Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects suspicious process creation events where a process is spawned from common user-writable directories (AppData\Roaming, AppData\Local\Temp, Desktop) and subsequently allocates memory with characteristics often associated with code injection or execution (VirtualAlloc, NtAllocateVirtualMemory, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, 0x40). It filters out known legitimate Windows processes that might exhibit similar behavior.
This rule detects suspicious process activity where common scripting or Office applications (PowerShell, WScript, CScript, MSHTA, Regsvr32, Word, Excel, Outlook) are either executing commands containing 'VirtualAlloc' (indicative of process injection techniques) or are themselves the target of such commands. This combination suggests an attempt to execute malicious code, potentially in-memory, leveraging legitimate applications.
This rule detects various stages of exploitation activity associated with the System Informer PHSVC (Process Hacker Service) proof-of-concept (PoC). It monitors for the loading of the PoC DLL via rundll32, the spawning of processes using the specific PoC marker string, unexpected elevated child processes spawned by SystemInformer.exe, and the creation of services or PoC artifacts that facilitate privilege escalation or persistence.
This rule identifies processes that trigger three or more STATUS_INVALID_PAGE_PROTECTION (0xC0000045) errors within a one-second interval. This specific behavior is caused by a recurring programming flaw in the pkr_mtsi packer, where it attempts to call NtProtectVirtualMemory with invalid memory protection constants.
Correlates RuntimeHost.exe spawning suspended MSBuild.exe to inject mining shellcode, followed by network activity. This behavior is indicative of cryptojacking campaigns abusing ScreenConnect and .NET utilities.
This rule detects sophisticated PowerShell activity involving reflective code loading and suspicious process interaction. It identifies three distinct patterns: malicious script execution using Invoke-Expression (IEX) on files within ProgramData, PowerShell script blocks utilizing low-level NT APIs (such as NtAllocateVirtualMemory and NtCreateThreadEx) often associated with reflective injection, and suspicious cross-process remote thread creation by PowerShell processes.
This rule detects PowerShell script block execution (EventID 4104) that contains indicators of process injection and memory manipulation. It specifically monitors for the presence of native Windows APIs (such as NtAllocateVirtualMemory or NtCreateThreadEx), memory protection flags indicating executable/writable memory (like 0x40), and unsafe native method calls. A scoring mechanism is used to aggregate these indicators and flag suspicious scripts, commonly associated with fileless malware or offensive security tools.
Detects PowerShell scripts attempting to perform memory injection by utilizing native Windows API calls (e.g., NtAllocateVirtualMemory, NtProtectVirtualMemory, NtCreateThreadEx) alongside memory manipulation patterns such as byte manipulation and the use of System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal.
Detects PowerShell scripts containing combinations of low-level memory manipulation functions (e.g., VirtualProtect, NtProtectVirtualMemory) and .NET instrumentation or API access functions (e.g., Marshal.Copy, DllImport) commonly used in fileless malware to facilitate process injection or memory-resident payload execution.
Detects the Chromelevator loader (drun.exe) performing reflective injection of an encrypted payload DLL into a remote process using direct syscalls (NtAllocateVirtualMemory, NtWriteVirtualMemory, NtCreateThreadEx) to bypass EDR hooks. Also detects the spawned vt-windows-event-stream.exe helper process.
This rule detects suspicious inter-process communication (IPC) attempts using WM_COPYDATA messaging, where processes (often script interpreters or unsigned binaries) interact with high-value GUI-based applications (like browsers or shell environments). This pattern is a common indicator of process injection techniques, such as hijacking existing Windows callbacks to execute code within the context of a target process.
Detects potential cross-process memory injection activity by monitoring for a non-debugger process that performs both NtAllocateVirtualMemory and WriteProcessMemory operations against a sensitive GUI target process within a short 5-minute correlation window.
Detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by performing in-memory patching of the AmsiScanBuffer function within amsi.dll. The rule identifies suspicious memory manipulation operations (VirtualProtect, WriteProcessMemory) performed by script hosts (PowerShell, WScript, CScript) involving PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE permissions or specific memory modification patterns (0xB8 opcode patching) indicative of disabling security scanning capabilities.
Detects cross-process activity where a non-Microsoft signed process or an unsigned process attempts to inject code into high-value Windows system processes, such as lsass.exe, explorer.exe, or svchost.exe. This activity is indicative of malicious code injection or process hollowing, often used to achieve privilege escalation or persistent stealth.
Detects cross-process activity where a non-Microsoft signed process or an unsigned process attempts to inject code into high-value Windows system processes, such as lsass.exe, explorer.exe, or svchost.exe. This activity is indicative of malicious code injection or process hollowing, often used to achieve privilege escalation or persistent stealth.
Detects cross-process access (such as memory read/write) by an unsigned process against sensitive system processes (e.g., lsass.exe, svchost.exe, explorer.exe). This activity is often a precursor to credential dumping, process hollowing, or other forms of process injection used by malicious actors to achieve persistence or privilege escalation.
Detects cross-process access (such as memory read/write) by an unsigned process against sensitive system processes (e.g., lsass.exe, svchost.exe, explorer.exe). This activity is often a precursor to credential dumping, process hollowing, or other forms of process injection used by malicious actors to achieve persistence or privilege escalation.
Detects post-exploitation behavior of LANDFALL spyware on Samsung devices. After exploiting CVE-2025-21042, the spyware uses LD_PRELOAD to inject a malicious shared object (.so) from its working directory (`/data/data/com.samsung.ipservice/files/`) into the benign `/system/bin/id` process, often via a shell wrapper.
Detects Hannibal Stealer-related process injection patterns involving the use of legitimate Windows binaries (sppextcomobj.exe, slui.exe) spawned by rundll32.exe, or specific child-process relationships, correlated with directory paths associated with CefSharp.BrowsersSubprocess or SCef.WindowsAdapter, which are indicative of malware staging.
This rule detects cross-process operations (such as memory access or thread injection) initiated by processes that are not signed by known, trusted vendors, or that do not reside in protected system directories. This behavior is a common indicator of process injection techniques used to evade security controls.
Detects the execution of an injector process associated with MYRA RAT, specifically monitoring for ptrace-based process injection techniques. The rule identifies processes attempting to attach to other processes using system calls like PTRACE_ATTACH, PTRACE_PEEKDATA, PTRACE_POKEDATA, or process_vm_writev. It also flags the specific behavior of spawning a 'sleep 600' decoy process as an injection target.
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