Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,153 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
541
211
97
75
69
Contributors
363
214
171
65
55
Categories
384
376
337
250
233
Platforms
1,097
44
8
7
3
Products / Services
448
379
89
86
36
MITRE Techniques
18,123
15,639
12,581
8,394
6,215
1,153
CVEs
6
5
2
1
1
IDS Classtypes
3
2
2
IDS Protocols
4
1
Detects post-exploitation command execution originating from a compromised explorer.exe process. The rule identifies processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or conhost.exe spawned by an explorer.exe instance that has previously loaded the malicious 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll' module, correlating this activity with the established 'tailcat.exe' command-and-control tunnel.
Detects post-exploitation command execution originating from a compromised explorer.exe process. The rule identifies processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or conhost.exe spawned by an explorer.exe instance that has previously loaded the malicious 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll' module, correlating this activity with the established 'tailcat.exe' command-and-control tunnel.
Detects post-exploitation command execution originating from a compromised explorer.exe process. The rule identifies processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or conhost.exe spawned by an explorer.exe instance that has previously loaded the malicious 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll' module, correlating this activity with the established 'tailcat.exe' command-and-control tunnel.
Detects post-exploitation command execution originating from a compromised explorer.exe process. The rule identifies processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or conhost.exe spawned by an explorer.exe instance that has previously loaded the malicious 'MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll' module, correlating this activity with the established 'tailcat.exe' command-and-control tunnel.
Detects attempts to inject code into an AI agent orchestrator process by monitoring for suspicious CreateRemoteThread events. This rule is designed to identify potential process hijacking attacks by malicious actors seeking to bypass application-layer controls, while excluding common legitimate security monitoring tools that may exhibit similar behavior.
This rule detects the creation of named pipes with names patterns commonly associated with post-exploitation frameworks, such as Cobalt Strike and Sliver. These frameworks frequently use specific, sometimes randomized, pipe patterns for inter-process communication, lateral movement, or command and control (C2) operations. Monitoring these pipe names can help identify malicious activity occurring within a compromised environment.
Detects suspicious cross-process access (Sysmon Event ID 10) and remote thread creation (Sysmon Event ID 8) targeting sensitive processes such as lsass.exe, svchost.exe, and explorer.exe, which are indicative of process injection or hollowing techniques used for evasion or persistence.
This rule detects instances where common system processes (svchost.exe, explorer.exe, dllhost.exe) perform process injection activities, followed within a 5-minute window by a network connection to known SaaS and collaborative platforms (Slack, Discord, Dropbox, Trello). This combination is often indicative of malicious code executing within a trusted process to facilitate command and control or data exfiltration.
This rule detects potential SectopRAT loader activity by identifying non-.NET-native processes accessing 'pool.db' in the ProgramData directory followed by the immediate loading of .NET CLR libraries (clr.dll or mscoreei.dll). This pattern is indicative of reflective loading of a decrypted .NET payload into memory within a target process.
Detects the drop and execution of the AvisLoader rootkit component, hmn_hook.dll. The rule identifies suspicious file drops in non-standard, user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) that are not associated with legitimate installers, as well as the loading of unsigned or non-Microsoft-signed versions of the DLL accompanied by hook-related process arguments such as HMN_HideStart or NtQuerySystemInformation.
Detects the drop and execution of the AvisLoader rootkit component, hmn_hook.dll. The rule identifies suspicious file drops in non-standard, user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) that are not associated with legitimate installers, as well as the loading of unsigned or non-Microsoft-signed versions of the DLL accompanied by hook-related process arguments such as HMN_HideStart or NtQuerySystemInformation.
Detects the loading of a known malicious 136KB browser injection helper DLL (SHA256: 75018b06c7105a1dca391805d17b402aed35ebd515b92d461236eafbd606cb40) into Google Chrome or Microsoft Edge processes. The rule further correlates this activity with command line arguments indicative of abusing the browser's elevation service, which is a technique often used for process injection or local privilege escalation.
Detects evidence of the Rapuncel infostealer attempting to compromise Chrome or Edge browsers. The rule identifies suspicious image loads into browser processes linked to known malicious hashes or the creation of specific browser decryption log files used by the malware to defeat App-Bound encryption.
Detects suspicious process execution patterns associated with RMMCRAT, where the Windows SmartScreen process (smartscreen.exe) spawns cmd.exe, which subsequently launches PowerShell with specific parameters for piped input/output. This behavior is characteristic of malicious code injection and command-and-control activity.
Detects parent process ID (PPID) spoofing associated with RMMCRAT and other HVNC malware, where an injected process (e.g., smartscreen.exe) spawns child processes while spoofing explorer.exe as the parent. The rule monitors for a mismatch between the reported parent (explorer.exe) and the actual creator (smartscreen.exe) and focuses on burst activity of common shell and browser processes.
This rule detects the loading of a suspicious DLL file named 'active_desktop_render_x64.dll' or the initiation of activity by a process named 'PDF_C2089_20260911100446.exe', which may indicate the execution of malicious code or potential process injection activity.
Detects behavior consistent with the RevStealer malware, specifically focusing on cross-process operations against web browsers originating from hidden AppData subdirectories and the creation of its unique single-instance mutex.
Detects suspicious process access attempts targeting common web browsers (chrome, msedge, firefox) using high-privilege access masks (such as 0x1F0FFF or 0x1FFFFF). The detection is specifically scoped to calls originating from unbacked memory (indicated by an UNKNOWN stack trace entry containing ntdll.dll), which is a common indicator of direct or indirect syscalls used by malware for stealthy memory access, such as credential theft or session cookie exfiltration.
Detects potential process injection attempts (e.g., Early Bird APC injection or process hollowing) where a process is spawned in a suspended state, followed shortly by a remote-thread or QueueUserAPC injection primitive targeting that same process. The rule correlates process creation events with subsequent API calls while excluding known legitimate patterns like .NET runtime operations, system updaters, and EDR/AV security components.
Detects process injection behaviors (e.g., remote thread creation, memory allocation) targeting the attrib.exe process. Such activity is often associated with process hollowing or reflective shellcode injection, consistent with loader behavior used to execute in-memory payloads within legitimate, rarely-used system utilities.
Detects the execution of attrib.exe spawned by known Sauron Loader process names (rnpkeys.exe, rnp.exe, or tdwp.exe). The rule flags instances where attrib.exe is executed without its typical command-line arguments (file attribute flags), suggesting it is being used as a surrogate process for injected C2-tasked shellcode.
Page 5 of 55