Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects the download of JavaScript (.js) or HTML Application (.hta) files followed by the execution of scripting interpreters like mshta, cscript, wscript, node, or powershell with encoded commands on the same device within a one-hour window. It assigns a score based on the count of downloaded files and executed scripts, triggering an alert if the combined score exceeds 2. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious script execution, often seen in initial access or execution phases of an attack.
Detects browser processes launching PowerShell, CMD, MSHTA, or WScript. This behavior aligns with ClearFake-style social engineering campaigns that instruct users to copy and execute malicious commands.
Detects suspicious execution patterns indicative of ransomware utilizing batch scripts. This rule triggers when 'cmd.exe' or 'powershell.exe' execute at least 5 times within a 5-minute window, with command lines containing '.bat', '.cmd', or '/c', suggesting automated script execution often seen in ransomware attacks.
Detects suspicious process execution patterns involving PowerShell with encoded commands or CMD with command execution flags. The rule looks for multiple occurrences of these patterns from the same computer and account within a one-hour window, which could indicate malicious activity such as script execution or obfuscated command execution.
Detects when a user executes more than 3 commands via the Windows Run dialog, as indicated by entries in the 'Explorer\RunMRU' registry key. This activity could be indicative of an attacker performing reconnaissance or executing multiple commands, or it could be a legitimate power user or administrator activity.
Detects the use of the `nsenter` utility targeting PID 1 to spawn a shell. This is a common container escape technique used to break out of a privileged container and execute commands on the underlying host.
Detects the specific use of RunDll32 to execute shell32.dll ordinal
Detects the execution of the Java runtime (javaw.exe) from the C:\ProgramData\ directory with the -jar flag. This behavior is indicative of malware like Nimbus RAT, which bundles its own OpenJDK runtime to evade detection and bypass missing Java dependencies on the target host.
Identifies wscript.exe executing a JavaScript file from a user directory and subsequently spawning a PowerShell process with execution policy bypass (-nop) and encoded command (-enc) flags, indicative of potential MonoGlyphRAT staging activity.
This detection identifies suspicious child process execution spawned from Notepad++ (notepad++.exe), which may indicate exploitation attempts related to CVE-2026-48778 and CVE-2026-48800. These vulnerabilities involve potential arbitrary code execution through malicious manipulation of Notepad++ configuration (config.xml) and shortcut (shortcuts.xml) files.
The rule detects abnormal execution of system binaries such as PowerShell, CMD, MSHTA, Rundll32, and Regsvr32 launched from Notepad++, which is not expected in normal user activity. Such behavior may indicate successful exploitation, plugin abuse, or post-exploitation execution triggered via malicious configuration or user interaction.
This detection is intended for identifying early indicators of code execution chains originating from Notepad++.
The rule detects abnormal execution of system binaries such as PowerShell, CMD, MSHTA, Rundll32, and Regsvr32 launched from Notepad++, which is not expected in normal user activity. Such behavior may indicate successful exploitation, plugin abuse, or post-exploitation execution triggered via malicious configuration or user interaction.
This detection is intended for identifying early indicators of code execution chains originating from Notepad++.
Identifies processes launched with the __DAEMONIZED=1 environment variable. This specific marker is used by the vpmdhaj malicious npm packages to spawn their stage-2 credential harvesting payload as a detached process, allowing it to survive parent termination.
KQL Query
Detects the export of Microsoft Teams messages, transcripts, recordings, and chat retrieval activities, particularly when performed via the Graph API. This rule identifies suspicious activity by looking for specific operation names in SaaS audit logs from Microsoft Teams and flags user agents commonly associated with automation tools (e.g., python-requests, axios, go-http, curl, wget, powershell, httpx, aiohttp, node) which could indicate post-compromise attackers using stolen tokens to silently export chat history.
This rule detects the download of JavaScript (.js) or HTML Application (.hta) files followed by the execution of scripting interpreters like mshta, cscript, wscript, node, or powershell with encoded commands on the same device within a one-hour window. It assigns a score based on the count of downloaded files and executed scripts, triggering an alert if the combined score exceeds 2. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious script execution, often seen in initial access or execution phases of an attack.
Sublime Threat Intelligence and Research (STIR) identified a phishing campaign using a recently published open-source Javascript virtual machine and obfuscation tool called KrakVM. The initial KrakVM-encoded HTML file arrives as an attachment in phishing emails. These emails are short, often not even including a body, with subjects and HTML attachment filenames suggesting the target has a new voicemail, a vendor credit, or unpaid invoices
Suspicious Azure VM Extension Deployment
Cortex XDR
This rule detects the deployment of suspicious or potentially malicious extensions on Azure Virtual Machines. These extensions, such as CustomScriptExtension, RunCommandHandler, DSCExtension, AADLoginForWindows, and NetworkWatcherAgent, can be abused by adversaries for various purposes including remote code execution, account manipulation, and network reconnaissance. Monitoring their deployment can help identify unauthorized activity within an Azure environment.
Monitors for Windows cmd.exe executions leveraging '//c' to run hidden batch files. This matches the Metasploit module's evasion technique for bypassing MSYS2 mangling on Windows Gogs installations during the argument injection exploit.
Azure VM RunCommand Activity
Cortex XDR
This rule detects activity related to Azure VM RunCommand, which allows execution of scripts on virtual machines without requiring RDP/SSH access. It specifically looks for 'WRITE', 'ACTION', 'DELETE', and 'READ' operations, filtering for successful or accepted statuses and valid identities. This activity can indicate an attacker executing commands or performing post-execution cleanup.
Detects network connections from Node.js or Bun runtime processes to common cloud instance metadata service IPs (AWS, Azure, GCP) or to the default HashiCorp Vault port (8200). This activity can indicate credential access attempts, especially in the context of a supply chain attack where malicious code might be injected into a Node.js/Bun application to exfiltrate sensitive information or gain further access. The rule correlates network connection events with process execution events to identify the specific runtime responsible.
One KQL to catch them all ... DirtyFrag or CopyFail (Fileless or ElfBinary execution)
Linux Interpreter with Command Execution
Cortex XDR
Detects the execution of PHP, Perl, or Ruby script interpreters on Linux systems when they are invoked with command-line arguments that suggest direct execution of code, especially when combined with commands or functions commonly used for remote code execution or data exfiltration. This rule aims to identify potential web shell activity or other forms of arbitrary command execution.
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