Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects potential shellcode injection attempts by monitoring process access events where a process requests specific access rights (0x147a or 0x1f3fff) and the call trace contains 'UNKNOWN'. This behavior is characteristic of tools like Metasploit's migrate and Empire's psinject, which inject shellcode into other processes. The rule includes filters to reduce false positives from legitimate system processes like Wmiprvse.exe accessing Lsass.exe, Dell software interactions, and Microsoft Visual Studio processes.
Detects a typical pattern of a Cobalt Strike Beacon Object File (BOF) attempting to inject into other processes. This rule specifically looks for process access events where the call trace indicates a sequence from ntdll.dll to KERNELBASE.dll, followed by an unknown module, combined with specific granted access rights (0x1028 or 0x1fffff). This pattern is indicative of certain process injection techniques used by Cobalt Strike BOFs.
Detects a specific image load pattern where 'svchost.exe' loads 'clfsw32.dll'. This pattern has been observed in the context of a tool named PRIVATELOG, which is associated with advanced persistent threat (APT) activities, and is considered rare under legitimate circumstances. This behavior could indicate process injection or other forms of defense evasion.
Detects the execution of the 'execve_hijack' component of the Triple Cross eBPF rootkit. This specific file is used by the rootkit to elevate privileges by hijacking the 'execve' system call, often in conjunction with the 'sudo' command.
This rule detects the highly unusual activity of 'svchost.exe' being spawned without any command-line arguments. This behavior is often indicative of a malicious process injecting code into the 'svchost.exe' memory space, leveraging a legitimate system process to evade detection. The rule specifically filters out known legitimate instances where 'svchost.exe' might appear without arguments, such as when spawned by 'rpcnet.exe' or 'rpcnetp.exe'.
Detects process access to 'verclsid.exe' that involves injecting shellcode, originating from a Microsoft Office application or VBA macro. This behavior is indicative of malicious activity, potentially leveraging 'verclsid.exe' for defense evasion and privilege escalation.
Detects suspicious child processes spawned by the SQL Server process (sqlservr.exe). This activity is highly indicative of successful exploitation, such as Remote Code Execution (RCE) or SQL Injection, where an attacker leverages the SQL Server to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system. The rule specifically looks for common system utilities and scripting interpreters that are often used by attackers for reconnaissance, persistence, or further compromise.
Detects the execution of a renamed version of the "Mavinject" process. Mavinject.exe is a legitimate Microsoft utility that can be abused to perform process injection, often using the "/INJECTRUNNING" flag. This rule specifically looks for instances where the original file name (mavinject32.exe or mavinject64.exe) does not match the executed image name, indicating a potential rename for defense evasion.
Detects the creation of named pipes with specific patterns known to be used by Cobalt Strike's malleable C2 profiles. This rule identifies common pipe names and patterns associated with Cobalt Strike's inter-process communication, including generic profiles and those related to catalog change listeners.
This rule detects the creation of named pipes with specific naming conventions commonly used by Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike is a legitimate penetration testing tool that is frequently misused by threat actors for post-exploitation activities. The rule looks for pipe names containing "\MSSE-" and "-server", or starting with "\postex_", "\status_", "\msagent_", "\mojo_", "\interprocess_", "\samr_", "\netlogon_", "\srvsvc_", "\lsarpc_", or "\wkssvc_". These patterns are indicative of Cobalt Strike's beacon communication or other internal operations.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell scripts containing specific Base64 encoded shellcode signatures. The rule looks for the presence of 'OiCAAAAYInlM' or 'OiJAAAAYInlM' within the ScriptBlockText, which are known indicators of shellcode.
This rule detects the Minodo backdoor by identifying a combination of specific byte patterns (YARA signatures) within executable files. These patterns correspond to functions responsible for generating system IDs, encrypting and sending data, gathering system information, copying payloads into memory, and executing payloads from temporary locations. The presence of all these patterns indicates the likely presence of the Minodo backdoor.
Yara rule that detects Minodo backdoor.
Detects the execution of a renamed version of the "Mavinject" process. Which can be abused to perform process injection using the "/INJECTRUNNING" flag
Detects process injection using the signed Windows tool "Mavinject" via the "INJECTRUNNING" flag
This YARA rule detects the Monalisa ransomware by identifying specific byte sequences (strings) associated with its core functionalities. These functionalities include finding files for encryption, writing to process memory (potentially for injection or other malicious operations), generating encryption keys, and encrypting files. The rule also checks for the standard Windows PE header (MZ) to ensure it's analyzing an executable.
Yara rule that detects Monalisa ransomware.
This rule detects the HentaiOniichan ransomware based on specific byte patterns found in its executable code. The patterns indicate functionalities related to finding files, injecting code into processes, encrypting files, and establishing remote connections. The rule specifically looks for the MZ header (0x5A4D) to confirm it's a Windows executable and then matches against all defined string patterns for high confidence detection.
Yara rule that detects Hentai Oniichan ransomware.
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