Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Identifies when DeepLoad target processes (LockAppHost.exe, makecab.exe, Magnify.exe) spawn child processes like shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, whoami.exe, net.exe), indicating successful injection and post-exploitation execution. This behavior is associated with the DeepLoad malware.
This rule detects attempts by PowerShell to modify the Windows Registry to re-enable Windows Script Host. This behavior has been observed with AsyncRAT, which may attempt to repair the script environment if it was disabled by defenders.
Detects the execution of the 'wmi_remote_escalate.py' script, which is associated with the MuddyWater APT group for lateral movement and privilege escalation using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).
Identifies the execution of IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString directly from a run prompt, avoiding disk writes entirely. This rule specifically looks for PowerShell command-line activity where 'IEX' is used in conjunction with 'New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString', indicating an attempt to download and execute content directly in memory.
Detects Windows Explorer executing an LNK file that directly spawns PowerShell to download the next-stage tax lure payload. This pattern is indicative of a phishing attack attempting to deliver malicious content.
This rule detects instances where 'Invoke-WebRequest' (or its aliases 'IEX', 'IWR') is executed by 'powershell.exe' directly from 'explorer.exe'. This pattern is often indicative of a user launching a malicious PowerShell command from the Run dialog, clipboard, or a shortcut, rather than within a legitimate script context. This specific detection is linked to the ClickFix campaign, which uses information stealers.
Detects PowerShell downloading payloads from cdn.jsdelivr.net, which has been associated with malware like ClearFake.
Detects PowerShell attempting to hook keystrokes via user32.dll SetWindowsHookEx. This behavior is often associated with malware like PS1Bot to capture user input.
Detects PowerShell using Net.WebClient to download an MSI payload. This technique is often used by adversaries to download and execute malicious installers.
Detects commands querying video controller names, memory, or GPU vendor information, commonly used by adversaries to select a compatible mining payload for cryptojacking campaigns.
This rule detects command-line executions that query for Windows Defender PUA (Potentially Unwanted Application) policy settings and Windows product edition information. This activity is often performed by adversaries during the discovery phase to understand the environment and tailor subsequent actions. The rule specifically looks for `reg`, `powershell`, `pwsh`, or `wmic` commands containing keywords related to 'puaprotection', 'windows defender', 'productname', or 'editionid'.
Udm Affair Build Vds
YARA-L
This rule detects the execution of `cmd.exe`, `powershell.exe`, or `pwsh.exe` when their command line arguments contain either "affair-build.bat" or commands to stop or start the Virtual Disk service (VDS) using `net` or `sc.exe`. This activity is indicative of a cleanup or persistence script sequence that interacts with the Virtual Disk service.
Oversized Executable Created by Archiver
Cortex XDR
This rule detects the creation of an executable file with an unusually large size by common archiving utilities such as 7-Zip, WinRAR, tar, or PowerShell extraction. The rule focuses on the causality chain to identify the process responsible for creating the oversized executable, which can be indicative of malware packing or other suspicious activity.
Defender exclusion for the Hola path
Cortex XDR
This rule detects attempts to modify Windows Defender preferences to exclude the Hola application directory or a related miner process. It specifically looks for command-line executions of PowerShell, pwsh, or MpCmdRun that include 'add-mppreference', 'exclusion', and 'hola' keywords, indicating an attempt to bypass antivirus scanning for the Hola application.
Detects the use of the New-NetQosPolicy PowerShell cmdlet with parameters designed to aggressively throttle application bandwidth. Attackers can utilize this technique to restrict EDR agent bandwidth to near zero, causing server timeouts while avoiding explicit process termination and bypassing standard WFP tampering alerts.
This YARA rule detects the presence of various PowerShell commands and functions that are commonly used in malicious scripts. It looks for a combination of specific cmdlets like 'New-Object', 'Invoke-WebRequest', 'Invoke-Expression', 'Set-ExecutionPolicy Bypass', and 'Add-Type', as well as patterns for functions that might be used for obfuscation or specific malicious activities (e.g., 'vS35wIDY9U', 'wEAXbwCuxi'). The rule triggers if at least three of the defined strings or regular expressions are found, indicating potential PowerShell-based malicious activity.
This rule detects the creation of new Windows services (EventID 7045) where the service executable path does not reside in a standard System32 directory (unless it's in a Temp directory) and the executable name contains common scripting interpreters like 'powershell', 'cmd', or 'cscript'. This pattern is often indicative of persistence mechanisms established by adversaries using scripting languages.
Detects the execution of processes with filenames commonly associated with malicious scripts, exploits, or malware. This rule monitors Windows Security Event ID 4688 (process creation) for specific filenames such as 'malware.ps1', 'payload.vbs', 'exploit.js', 'attack.bat', 'backdoor.cmd', 'dropper.exe', 'loader.exe', and 'injector.exe'.
Detects PowerShell executing a WebClient DownloadFile method and saving the output directly into the Windows Startup folder, indicating persistence setup. This technique was observed in a campaign deploying obfuscated batch scripts disguised as PNG files into the Startup folder.
Detects fragmented string reconstruction techniques within PowerShell memory targeting IWR (Invoke-WebRequest) or IEX (Invoke-Expression). This rule specifically looks for PowerShell process command lines containing 'IWR' or 'IEX' with fragmented string obfuscation (e.g., I['']w['']r).
This rule detects PowerShell execution that includes specific command-line arguments consistent with decoding XOR-encoded payloads. It looks for 'powershell.exe' processes where the command line contains '-bxor' and references to files like 'Profile.ps1', '1.dat', or 'Com.dat', which are associated with the Dragon Weave campaign's decoding activities.
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