Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
4,466 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
1,885
1,282
329
251
239
Contributors
1,186
586
532
507
347
Categories
2,847
2,671
2,393
1,718
312
Platforms
4,411
153
89
34
21
Products / Services
1,184
1,146
1,042
668
277
MITRE Techniques
18,127
15,648
12,596
8,407
6,231
4,466
CVEs
12
6
6
6
6
IDS Classtypes
20
7
2
1
1
IDS Protocols
22
5
3
1
Detects the use of PowerShell to archive files (using Compress-Archive) followed by an HTTP network connection to a suspicious external IP address (91.196.32.232) within a short time window. This sequence is often indicative of data staging followed by exfiltration.
This rule detects the use of BITSAdmin and PowerShell's Start-BitsTransfer utility to download files from known malicious or suspicious GitHub repositories and specific filenames associated with campaign activity.
Detects execution of PowerShell scripts associated with ErrTraffic (ClickFix) campaigns. The rule identifies malicious patterns, including the use of hex-encoded XOR operations, specific browser update comment markers, and the dynamic creation of ScriptBlocks to facilitate payload execution.
Detects PowerShell commands executed by a Node.js process to gather system information, specifically targeting installed applications and packages. This could indicate malicious activity where a Node.js application or script is being used to enumerate system details.
Detects the creation of a .ps1 script in the Windows AppData\Local\Temp directory followed by the execution of that script via PowerShell using hidden window flags (-WindowStyle Hidden) and policy bypass options (-ExecutionPolicy Bypass). This pattern is commonly associated with persistence mechanisms used by steganographic loaders to execute obfuscated payloads.
Detects instances where FFmpeg media processing tools spawn interactive shell processes. This behavior is highly indicative of successful remote code execution (RCE) via CVE-2026-8461 (PixelSmash), where an attacker hijacks the AVBuffer struct to call libc's system() function.
Detects suspicious installations of ManageEngine Endpoint Central components (ManageEngineADSelfService.exe or me_servicelaunchpad.exe) when executed with silent installation parameters or initiated by scripting engines (wscript.exe, cscript.exe, powershell.exe), followed by the execution of 'reg.exe' or 'regsvcs.exe' within a two-hour window. This pattern can indicate an attempt to install or configure the software surreptitiously, potentially for persistence or privilege escalation.
This rule detects inbound Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connections (ports 3389, 3390, 3391) that are initiated by common scripting engines such as wscript.exe, cscript.exe, or powershell.exe. This behavior can be indicative of post-exploitation activity where an attacker uses scripts to establish remote access.
Detects common self-deletion patterns used by Pony malware, including the use of 'cmd.exe' with 'del /f' targeting executables in temporary or application data directories, batch file self-deletion loops, and PowerShell 'Remove-Item' or '[System.IO.File]::Delete()' targeting its own image path.
Detects the suspicious execution chain where mmc.exe is spawned by svchost.exe via DCOM activation (indicated by '-Embedding' in the command line), followed by mmc.exe spawning a command shell (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or pwsh.exe). This behavior is indicative of lateral movement or privilege escalation using DCOM and MMC20.Application.
Detects various post-exploitation activities associated with the Amadey loader, including the execution of its persistence mechanism (nudwee.exe), dropping and executing secondary payloads in temporary directories, using PowerShell download cradles, creating scheduled tasks for persistence, and silent MSI installations. This rule aims to identify the delivery of secondary payloads like StealC and Lumma Stealer.
Detects PowerShell execution with a highly suspicious command line containing common obfuscation techniques, the 'DownloadString' method, and a hardcoded IP address. This pattern is frequently observed in malware and adversary tooling to download and execute malicious payloads from a remote server.
Detects suspicious child processes spawned by VS Code extension hosts (node.exe, code.exe, code-server, cursor) that indicate potential abuse, possibly related to WASM syscall/js bridge exploitation. The rule specifically looks for common command-line patterns used for downloading and executing payloads, such as those seen in GLASSWORM WASM loader attacks.
This rule detects programmatic file downloads from SharePoint and OneDrive using various automation tools and SDKs, rather than typical browser access. It specifically looks for `FileDownloaded`, `FileSyncDownloadedFull`, `FileAccessed`, or `FilePreviewed` operations within SharePoint or OneDrive audit logs where the user agent string indicates the use of PowerShell, PnP, Microsoft Graph SDK, Python, Node.js, or common command-line tools like curl or wget. This behavior can be indicative of data exfiltration.
Detects the spawning of suspicious command-line interfaces or utility processes (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell.exe, curl.exe) by an AutoGen Studio Python process. This pattern is indicative of potential exploitation attempts where an adversary leverages AutoGen Studio's capabilities to achieve arbitrary code execution on the underlying host.
Detects the execution of script-based interpreters (wscript.exe, cscript.exe, powershell.exe) where the command line contains keywords typically associated with downloading or executing remote content (http, ftp, download, invoke, execute). This activity is often used in the initial stages of a malware attack to retrieve and run malicious payloads.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with the '-ExecutionPolicy Bypass' flag to interact with BitLocker-related cmdlets (Suspend-BitLocker or Get-BitLockerVolume). This pattern is often associated with adversary attempts to weaken or assess disk encryption protections, a technique commonly used by ransomware actors.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands intended to suspend BitLocker protection on system volumes. This behavior is indicative of VILE ransomware attempting to disable volume encryption to facilitate further malicious activity or file encryption.
Detects Pay2Key ransomware's polyglot technique where a Batch script (e.g., setup.cmd) invokes PowerShell to read its own content and execute it in-memory via Invoke-Expression (IEX). This includes detection of 64-bit PowerShell invocation from 32-bit processes using Sysnative and command-line patterns indicative of self-referencing fileless execution.
Detects vLLM processes spawning Windows shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, pwsh.exe) if hosted in a Windows context, indicating potential exploitation of CVE-2026-22778 for remote code execution.
This rule detects unauthorized file creation, deletion, or execution activity occurring within the 'Program Files\Windows Media Player\' directory by processes other than standard Windows Media Player executables. It flags activity such as creating non-media files (executables, scripts) or using system binaries like cmd, powershell, wmic, or fsutil to perform file operations in this directory. This behavior is indicative of potential masquerading or persistence techniques where an attacker places malicious payloads in a seemingly legitimate system location.
Page 106 of 213