Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of heavily obfuscated PowerShell, characteristic of the MAYBEROBOT backdoor. COLDRIVER uses this script, often via a logon script for persistence, to download and execute further commands. The rule specifically looks for a combination of string replacement functions ('-replace', '\n', ';', '[^\x20-\x7E]') used by MAYBEROBOT for de-obfuscation before execution.
Detects PowerShell execution patterns consistent with the Caminho Loader, which uses LSB steganography to extract a payload from a downloaded image file. This rule requires PowerShell Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104).
CyberSecurityNews has reported a raising case about a new wave of phishing emails masquerading as breach notifications from LastPass.
To summarise, these emails claim that the recipient’s account has been compromised and urge them to download a “security patch” to restore access.
In reality, the attached file is a sophisticated malware loader built to steal credentials and deploy additional malicious payloads onto the victim’s system.
Each phishing message includes a ZIP attachment named 'LastPass_Security_Update' that contains an executable disguised as an MSI installer. When executed, the fake MSI installs a PowerShell script into the user’s AppData folder and schedules it to run via a scheduled task. The script then contacts a remote command-and-control server to download a second-stage payload capable of keylogging, taking screenshots, and moving laterally within corporate networks.
This following KQL Query is based on the IOA where the emails arrive with a .zip file attached and it content is a msi file. Using IOA instead the IOC (LastPass_Security_Update .zip) is more feasible because the malicious actors could easily change the zip name and the detection would not detect the mentioned threat.
To summarise, these emails claim that the recipient’s account has been compromised and urge them to download a “security patch” to restore access.
In reality, the attached file is a sophisticated malware loader built to steal credentials and deploy additional malicious payloads onto the victim’s system.
Each phishing message includes a ZIP attachment named 'LastPass_Security_Update' that contains an executable disguised as an MSI installer. When executed, the fake MSI installs a PowerShell script into the user’s AppData folder and schedules it to run via a scheduled task. The script then contacts a remote command-and-control server to download a second-stage payload capable of keylogging, taking screenshots, and moving laterally within corporate networks.
This following KQL Query is based on the IOA where the emails arrive with a .zip file attached and it content is a msi file. Using IOA instead the IOC (LastPass_Security_Update .zip) is more feasible because the malicious actors could easily change the zip name and the detection would not detect the mentioned threat.
Detects a sequence of events where a user visits a Cloudflare Pages URL (*.pages.dev) and shortly after, a suspicious command (mshta, powershell, or curl) is executed. This pattern is consistent with the UNC5142 threat actor's TTP of using social engineering lures hosted on Cloudflare Pages to trick users into running malicious commands.
Detects the use of PowerShell to decode a Base64 encoded string and write it to the filesystem. This technique is used by adversaries, including in the PassiveNeuron campaign, to drop web shells or other malicious payloads.
Detects conhost.exe launching a headless PowerShell one-liner that creates a FortiClient compliance directory, copies Chrome Cache data, reconstructs a ComplianceChecker.zip using unique markers, expands it and executes FortiClientComplianceChecker.exe — behavior observed in ClickFix-style social engineering campaigns.
Detects various activities associated with the 'Operation Wocao' campaign, including the use of 'checkadmin.exe', 'netsh' commands to modify firewall rules, PowerShell execution with bypass and encoded commands, scheduled task creation, and attempts to query KeePass configuration files and PuTTY sessions from the registry. These activities indicate potential privilege escalation, persistence, discovery, and defense evasion techniques used by the threat actor.
This rule detects the creation or registration of scheduled tasks using PowerShell cmdlets or WMI methods. It specifically looks for the use of `New-ScheduledTaskAction`, `New-ScheduledTaskTrigger`, `New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal`, `New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet`, `New-ScheduledTask`, `Register-ScheduledTask` cmdlets, or the `Invoke-CimMethod` cmdlet targeting the `PS_ScheduledTask` class within the `Root\Microsoft\Windows\TaskScheduler` namespace. This activity is often abused by adversaries for persistence, privilege escalation, and execution.
