Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects sophisticated shellcode execution patterns characteristic of MovieReaper, specifically monitoring for the combination of RWX memory protection allocation, manipulation of Vectored Exception Handlers (VEH), and usage of manual syscall stubs (NtProtectVirtualMemory) to bypass EDR user-mode API hooking.
This rule detects attempts by AutoIt scripts (running as AutoIt3.exe or from Temp directories) to perform process injection into the Windows Character Map utility (charmap.exe). It monitors for suspicious API calls like OpenProcess, CreateRemoteThread, and VirtualAllocEx, specifically looking for memory access and protection flags commonly used during malicious process injection.
This rule detects the creation of a synchronization mutex with a specific naming pattern ('Global\EVOLUTION') often used by malware families to ensure only a single instance of the malicious process runs on the infected host. The rule monitors DeviceEvents for 'MutexCreated' or 'MutexEvent' and parses the synchronization object name to identify this specific indicator.
Detects the creation of the file 'nb_hook_dbg.txt' within 'C:\Windows\Temp\', which is a specific debug artifact generated by the PIVOTPIPE loader during the initialization of its HookGate subsystem. This subsystem is responsible for implementing indirect system calls to bypass user-mode EDR hooks by decoding syscall numbers at runtime and utilizing the WoW64 transition.
This rule detects suspicious process injection activity directed at explorer.exe. It looks for cases where explorer.exe is initiated by a non-standard parent process and performs remote thread creation, thread context manipulation, or process image mapping, which are common techniques used by malware to hide execution within a legitimate system process.
Detects the loading or execution of known SloppyRAT DLL samples. This malware is identified for its implementation of Hell's Gate-style indirect syscalls, utilizing techniques such as DJB2 API hashing and NTDLL stub parsing to evade EDR hooks. The rule monitors for specific file hashes and potential masquerading behaviors (e.g., hostfxr.dll) across image loading, file, and process events.
Detects a malicious browser helper DLL (Rapuncel) that attempts to inject into web browsers like Chrome and Edge. The rule identifies code that interacts with the browser's Elevation Service 'DecryptData' method, a technique used to bypass app-bound encryption, potentially to extract sensitive information like stored credentials.
Detects techniques used by SloppyRAT, including indirect NTDLL syscalls bypassing API hooks (Hell's Gate style), and the use of DJB2 API hashing for NtAllocateVirtualMemory and NtCreateThreadEx. It monitors for CallTrace patterns indicating unbacked memory calls into ntdll.dll, detection of hardcoded DJB2 hash constants, or the presence of the B8 (mov eax, imm32) instruction followed by the 0F 05 syscall opcode.
Detects the loading of .NET Common Language Runtime (clr.dll) and System.Management.Automation.dll into a process that is not a recognized PowerShell binary (e.g., powershell.exe, pwsh.exe). This behavior is associated with the 'PSInline' technique used by SloppyRAT, where PowerShell capabilities are invoked directly via COM objects to execute commands in memory. The rule further correlates this activity with the creation of files with a .png extension in temporary directories, which is consistent with the exfiltration staging behavior of the malware.
This rule detects potential SectopRAT loader activity by identifying non-.NET-native processes accessing 'pool.db' in the ProgramData directory followed by the immediate loading of .NET CLR libraries (clr.dll or mscoreei.dll). This pattern is indicative of reflective loading of a decrypted .NET payload into memory within a target process.
This rule detects potential SectopRAT loader activity by identifying non-.NET-native processes accessing 'pool.db' in the ProgramData directory followed by the immediate loading of .NET CLR libraries (clr.dll or mscoreei.dll). This pattern is indicative of reflective loading of a decrypted .NET payload into memory within a target process.
This rule detects potential SectopRAT loader activity by identifying non-.NET-native processes accessing 'pool.db' in the ProgramData directory followed by the immediate loading of .NET CLR libraries (clr.dll or mscoreei.dll). This pattern is indicative of reflective loading of a decrypted .NET payload into memory within a target process.
Detects a specific execution sequence associated with the SectopRAT loader. The rule identifies a process named 'ReportDump.exe' reading a payload file 'Activation.Desktop.db' and subsequently loading 'stp_aim_x64_vc15.dll', which is known to trigger malicious shellcode via an exported function.
Detects a specific execution sequence associated with the SectopRAT loader. The rule identifies a process named 'ReportDump.exe' reading a payload file 'Activation.Desktop.db' and subsequently loading 'stp_aim_x64_vc15.dll', which is known to trigger malicious shellcode via an exported function.
Detects the suspicious loading of both 'FrameworkBase.dll' and 'sdkcra.dll' by the 'ReportDump.exe' process within a two-minute window. This behavior is often associated with the execution of specialized tools or potential post-exploitation activity where legitimate processes are abused to load specific modules.
Detects the suspicious loading of both 'FrameworkBase.dll' and 'sdkcra.dll' by the 'ReportDump.exe' process within a two-minute window. This behavior is often associated with the execution of specialized tools or potential post-exploitation activity where legitimate processes are abused to load specific modules.
Detects the suspicious loading of both 'FrameworkBase.dll' and 'sdkcra.dll' by the 'ReportDump.exe' process within a two-minute window. This behavior is often associated with the execution of specialized tools or potential post-exploitation activity where legitimate processes are abused to load specific modules.
Detects the drop and execution of the AvisLoader rootkit component, hmn_hook.dll. The rule identifies suspicious file drops in non-standard, user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) that are not associated with legitimate installers, as well as the loading of unsigned or non-Microsoft-signed versions of the DLL accompanied by hook-related process arguments such as HMN_HideStart or NtQuerySystemInformation.
Detects the drop and execution of the AvisLoader rootkit component, hmn_hook.dll. The rule identifies suspicious file drops in non-standard, user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) that are not associated with legitimate installers, as well as the loading of unsigned or non-Microsoft-signed versions of the DLL accompanied by hook-related process arguments such as HMN_HideStart or NtQuerySystemInformation.
This rule detects processes flagged by SentinelOne's behavioral engine with an 'Evasion' indicator. Specifically, this captures behaviors where a process performs manual module or function export enumeration (such as traversing the PEB Ldr linked list or parsing the EAT) to resolve API addresses, a technique often used to avoid standard dynamic-resolution APIs like LoadLibrary or GetProcAddress in order to bypass EDR API hooking.
Detects suspicious process injection, module loads, or thread creation events where a web browser process (chrome.exe or msedge.exe) is the target, excluding known legitimate browser-related processes or sub-components like the elevation service.
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