Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects anomalous activity where multiple distinct Living-off-the-Land (LotL) binaries (e.g., powershell.exe, cmd.exe, wmic.exe, tasklist.exe, systeminfo.exe) are executed on the same device within a single hour. This threshold of 4 unique administrative or discovery tools being used in a short timeframe is often indicative of reconnaissance, lateral movement, or post-exploitation environment assessment by an adversary.
Detects PowerShell execution with a command line indicative of a download cradle, initiated from the user's shell (explorer.exe). This behavior is characteristic of the "ClickFix" social engineering technique where a user is tricked into copying and running a malicious command from a webpage.
Detects PowerShell invoking Add-AppxPackage -Register with a UNC path, the initial trigger in the UNCanny attack chain. A standard user registers a loose-file AppX package from an attacker-controlled SMB share, causing the Windows Store Install Service (running as SYSTEM) to perform a LoadLibraryW call against the remote path.
Detects the execution of psql.exe with arguments pointing to a VeeamBackup database, or suspicious database queries containing 'credentials' or 'SELECT' statements. The rule specifically alerts when this behavior is initiated by PowerShell or WMI processes, which are common indicators of automated post-exploitation activities intended to extract sensitive information from the backup infrastructure.
This rule detects suspicious activities involving the Microsoft Edge browser (msedge.exe). It monitors for the spawning of known command-line utilities (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe) by the browser process and the loading of DLLs that do not originate from expected Windows or Microsoft Edge installation directories. Additionally, it correlates these events with recent Microsoft Edge application crashes on the same host, which may indicate exploitation attempts.
Detects unauthorized attempts to access or interact with the Veeam Backup database, including psql.exe direct queries, PowerShell scripts attempting to decrypt credentials using DPAPI, and encoded PowerShell commands launched from cmd.exe that target the Veeam environment.
Detects the unauthorized installation and execution of cloudflared (a Cloudflare Tunnel binary). This rule monitors for PowerShell-based downloading of the binary, silent installation via msiexec, service installation commands, and cloudflared execution from unexpected parent processes, which are patterns often associated with adversary lateral movement or establishing persistence.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell commands related to network share discovery (Invoke-ShareFinder, Get-NetShare) and the execution of the SoftPerfect Network Scanner (netscan.exe/netscan64.exe), which are techniques commonly used by adversaries for internal network reconnaissance.
Detects suspicious usage of remote execution tools like PsExec, WMIC, and PowerShell, which are commonly used for lateral movement by adversaries. The rule identifies instances where these tools are executed multiple times within a short period (more than 2 times in 5 minutes) from non-system accounts and outside of standard system directories, indicating potential malicious activity.
Detects suspicious PowerShell execution initiated by explorer.exe, specifically when the command line includes a .lnk file, execution policy bypass, and contains keywords or paths commonly associated with malicious activity (e.g., tor, ssh, github.io, dropbox.com, or suspicious temporary/public directories). This pattern is often observed in initial access or execution phases of attacks.
Detects a sequence of events where PowerShell is used to download files from 'nvidiadriver.net' or with filenames containing 'winPatch', followed by a suspicious file drop (specifically 'winPatch.zip' or 'update.vbs') in a temporary directory within a 30-minute window. This behavior is indicative of potential initial staging for a RAT or malicious script deployment.
This rule detects potential discovery activities indicative of a virtual machine or virtualization environment enumeration. It monitors for the execution of wmic.exe or powershell.exe triggered by suspicious parent processes (python.exe, chost.exe) that query hardware-specific identifiers like Manufacturer, Model, or MAC Address using Win32_ComputerSystem or Win32_NetworkAdapterConfiguration.
Detects indicators of active exploitation or malicious activity targeting the Flowise application. The rule triggers on the creation of a 'flowise_marker.txt' file, the spawning of node processes with suspicious command-line flags ('--require', 'node_options') potentially intended to bypass security controls, and the execution of unexpected shell or scripting processes (cmd, bash, python, etc.) by a Flowise process.
Detects signs of active exploitation of the PHP857 vulnerability. The rule identifies suspicious behaviors associated with this RCE, including the spawning of shells by PHP processes, access to sensitive memory maps (/proc/self/) for ASLR bypass, and the creation of specific indicator files or execution of proof-of-concept strings.
This rule detects the suspicious creation or modification of high-privileged accounts (Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Administrators) using net.exe or net1.exe. It triggers when these commands are executed via PowerShell or cmd.exe, originating from suspect parent processes (WmiPrvSE.exe, mstsc.exe, etc.), and specifically monitors for a pattern of creating the same new account across multiple distinct hosts within a short 30-minute window, excluding accounts that existed in the prior 24-hour baseline.
Detects the execution of a PowerShell script named 'cap.ps1' using common obfuscation and evasion flags including '-windowstyle hidden' and '-executionpolicy bypass'. This pattern is frequently used by adversaries to execute malicious scripts while minimizing user visibility and bypassing standard security policy restrictions.
Detects PowerShell scripts that contain custom bit-reversal and XOR decoding routines used to deobfuscate an embedded byte blob, followed by the reflective loading of that blob into memory as a .NET assembly using [Reflection.Assembly]::Load. This behavior is associated with loaders like cap.ps1 used to deploy RATs such as AsyncRAT.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious download-related commands (Invoke-WebRequest, DownloadFile, WebClient, IEX, DownloadString) when initiated through conhost.exe, specifically when the originating parent process is a common shell or utility associated with shortcut (.lnk) file execution or specific command patterns.
Detects instances where OpenVPN Connect executables (OpenVPNConnect.exe, openvpn.exe) spawn shell interpreters or script hosts. This pattern is often indicative of exploitation or post-exploitation activities, as legitimate VPN client operation does not typically require the execution of cmd.exe, PowerShell, or script engines.
Detects instances where the Ghidra reverse engineering tool (via java.exe or javaw.exe) spawns suspicious child processes. This behavior is considered anomalous as Ghidra typically does not require launching command shells, scripting interpreters, or other system binaries directly from its process tree. Such activity often indicates that an attacker is using the Ghidra environment to execute secondary payloads or perform post-exploitation tasks.
Detects instances where the RustDesk remote access tool spawns suspicious child processes, such as command shells, scripting interpreters, or system administrative utilities. This pattern is often indicative of an adversary abusing legitimate remote access software to execute arbitrary commands, perform discovery, or maintain interactive control over a host.
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