Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects instances where the Amazon Q language server or VS Code extension host spawns suspicious child processes, such as shells, interpreters (python, bash, powershell), or utilities commonly used to query or extract AWS cloud credentials.
Detects instances where common shell or command-line tools are spawned by Amazon Q processes (amazonq-language-server) or development-related processes (Code.exe, node) shortly after the creation or access of the 'mcp.json' configuration file within an '.amazonq' directory. This behavior may indicate an attacker using development tool vulnerabilities or compromised extensions to execute arbitrary commands.
Detects the execution of script interpreters (mshta, wscript, cscript) or PowerShell initiated by Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook). This pattern is a common indicator of malicious macro or embedded script execution, often used to deliver secondary payloads.
This rule detects the execution of common scripting interpreters (PowerShell, WScript, CScript) that include command-line arguments referencing major cloud storage providers and file-hosting services. This behavior is frequently associated with data exfiltration or the staging of malicious payloads using legitimate web services.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that query system hardware and environment configurations often used by malware for sandbox detection, virtualization identification, or anti-analysis checks. The rule looks for queries related to VM guest tools (VMware, VirtualBox), BIOS/BaseBoard information, CPU core counts, total memory, and environment variables related to sandbox artifacts.
Detects instances where common productivity applications (such as Microsoft Office suite, Outlook, or script engines like mshta/wscript) spawn PowerShell or PowerShell Core. The rule specifically looks for suspicious command line arguments often associated with malicious payloads, such as encoded commands, download instructions, or specific indicators related to Ptero-family malware.
Detects the Gamaredon PteroVDoor malware chain, including initial execution of obfuscated VBScript files from Office applications or temporary folders, the spawning of PowerShell with obfuscated arguments, subsequent C2 communication over common ports to dynamic DNS domains, and secondary WMI event subscription persistence.
Detects execution chains attributed to the Gamaredon threat group (also known as Shuckworm/ACTINIUM). The rule monitors Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Equation Editor) spawning cmd.exe or powershell.exe, where the child process contains suspicious patterns such as base64 blobs, script download commands, or known Gamaredon Ptero-toolset strings (PteroPaste, PteroVDoor, PteroDee). This activity is correlated with a network connection to non-Microsoft infrastructure within 60 seconds of process execution.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands associated with the Gamaredon Group's Ptero malware family. This rule monitors for suspicious PowerShell command lines (including encoded commands and common obfuscation patterns) originating from Office applications or temporary directories, correlated with network connections to known Gamaredon C2 domains or registry modifications to Run keys for persistence.
Detects the multi-stage execution chain associated with the Gamaredon group's PteroEffigy loader. The rule monitors for PowerShell or scriptrunner instances originating from suspicious directories (AppData/Temp) that employ .NET reflection to load DLLs into memory. It then detects the subsequent creation of a scheduled task with a random alphanumeric name and the eventual execution of regsvr32 or rundll32 by that task to load the malicious DLL. Additionally, the rule identifies potential command-and-control activity by detecting specific Kazuar malware HTTP User-Agent strings.
Detects persistence mechanisms associated with the Gamaredon Group (also known as Shuckworm/ACTINIUM) involving the Ptero-family of malware. The rule identifies suspicious combinations of encoded PowerShell commands (using -EncodedCommand, IEX, or FromBase64String), registry modification to Windows Run/RunOnce keys referencing suspicious interpreters (wscript, mshta, powershell, rundll32) within user profile paths, and command-line indicators of C2 activity such as DownloadString/WebClient or specific .ru/.online domain patterns.
Detects Microsoft Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) spawning command-line interpreters (PowerShell, CMD, WScript). This behavior is characteristic of malicious macros or exploitation attempts where Office applications execute shell commands to facilitate second-stage payload delivery or system compromise.
This rule detects potentially malicious PowerShell execution by identifying the use of obfuscated encoded commands or common execution policy bypass flags. It monitors for patterns such as '-EncodedCommand' with long strings, '-ExecutionPolicy Bypass', and other flags typically used to hide PowerShell execution or bypass security restrictions, while excluding trusted Microsoft-signed processes and commands executed from standard system paths.
This rule detects potentially malicious PowerShell execution by identifying the use of obfuscated encoded commands or common execution policy bypass flags. It monitors for patterns such as '-EncodedCommand' with long strings, '-ExecutionPolicy Bypass', and other flags typically used to hide PowerShell execution or bypass security restrictions, while excluding trusted Microsoft-signed processes and commands executed from standard system paths.
Detects instances where common Windows processes (svchost.exe, explorer.exe, or notepad.exe) spawn suspicious child processes (such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or wscript.exe). The rule identifies potential process hollowing or living-off-the-land techniques by correlating parent-child relationships with suspicious command-line parameters (encoding, hidden execution, or in-memory execution) or anomalous file paths (running from user-writable directories).
Identifies the BackgroundFix script invoking hidden PowerShell instances to retrieve updated payloads or auxiliary modules from the C2.
This rule detects the use of common command-line utilities such as curl, certutil, and PowerShell to download files from a specific external domain ('thomphon.com') or to download a file named 'update.msi'. These activities are often associated with the staging of malicious payloads.
Detects the deletion of local shadow copies using vssadmin, WMI, PowerShell, or wbadmin, a common tactic employed by ransomware to prevent system recovery.
This rule detects the creation of an SVG file in common user-writable/temporary directories, followed closely (within 60 seconds) by the execution of common scripting interpreters (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wscript.exe) by a web browser. This behavior is often associated with browser-based exploitation or malicious file downloads where an attacker uses an SVG or accompanying file to trigger secondary malicious processes.
Detects the Prinz Eugen ransomware operator leveraging RemotePC's RPCCMDHOST.EXE to spawn PowerShell with hidden window, no profile, and non-interactive flags, consistent with obfuscated stager execution observed in active intrusions.
Detects `cmd.exe` starting PowerShell with hidden-window, bypass execution policy, and encoded-content options, which is a common technique used by malware like Banana RAT to evade detection and execute malicious scripts. The rule specifically looks for PowerShell or pwsh.exe being launched with command-line arguments indicating hidden windows, execution policy bypass, or encoded commands, with `cmd.exe` as the parent process.
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