Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects usage of common built-in tools (driverquery.exe, sc.exe) and PowerShell commands (Get-WindowsDriver, WMI queries for Win32_PnPSignedDriver or Win32_SystemDriver) used to enumerate installed system drivers. This is often part of reconnaissance to identify third-party drivers for BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) attacks.
Detects instances where common web browsers (chrome.exe, firefox.exe, etc.) spawn command shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) to execute suspicious commands or perform file downloads, often indicative of an initial stage of a drive-by download or malicious script execution.
This rule monitors for suspicious activity related to Microsoft Exchange servers and potential DLL side-loading. It detects the creation of web shell files (.aspx, .ashx, .asmx) in Exchange-related directories, the execution of command shells (cmd, powershell) by the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) within Exchange, and the side-loading of DLLs by specific signed binaries (dfsvc.exe, rasautou.exe) from non-standard directories.
Detects a specific beaconing pattern associated with Fog Ransomware, characterized by a non-browser process making OAuth2 token requests to Google accounts followed by Drive/Sheets API calls, correlated with the deletion of volume shadow copies (VSS) for recovery inhibition.
Detects remote PowerShell execution initiated by processes associated with Remcos RAT or Optimax. The rule specifically looks for PowerShell or cmd.exe processes executing commands containing 'IEX', 'Invoke-Expression', 'DownloadString', or a specific IP address (62.102.148.212), where the initiating parent process is identified as 'Remcos' or 'Optimax'. This indicates a potential compromise and execution of malicious code via a known RAT.
Detects the creation of a new deviceManagementScript or deviceShellScript object in Intune, indicating a PowerShell (Windows) or Shell (macOS/Linux) script has been uploaded to the Intune management platform. This is considered a high-fidelity indicator of script-based abuse as these scripts execute as SYSTEM on targeted endpoints and leave minimal forensic traces. The rule also identifies script creation initiated by service principals that might bypass human-UPN-based monitoring.
Detects wscript.exe spawning PowerShell with encoded command from C:\Temp.
Detects users copy-pasting PowerShell commands from fake 'system error' prompts.
Detects PowerShell downloading an archive and expanding it into a user-writable directory with mining-related filenames or parameters. This behavior is indicative of cryptojacking campaigns where adversaries use compromised systems to mine cryptocurrency.
Detects PowerShell executing base64 encoded payloads or the string "I am not a robot" typically associated with FakeCaptcha malware found in the clipboard. This rule specifically looks for these indicators within the process command line of PowerShell or pwsh processes.
Detects the execution of Invoke-SMBRemoting for fileless lateral movement, specifically looking for PowerShell processes with 'Invoke-SMBRemoting' in their command line.
Detects the creation of 'Screenshot.jpg' in the AppData directory by PowerShell. This activity is often associated with malware like PS1Bot attempting to capture screenshots of the user's desktop.
Detects PowerShell executing specific WMI queries targeted at identifying video controllers or domain membership in a hidden, non-interactive window. This behavior is used by EtherRAT for sandbox evasion and system profiling post-compromise.
Detects PowerShell compressing stolen data prior to POST exfiltration. This rule specifically looks for the execution of 'powershell.exe' or 'pwsh.exe' with command-line arguments that include 'Compress-Archive', 'Invoke-WebRequest', and '-Method POST'. This combination indicates an attempt to compress data and then exfiltrate it via an HTTP POST request.
Detects chained execution of Living-off-the-Land binaries (LOLBins) such as wmic, netstat, ipconfig, arp, nltest, net, ping, nslookup, whoami, systeminfo, tasklist, and quser in rapid succession (within a 3-minute window) from the same process tree. This behavior is indicative of reconnaissance activities, specifically as observed in Volt Typhoon operations.
Detects PowerShell command-line executions that utilize the '-enc' (encoded command) parameter, combined with common Base64 encoded string prefixes. This technique is frequently used by adversaries to obfuscate malicious PowerShell scripts and evade detection.
Detects ClickFix payloads executing PowerShell with invoke-expression (iex) and invoke-restmethod (irm) to fetch remote payloads into memory without touching disk, as seen in DeepLoad delivery.
Detects command-line installation of VS Code extensions (.vsix) launched by script interpreters. Threat actors like UNK_DeadDrop use this technique to silently install malicious extensions via VBScript and CMD payloads.
This rule detects the enumeration of specific security-related drivers or services, including those associated with ESET, Npcap, NPF, and Sysmon. It triggers when processes like 'sc', 'reg', 'cmd', 'powershell', or 'pwsh' are launched and their command line contains keywords related to these drivers/services. The rule aims to identify potential reconnaissance activities by adversaries attempting to discover installed security software or system monitoring tools.
Udm Task Fonts Startup
YARA-L
Targets the startup task behaviour that launches a Fonts-hosted executable with SYSTEM-level persistence. The UDM rule retains principal and target context for correlation.
Udm Task Fonts Startup
YARA-L
Targets the startup task behaviour that launches a Fonts-hosted executable with SYSTEM-level persistence. The UDM rule retains principal and target context for correlation.
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