Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
4,466 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
1,885
1,282
329
251
239
Contributors
1,186
586
532
507
347
Categories
2,847
2,671
2,393
1,718
312
Platforms
4,411
153
89
34
21
Products / Services
1,184
1,146
1,042
668
277
MITRE Techniques
18,127
15,648
12,596
8,407
6,231
4,466
CVEs
12
6
6
6
6
IDS Classtypes
20
7
2
1
1
IDS Protocols
22
5
3
1
Detects PowerShell accessing browser Local State files to steal credentials. This rule specifically looks for file access events where the file name is 'Local State' and the initiating process is 'powershell.exe' or 'pwsh.exe'.
Detects PowerShell iterating directories for known cryptocurrency wallet extensions and associated strings, indicative of PS1Bot malware activity attempting to harvest wallet data.
Detects privilege escalation attempts utilizing PowerShell's Start-Process cmdlet with the 'RunAs' verb. This technique can be used by malware like Lucid Stealer's UAC module to elevate privileges.
This detection captures the initial self-infection mechanism of ClickFix campaigns before secondary payloads are downloaded. It identifies PowerShell execution matching the ClickFix clipboard pattern, specifically launching with hidden window styles and executing base64-encoded strings via Invoke-Expression (IEX).
This rule detects the creation of scheduled tasks (Event ID 4698) that are configured to execute scripting languages (PowerShell, cmd, Python, Java) with hidden window styles. This behavior is often indicative of an adversary attempting to establish persistence while evading detection by hiding the execution of their malicious scripts.
This rule detects when a PowerShell script (.ps1 file) is dropped into the C:\ProgramData directory. Adversaries often use this directory to store malicious scripts or tools for persistence or execution, as it is generally writable by standard users and less monitored than other system directories.
Detects PowerShell running base64 encoded commands
This rule detects process command lines that indicate an attempt to execute a one-line install command from a GitHub raw content URL, often associated with untrusted or malicious projects. It specifically looks for common command-line tools used for downloading and executing scripts (like iex, Invoke-WebRequest, curl, wget, msiexec, Start-Process) in conjunction with keywords suggesting fake software or plugins (e.g., ChatGPT, Claude, AutoTune, Kontakt, plugin, installer).
Detects PowerShell script executions that contain common cmdlets and classes used for downloading external payloads. This rule specifically looks for `Invoke-WebRequest`, `Invoke-RestMethod`, `DownloadString`, `DownloadFile`, `Net.WebClient`, and `Start-BitsTransfer` within PowerShell command lines, focusing on scripts executed from files.
Identifies PowerShell executing a script block directly from the specific environment variable 'INTERNAL_DB_CACHE', as observed in the Evil MSI Background steganography campaign. This technique is used to hide malicious PowerShell code within an environment variable and execute it, bypassing direct script file detection.
Detects PowerShell commands that include references to memory manipulation APIs such as Reflection.Assembly, VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateThread. These APIs are often associated with advanced techniques like reflective PE injection or shellcode execution, indicating potential malicious activity.
Detects PowerShell processes launched by web browsers (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Internet Explorer) or Windows Explorer, especially when using suspicious command-line arguments like encoded commands, Invoke-Expression, or web download functions. This behavior can indicate an attempt to execute malicious scripts, often initiated through user interaction (e.g., clicking a malicious link or opening a crafted file).
Detects suspicious network connections to 'sfrclak.com' on port 8000 or command-line activity involving 'curl' targeting 'packages.npm.org' on port 8000, potentially indicating malicious activity such as malware download or command and control communication. The rule specifically looks for various command-line patterns including 'cmd.exe' with PowerShell scripts, 'python' scripts, or 'com.apple.act.mond' related commands.
This rule detects the creation of PowerShell aliases for high-risk cmdlets or .NET web client patterns. Adversaries may use 'Set-Alias' to create short, obfuscated aliases for common cmdlets like Invoke-WebRequest, Invoke-Expression, or cmdlets related to Defender tampering, making their command-line activity harder to detect and analyze. This detection focuses on the 'ProcessCreated' event for PowerShell processes where 'Set-Alias' is used to map to a predefined list of suspicious cmdlets or patterns.
This rule detects modifications to Windows Registry Run keys (Run, RunOnce, RunOnceEx, Policies\Run) where the new value contains common scripting interpreters like PowerShell, cmd, cscript, or wscript, and the path is not within the System32 directory. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to establish persistence by ensuring their malicious script or command executes upon user login.
This rule detects unusual child processes spawned from critical Windows system binaries (svchost.exe, lsass.exe, csrss.exe, winlogon.exe, system.exe). Specifically, it looks for these parent processes launching command-line interpreters or scripting engines like PowerShell, cmd, Python, or Java, excluding common legitimate child processes such as conhost.exe, csc.exe, taskkill.exe, and services.exe. A count of 2 or more such events within an hour on the same computer triggers an alert, indicating potential malicious activity like privilege escalation or execution.
This rule detects the execution of common command-line interpreters (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, cscript.exe) or generic executables from suspicious user-writable directories such as 'Temp', 'AppData', 'Downloads', or 'Public'. It specifically excludes 'msbuild.exe' and 'dotnet.exe' to reduce false positives. A high count (3 or more) of such events within an hour for a given computer and user is flagged as an anomaly, indicating potential malicious activity like malware execution or persistence.
This rule detects command-line executions that involve downloading content from the internet and immediately executing it. It specifically looks for `SecurityEvent` with `EventID 4688` (process creation) where the `CommandLine` contains keywords associated with web client operations (`IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient)`, `DownloadString`, `DownloadFile`, `Invoke-WebRequest`, `curl.exe`) and also contains terms indicating a download and execute intent (`http`, `payload`, `execute`). This pattern is commonly used by adversaries for initial access, execution, and persistence.
Identifies the creation of PowerShell or batch files in unusual ProgramData subdirectories by command-line interpreters, which may indicate malware staging or persistence preparation.
Detects fileless malware storing payloads in registry keys for evasion
Detects PowerShell command obfuscation techniques used to evade detection
Page 133 of 213