Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects PowerShell being copied and renamed to 'wt.exe' in the ProgramData directory, initiated by cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or pwsh.exe, and executing a command line containing '-curl'. This behavior has been documented in the Axios npm supply chain attack.
On March 11, 2026, the global medical technology giant Stryker experienced a severe cyberattack when Iranian-linked hackers called Handala Hack affiliated with Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) used wiper malware to permanently erase data from its network. Based On the List of IOC’s seen from the previous attacks from the threat group I’ve done threat hunt.
On March 11, 2026, the global medical technology giant Stryker experienced a severe cyberattack when Iranian-linked hackers called Handala Hack affiliated with Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) used wiper malware to permanently erase data from its network. Based On the List of IOC’s seen from the previous attacks from the threat group I’ve done threat hunt.
Detects EtherRAT-related host and network activity using reported artefacts including a known C2 domain (aurineuroth[.]com), a CDN-like beacon URL pattern, the creation of a svchost.log debug file, and various hidden PowerShell commands for system information discovery (AV, domain, MachineGuid, GPU).
Detects the CTRL persistence pattern by correlating suspicious registry value modifications (using disguised names like 'ShellStateVersion1', 'IconSizeVersion1', 'IconUnderlineVersion1') with the creation of scheduled tasks via PowerShell or schtasks.exe. The scheduled tasks often involve hidden or encoded commands and are set to launch at startup or with specific system privileges.
This rule detects various stages of DeepLoad malware activity, including initial delivery via PowerShell execution policy bypass with IEX/IRM style ClickFix, network retrieval using mshta.exe, persistence mechanisms like scheduled task creation and WMI, fileless injection through PowerShell Add-Type compilation and suspicious child processes (LockAppHost.exe, makecab.exe, Magnify.exe), credential stealing via filemanager.exe, and USB propagation indicators including specific C2 paths and LNK themed installer names. It also identifies known DeepLoad infrastructure domains.
DeepLoad leverages this specific command structure in fake browser prompts to trick users into executing the initial payload.
Detects PowerShell commands that attempt to modify Windows Defender preferences to add exclusions for paths, extensions, or processes. This activity is often indicative of an adversary attempting to disable or bypass security controls. Also seen by XWorm Malware.
Detects the initial CTRL execution chain where a malicious LNK launches hidden PowerShell, writes ms-settings UAC bypass registry keys including DelegateExecute, then starts fodhelper.exe. This rule correlates process events for PowerShell executing with a hidden window style and obfuscated commands, registry modifications to the ms-settings UAC bypass key, and the subsequent execution of fodhelper.exe.
Detects suspicious execution of PowerShell or MSHTA with encoded commands or web content from common user-facing applications like Explorer, Word, or Outlook. This pattern is often indicative of initial access or execution techniques used by adversaries.
Detects the use of PowerShell to disable various aspects of Microsoft Defender. This technique is commonly used by malware to evade detection before executing malicious payloads.
Detects suspicious command-line executions involving PowerShell or WMI, combined with network-related keywords (http, https, encodedcommand, FromBase64String), originating from common user applications like Microsoft Word (winword.exe) or Windows Explorer (explorer.exe). This pattern can indicate malicious activity such as script execution, download of payloads, or obfuscated command execution.
Detects network communication patterns associated with EtherRAT, including beaconing to 'aurineuroth.com' and CDN-like URLs. Additionally, it identifies host-based fingerprinting activities often performed by EtherRAT, such as hidden PowerShell execution, discovery of MachineGuid, antivirus product information, domain membership, and video controller details, as well as the creation of 'svchost.log' in AppData.
This rule detects PowerShell processes executing commands that involve reading bytes from a .lnk file. This behavior is often associated with malware attempting to extract malicious content embedded within a shortcut file, potentially for further execution or to bypass security controls. The rule specifically looks for `powershell.exe` or `pwsh.exe` in the image filename or original filename, combined with command-line arguments containing both `.lnk` and `readallbytes`.
AI is becoming a key part of detection and response, but it’s important not to overlook simpler techniques that are still effective.
In this article, I share a practical example of how Powershell clipboard commands can be abused, based on a real scenario. It covers how basic activities related to Get/Set-Clipboard can be leveraged in ways that may go unnoticed.
The following KQL (which can be configured as Detection Rule) help s to identify this type of activity in your environment.
In this article, I share a practical example of how Powershell clipboard commands can be abused, based on a real scenario. It covers how basic activities related to Get/Set-Clipboard can be leveraged in ways that may go unnoticed.
The following KQL (which can be configured as Detection Rule) help s to identify this type of activity in your environment.
This rule detects activities associated with the 'CTRL' Russian .Net access framework. It looks for a combination of a hidden PowerShell stager, UAC bypass attempts via registry modification (ms-settings), and the launch of fodhelper.exe. Additionally, it requires the presence of at least one of the following: disguised registry payload storage, FRP configuration file staging, keylogger artifact creation, named pipe creation ('ctrlPipe'), RDP tampering artifacts, or PowerShell commands related to Windows Defender exclusion changes.
This rule detects PowerShell commands that are used to enumerate locale-related system information. Specifically, it looks for PowerShell or pwsh.exe processes executing commands containing keywords like 'InstalledUICulture', 'Get-UICulture', 'CurrentUICulture', 'CurrentThread.CurrentUICulture', 'DefaultThreadCurrentUICulture', 'OSLanguage', or 'MUILanguages'. This activity can be indicative of an adversary attempting to gather system configuration details, potentially for environmental awareness or to tailor subsequent actions.
Faux Elevate Uac Bypass
YARA-L
This rule detects a Faux-Elevate UAC bypass technique. It correlates the launch of auto-elevated processes like 'fodhelper.exe' or 'eventvwr.exe' with the subsequent spawning of suspicious child processes such as 'powershell.exe', 'cmd.exe', or 'wscript.exe'. The detection is further refined by looking for malicious PowerShell patterns within the command line of these child processes, specifically keywords like 'IEX', 'DownloadString', 'Invoke-WebRequest', or '-enc'. Additionally, the rule identifies registry modifications targeting keys related to 'ms-settings\shell\open\command', which is indicative of a registry hijack often used in UAC bypasses.
This rule detects the creation of a PowerShell or Pwsh process with its window style set to minimized. Adversaries often use this technique to hide their activities from the user, making it a potential indicator of malicious PowerShell execution.
Detects PowerShell queries against the root/SecurityCenter2 namespace to discover installed Antivirus products. The EtherRAT SYS_INFO module aggressively maps defensive tooling to tailor follow-on payloads and evade detection.
Detects PowerShell commands attempting to retrieve the installed UI culture name. This specific technique is utilized by the EtherRAT SYS_INFO module to check the system's locale and selectively self-destruct on CIS-region machines.
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