Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects a hidden PowerShell process dynamically loading the Windows Forms assembly to inject base64-encoded keystrokes into foreground applications. This behavior is associated with the SStar Agent RAT's remote 'type' functionality.
Detects scheduled tasks created with embedded PowerShell XOR decoding logic, ReadAllBytes, and Invoke-Expression techniques that may be used to establish persistence and execute obfuscated payloads. The rule specifically looks for 'schtasks.exe' creating a task with '/create', containing 'OneDrive', 'Startup', 'Task' in the command line, and also includes '-bxor', 'ReadAllBytes', 'iex', and '[Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes' which are indicative of obfuscated PowerShell execution via XOR decoding.
Detects PowerShell executions associated with Gamaredon's GammaSteel persistence mechanism, which reconstructs a payload path from the HKCU:\Printers registry key and executes it using [scriptblock]::Create. This technique indicates an attempt to maintain access by leveraging registry keys for autostart execution and dynamic script execution.
This rule detects the creation of suspicious child processes by Microsoft Office applications. This behavior is commonly associated with malicious macros embedded in Office documents or phishing attacks that leverage Office documents to execute arbitrary commands. The rule specifically looks for Office applications (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Outlook, OneNote, Publisher, Visio, Access) spawning known suspicious executables like command prompts, PowerShell, script interpreters (wscript, cscript), and various utility tools (mshta, regsvr32, rundll32, certutil, bitsadmin, wmic, schtasks, whoami, net, netsh, nslookup, curl).
Detects PowerShell script blocks containing WMI queries (Get-WmiObject or SELECT statements) targeting specific Win32 classes commonly used for system reconnaissance.
This rule detects the download of JavaScript (.js) or HTML Application (.hta) files followed by the execution of scripting interpreters like mshta, cscript, wscript, node, or powershell with encoded commands on the same device within a one-hour window. It assigns a score based on the count of downloaded files and executed scripts, triggering an alert if the combined score exceeds 2. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious script execution, often seen in initial access or execution phases of an attack.
Detects suspicious PowerShell execution chains (-nop, -w hidden, iex (gc) used in ClickFix RAT delivery.
Detects PowerShell commands that reverse byte arrays before dynamically loading assemblies into memory, a behavior commonly associated with advanced malware loaders and fileless execution techniques. The rule specifically looks for PowerShell process command lines containing 'IO.File', 'System.Reflection.Assembly', 'Length-1', and '..0', which are indicative of byte array manipulation and in-memory assembly loading.
Identifies PowerShell executing scripts or expressions from the ProgramData directory, which may indicate malicious staging or backdoor execution. This rule specifically looks for PowerShell processes where the command line includes 'C:\ProgramData\' and also contains keywords like 'IEX', 'Invoke-Expression', or '.ps1', suggesting the execution of a script or expression.
Detects PowerShell commands using XOR operations together with execution primitives that may indicate obfuscated in-memory payload decoding. Specifically looks for 'powershell.exe' executing with '-bxor', '81', and either 'IEX' or 'Invoke-Expression' in the command line.
Detects suspicious process execution patterns involving PowerShell with encoded commands or CMD with command execution flags. The rule looks for multiple occurrences of these patterns from the same computer and account within a one-hour window, which could indicate malicious activity such as script execution or obfuscated command execution.
Identifies wscript.exe executing a JavaScript file from a user directory and subsequently spawning a PowerShell process with execution policy bypass (-nop) and encoded command (-enc) flags, indicative of potential MonoGlyphRAT staging activity.
Detects PowerShell scripts attempting to download and execute the official Deno installation script. This behavior is abused by threat actors, such as the operators behind the DinDoor backdoor, to silently prepare an endpoint for fileless JavaScript malware execution.
Detects mshta.exe spawning PowerShell with hidden execution, web download, archive extraction, and staged process launch behavior, indicative of the UAC-0184 threat actor.
Detects PowerShell script block telemetry (Event ID 4104) containing P/Invoke declarations targeting advapi32.dll's CredEnumerate function or related Credential Manager APIs (CredRead, CredWrite). This technique bypasses standard cmdlets that may be monitored or restricted, providing direct API access to stored Windows credentials including RDP sessions, web service credentials, and enterprise application tokens. Generalizes well beyond specific campaigns to most PowerShell credential-theft families.
This rule detects the download of JavaScript (.js) or HTML Application (.hta) files followed by the execution of scripting interpreters like mshta, cscript, wscript, node, or powershell with encoded commands on the same device within a one-hour window. It assigns a score based on the count of downloaded files and executed scripts, triggering an alert if the combined score exceeds 2. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious script execution, often seen in initial access or execution phases of an attack.
Detects PowerShell executing certutil.exe to decode base64 files, specifically when a hidden window style is used. This behavior is indicative of the JSE dropper routine employed by the Kimsuky threat group to decode malicious payloads to disk.
Detects variable splitting technique in cmd.exe to obfuscate PowerShell invocation.
This rule detects the creation of scheduled tasks (`schtasks.exe /create`) where the command line arguments contain suspicious executables or paths commonly associated with malicious activity. This indicates a potential persistence mechanism being established by an adversary.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving PowerShell downloading content (using Invoke-WebRequest, iex, or DownloadString) followed by the creation of specific suspicious files (Browser Update.exe, update.zip, update.msi) on the same device within a 10-minute window. This correlation suggests a potential ingress of malicious tools or updates.
Detects PowerShell scripts attempting to overwrite the amsiContext buffer using Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal.WriteInt32 to disable AMSI scanning.
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