Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects suspicious activity originating from an OpenVPN process by correlating the creation of temporary files (common for dropped payloads) with the subsequent execution of shell interpreters (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, bash) within a 120-second window on the same host. This pattern suggests potential exploitation or post-exploitation activities where OpenVPN is leveraged to drop and execute malicious secondary tools.
Detects suspicious WMI activities including the use of WMIC, PowerShell, and script hosts to perform enumeration of system configurations, installed antivirus products, or process listings. Additionally, it identifies suspicious child processes spawned by the WMI provider (wmiprvse.exe) such as cmd, mshta, or regsvr32. The rule uses behavioral thresholds (multiple WMI calls in 30 seconds) and identifies the execution of common analyst/security tools via WMI to flag potential reconnaissance or malicious execution.
Detects potentially unauthorized or suspicious usage of the RustDesk remote access tool. The rule monitors for connections from new peer IDs, the spawning of command shells (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) by the RustDesk process, and the writing of executable or sensitive file types by RustDesk to non-standard directories.
This rule detects malicious activity associated with the GIFTEDCROOK (UAC-0226) threat actor. It identifies the use of PowerShell or cmd.exe to execute staged files from specific ProgramData paths (WC3, wt1), monitors for common NT API-based reflective injection patterns (such as NtAllocateVirtualMemory and NtWriteVirtualMemory) originating from PowerShell, tracks the creation of known staging artifacts in ProgramData, and identifies the execution of known malicious process image hashes.
Detects the spawning of shell or scripting processes from IDEs, code editors, or AI-assistant processes (e.g., 'claude', 'node'). The rule specifically flags potential reverse shell patterns or dangerous command-line flags often used during development or exploitation, such as '--dangerously-skip-permissions'.
Detects execution of PowerShell or PWSH containing multiple suspicious command line flags commonly associated with malicious scripts and evasion techniques, such as bypassing execution policies, running in hidden windows, using encoded commands, or utilizing invoke-expression.
Detects the execution of PowerShell scripts attempting an in-memory AMSI bypass by patching the AMSI scan content handler. The rule identifies suspicious combinations of .NET reflection and memory protection APIs (such as RuntimeHelpers.PrepareMethod, VirtualProtect, and Marshal.Copy) commonly utilized to overwrite AMSI function pointers or return values during runtime.
This rule detects activity associated with a known malicious campaign involving 'Photo ZIP' themed lures. It identifies DNS queries to actor-controlled domains, the spawning of PowerShell by Explorer.exe with command lines referencing photo-related filenames or external file-sharing services, and the subsequent downloading of the node.exe runtime to user-accessible directories (consistent with TonRAT delivery).
This rule detects instances where the IIS web server process (w3wp.exe) spawns common command-line interpreters such as cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This activity is a classic indicator of a successful web application exploit, potentially leading to remote code execution.
Detects instances where code editors like Cursor or Claude execute shell commands or CLI tools often used for configuration, network activity, or credential interaction. This pattern may indicate malicious exploitation of editor configuration files (e.g., MCP configuration) or unauthorized use of the editor environment to execute shell commands.
Detects instances where explorer.exe launches a PowerShell process originating from an LNK file, which then performs a remote download of a Node.js runtime and JavaScript implant (TonRAT) to standard Windows temporary or application data directories. This activity is indicative of the TonRAT campaign targeting hospitality front-desk systems.
Detects persistence mechanisms used by Gamaredon's Ptero-family implants (e.g., PteroSetup, PteroPSDoor) which modify Windows registry run keys to execute malicious scripts or binaries located in suspicious directories like APPDATA or TEMP. The detection specifically looks for the combination of registry run key modifications and the use of obfuscated or stealthy execution arguments associated with PowerShell, VBScript, or MSHTA.
Detects anomalous file activity on removable media drives characteristic of the Gamaredon group's PteroOdd/PteroSetup malware. The rule identifies PowerShell, wscript.exe, or cscript.exe writing autorun.inf or .lnk files to removable drive letters (D-Z), which is a common technique for lateral movement and propagation via USB drives.
Detects the use of PowerShell to modify Microsoft Defender preferences, specifically attempting to disable security features like Realtime Monitoring, IOAV protection, or Behavior Monitoring.
Detects the use of PowerShell to modify Microsoft Defender preferences, specifically attempting to disable security features like Realtime Monitoring, IOAV protection, or Behavior Monitoring.
Detects powershell.exe executing a hidden .ps1 script from AppData\Local\Temp using character-code string concatenation obfuscation ([char]N+[char]N) and ForEach-Object {[char]$_} patterns, consistent with the TuglaInsaatci/Remcos steganographic loader campaign dropping pmxhtzb4w2q.ps1 for persistence.
Detects the steganographic loader campaign setting HKCU Run key persistence using powershell.exe with -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -WindowStyle Hidden -File pointing to an obfuscated .ps1 script in AppData\Local\Temp, as observed in the FortiBleed/TuglaInsaatci campaign delivering Remcos RAT.
This rule detects the use of system utilities (wevtutil.exe, auditpol.exe, PowerShell) to interact with, query, or check status of security event logs and auditing configurations. While these tools are standard for administration, their usage by non-system accounts can indicate an adversary attempting to understand, monitor, or manipulate system audit policies and event log configurations as part of a reconnaissance or defense evasion strategy.
Detects the use of VMware ESXi command-line management tools (esxcli, esxcfg) or VMware PowerCLI cmdlets (e.g., Connect-VIServer, Invoke-VMScript) from endpoints that are not identified as servers. This behavior often indicates an attacker attempting to manage or interact with a virtualized environment from a compromised workstation.
Detects instances where common browser processes or Windows Explorer initiate suspicious child processes like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or mshta.exe. The rule uses a scoring mechanism based on the presence of encoded command indicators, web-related payloads, or specific HTA script arguments to identify potentially malicious activity such as drive-by downloads or living-off-the-land execution.
This rule detects the use of system utilities (wevtutil.exe, auditpol.exe, PowerShell) to interact with, query, or check status of security event logs and auditing configurations. While these tools are standard for administration, their usage by non-system accounts can indicate an adversary attempting to understand, monitor, or manipulate system audit policies and event log configurations as part of a reconnaissance or defense evasion strategy.
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