollowing, code injection, or advanced process manipulation within command-line strings. The monitored functions include NtCreateWaitCompletionPacket, NtAssociateWaitCompletionPacket, RtlGetCurrentPeb, ProcessPrng, and PowerRegisterSuspendResumeNotification.
This rule detects potential memory-resident malware or staging activity by identifying instances where a high volume of DLL, OCX, or SYS files are loaded from user-writable directories (Temp, AppData, Users) on a specific device within a one-hour window. A threshold of 5 or more unique image loads from these locations is flagged as potentially suspicious, as it may indicate an attacker loading multiple malicious components or modules.
Detects potential ransomware activity (specifically VILE) that utilizes direct NT system calls and specific API interactions (e.g., NtCreateWaitCompletionPacket) to bypass user-mode EDR hooks. The rule monitors for a combination of suspicious process activity, unexpected image loads of ntdll.dll, and specific API calls often associated with evasion techniques in Go-based binaries.
Detects Grixba infostealer execution from the C:\Users\Public\Music\ staging path, identified by the creation of RWX (PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE) memory regions and the registration of Vectored Exception Handlers (VEH). These behaviors are indicative of advanced process injection techniques used during the preparation phase of malware execution, often associated with the Play Ransomware group.
Detects the execution of the Grixba infostealer, associated with the Play Ransomware group, which is known to perform ntdll EDR unhooking. The rule specifically monitors the launch of the identified malicious binary (Gt_net.exe or GT_NET.exe) from the C:\Users\Public\Music\ directory, a behavior observed consistently across Grixba versions.
Detects cross-process activity (such as process injection or handle access) initiated by the Windows Update service (wusvc.exe) where the executable is not digitally signed by Microsoft Corporation. This behavior is highly suspicious as the legitimate wusvc.exe should always be signed by Microsoft, and this may indicate process masquerading or a compromised service binary.
This rule detects potential memory-resident malware or staging activity by identifying instances where a high volume of DLL, OCX, or SYS files are loaded from user-writable directories (Temp, AppData, Users) on a specific device within a one-hour window. A threshold of 5 or more unique image loads from these locations is flagged as potentially suspicious, as it may indicate an attacker loading multiple malicious components or modules.
Detects Vidar Stealer scanning the memory of a forked browser process for the Chromium KeyRing 32-byte pattern using NtReadVirtualMemory and NtQueryVirtualMemory to locate the v20_master_key across MEM_COMMIT and MEM_PRIVATE regions. This behavior is indicative of an information stealer attempting to exfiltrate sensitive browser data.
Detects the Drun/Chromelevator loader (drun.exe) performing cross-process memory allocation and remote thread creation via direct syscalls (NtAllocateVirtualMemory, NtWriteVirtualMemory, NtCreateThreadEx) to bypass EDR user-mode API hooking during reflective payload injection. The rule specifically looks for 'drun.exe' initiating these syscalls within a 5-minute window.
This rule detects the suspicious behavior where the process 'MpExtMs.exe' loads the 'EndpointDlp.dll' library into memory without any corresponding file creation or modification events for that DLL. This pattern is indicative of reflective code loading or fileless execution techniques often associated with Backdoor.Mistic (MLTBackdoor), where malicious code is executed directly from memory to evade disk-based security controls.
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