Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects instances where Microsoft Teams (Teams.exe or ms-teams.exe) initiates a PowerShell process (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe) with command-line arguments typically associated with malicious activity, such as downloading content from the internet, executing encoded commands, or utilizing scripting shortcuts (e.g., IEX, curl). This behavior may indicate an attempt to achieve code execution through compromised collaboration tools.
This rule detects instances where Microsoft Teams (Teams.exe or ms-teams.exe) initiates a PowerShell process (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe) with command-line arguments typically associated with malicious activity, such as downloading content from the internet, executing encoded commands, or utilizing scripting shortcuts (e.g., IEX, curl). This behavior may indicate an attempt to achieve code execution through compromised collaboration tools.
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell execution patterns involving scripts or payloads stored within specific directory paths (ProgramData\WC3\ or ProgramData\wt1). It flags instances where PowerShell commands include reflective loading techniques ('IEX' or 'Invoke-Expression') while referencing files in these paths, which is often associated with fileless malware execution or malicious loaders.
This rule detects the execution of processes that contain keywords associated with Agent Tesla, RedLine, or other stealers in their command line, specifically when initiated by common Windows utilities like PowerShell, CMD, or rundll32. This pattern often indicates the loading or execution of malware.
Detects attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by abusing 'eventviewer.exe'. This rule specifically looks for 'eventviewer.exe' being initiated by suspicious processes like 'powershell.exe', 'cmd.exe', 'rundll32.exe', or 'Optimax.dll', while excluding legitimate command-line usage of 'eventvwr.exe'.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands used to initiate remote sessions (e.g., New-PSSession, Invoke-Command) targeting specific remote hosts, excluding localhost connections and common system processes. This behavior is often associated with lateral movement or remote administration activities.
Detects the use of PowerShell commands that modify file system metadata (e.g., CreationTime, LastWriteTime, LastAccessTime). This technique, often referred to as 'timestomping', is used by adversaries to manipulate file timestamps to evade detection or hide activity.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of network connections indicative of information stealer activity, specifically targeting behaviors observed with malware like VVS Stealer. It identifies instances where a non-browser process, originating from common user-writable or temporary directories (AppData, Temp, Downloads, Users\Public), first connects to an external IP discovery service (ipify.org) and then subsequently communicates with Discord services (discord.com or discordapp.com) within a ten-minute window. This pattern suggests that malware is collecting the victim's public IP address before exfiltrating stolen data (e.g., account or browser information) to Discord infrastructure, often used as a command and control or data exfiltration channel by stealers.
Detects the hallmark of a ClickFix attack: a user tricked by a fake error message into pasting a PowerShell command into the Run dialog (explorer.exe), which accesses the clipboard. Specifically, it looks for PowerShell commands initiated by explorer.exe that contain 'Get-Clipboard', 'iwr' (Invoke-WebRequest), or 'iex' (Invoke-Expression).
Detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in PowerShell by searching for common memory patching techniques, such as modifying AmsiUtils, AmsiScanBuffer, or related reflection-based obfuscation in process command lines.
This rule detects instances where PowerShell or PowerShell Core (pwsh.exe) are spawned as child processes of common COM object host processes (e.g., wscript.exe, mshta.exe, rundll32.exe). The detection specifically looks for command-line arguments containing encoded commands or indicators of download cradles (e.g., IEX, Net.WebClient, DownloadString), which are common patterns for fileless execution and malicious script staging.
Detects the abuse of Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) via 'bitsadmin.exe' or PowerShell's 'Start-BitsTransfer' cmdlet to download files from remote URLs. This rule identifies potentially malicious activity by monitoring for specific transfer-related command-line arguments coupled with external network connections, excluding Microsoft-signed processes. It further refines detection by flagging output to suspicious directories (like Temp, AppData, or Public) or files with common executable extensions.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands associated with the ClickFix social engineering tactic. This involves downloading and executing remote payloads, often followed by creating a .lnk file in the Startup folder for persistence.
Detects attempts to delete Volume Shadow Copies (VSS) using standard Windows utilities like vssadmin.exe, wmic.exe, or PowerShell commands. This behavior is a common tactic employed by ransomware to inhibit system recovery and prevent the restoration of encrypted files.
Detects suspicious PowerShell command lines that utilize Base64 encoded commands combined with memory-execution primitives such as Invoke-Expression (IEX) or DownloadString. The rule specifically flags commands longer than 100 characters to reduce noise from short administrative tasks.
Detects node.exe spawning powershell.exe as a child process, consistent with malicious npm postinstall lifecycle hooks used by the PostCSS typosquatting campaign (postcss-minify-selector-parser / postcss-minify-selector). The attack chain decrypts an AES-256-GCM blob at runtime and executes a PowerShell downloader stage.
This rule detects the execution of processes that contain keywords associated with Agent Tesla, RedLine, or other stealers in their command line, specifically when initiated by common Windows utilities like PowerShell, CMD, or rundll32. This pattern often indicates the loading or execution of malware.
Detects suspicious process injection attempts where common scripting/execution binaries (wscript.exe, cscript.exe, mshta.exe, powershell.exe, msiexec.exe) are observed creating remote threads in other processes (RegAsm.exe, InstallUtil.exe, vbc.exe, svchost.exe, explorer.exe). The detection is further refined by looking for specific keywords in the initiating process's command line that are indicative of malicious activity, such as downloading content or executing scripts. This rule aims to identify advanced persistent threats and malware leveraging process injection for defense evasion and privilege escalation.
Detects ClickFix PowerShell payloads
Identifies an interactive logon session established from a RedVDS IP executing PowerShell downloaders to pull secondary payloads. This rule correlates process execution events for PowerShell with specific command-line patterns indicative of downloading content (Net.WebClient or DownloadString) with interactive logon events originating from a known RedVDS IP address.
Detects execution of PowerShell spawned by script engines (wscript.exe, cscript.exe) using 'certutil -decode' to process files within the 'ProgramData' directory. This pattern is characteristic of the NUKESPED staging phase, often attributed to the Kimsuky threat actor, where obfuscated or encoded payloads are decoded into executable form using built-in system utilities.
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