This rule detects instances where 'powershell.exe', 'pwsh.exe', or 'conhost.exe' are launched by 'explorer.exe' with a command line containing an unusual number of spaces or tabs. This pattern can indicate obfuscation attempts often used by adversaries to hide malicious commands or scripts.
This rule detects the usage of the 'Get-ReverseShell' PowerShell tool by looking for specific strings associated with its code and its GitHub repository. The rule specifically targets the string "odTPYnuuGIGzrAeHM ", the obfuscation string "Invoke-PSObfuscation", and the GitHub repository URL "https://github.com/gh0x0st". This tool is designed to create reverse shells, which are commonly used by attackers for remote access and control.
This rule detects PowerShell scripts attempting to identify a virtualization or sandbox environment. It specifically looks for the use of WMI objects like 'MSAcpi_ThermalZoneTemperature' and 'Win32_ComputerSystem' in PowerShell script block text, which are commonly queried by malware to determine if it's running in a virtualized environment.
Detects when an attacker attempts to modify an existing scheduled task to execute a payload from suspicious locations. This technique allows attackers to bypass detection mechanisms that primarily focus on the creation of new scheduled tasks, by instead altering a legitimate task to include their malicious code.
This rule detects LNK (shortcut) files that contain embedded PowerShell commands, specifically looking for the string "powershell" and the argument "-windowstyle hidden". This combination is often used by adversaries to execute malicious PowerShell scripts discreetly, making them less visible to the user.
Detects exploitation attempts of CVE-2024-50623 in Cleo software by identifying `cmd.exe` processes spawned from `javaw.exe` (associated with Cleo applications like Harmony, Lexicom, VersaLex, or VLTrader) that execute PowerShell commands with suspicious arguments indicative of encoded commands or web downloads.
Detects the invocation of PowerShell commands that reference classes from the "System.Security.Cryptography" namespace. This namespace provides classes for on-the-fly encryption and decryption, which can be abused by adversaries for defense evasion, such as decrypting malicious payloads.
Detects PowerShell writing shortcut (.lnk) files into the Windows startup directory. This technique is commonly used by adversaries to establish persistence, ensuring their malicious code executes each time a user logs in. The rule specifically looks for PowerShell (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe) as the process creating these shortcut files in the 'Start Menu\Programs\Startup' path.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell cmdlets from the 'Microsoft.PowerShell.LocalAccounts' module, which are used to manipulate local user accounts. This includes actions such as disabling, enabling, getting information about, setting properties of, creating, renaming, and removing local users. Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain access to victim systems, modify credentials, or change permission groups.
This rule detects PowerShell script block logging events that indicate an attempt to establish persistence using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscriptions. Specifically, it looks for the creation of WMI event filters (`__EventFilter`) and command-line event consumers (`CommandLineEventConsumer`) within the `root/subscription` namespace, which are common components of WMI persistence techniques.
This rule detects the use of the Deployment Image Servicing and Management (DISM) tool to enable the 'WindowsPowerShellWebAccess' feature. Adversaries may enable this feature to establish remote access to a system, potentially for persistence, privilege escalation, or further malicious activities. The detection specifically looks for `dism.exe` or `DISM.EXE` being executed with command-line arguments that include 'WindowsPowerShellWebAccess', '/online', and '/enable-feature'.
Detects suspicious child processes created by CrushFTP, which could indicate the exploitation of a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability like CVE-2025-54309. The rule specifically looks for PowerShell, cmd, bitsadmin, certutil, mshta, cscript, or wscript processes spawned by CrushFTP, often with command-line arguments indicative of malicious activity (e.g., IEX, encoded commands for PowerShell, or common system commands for cmd).
Detects suspicious processes attempting to log on with explicit credentials (Event ID 4648). This rule specifically targets common command-line utilities like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wmic.exe, net.exe, and reg.exe when they are used to explicitly log on, while filtering out localhost connections and service accounts (users ending with '$') to reduce false positives. This behavior can indicate an adversary attempting to escalate privileges or move laterally using compromised credentials.
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