Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of the Oracle Database Scheduler's External Job process (`extjobo.exe`) spawning a suspicious child process, such as PowerShell with an encoded command or the Windows Command Shell. This behavior was observed in Elons ransomware attacks for initial access and remote command execution.
Detects alternate PowerShell hosts potentially bypassing detections looking for powershell.exe
Detects changing the PowerShell script execution policy to a potentially insecure level using the "-ExecutionPolicy" flag.
Detects on the execution of an encoded powershell command with a parent process of w3wp.exe.
This analytic identifies instances where a shell (PowerShell.exe or Cmd.exe) is spawned from W3WP.exe, the IIS worker process. This activity is significant as it may indicate webshell activity, often associated with exploitation attempts like those by the HAFNIUM Group on Exchange servers. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe) to download files from known file-sharing or content delivery network (CDN) domains. It specifically looks for command-line arguments indicative of file download operations, such as '.DownloadString(', '.DownloadFile(', 'Invoke-WebRequest', 'iwr', and 'wget'. The rule aims to identify suspicious activity where PowerShell is leveraged to retrieve potentially malicious payloads from untrusted or commonly abused online services.
This detection identifies potentially suspicious usage of Invoke-Sqlcmd PowerShell cmdlet, which can be used for database operations and potential data exfiltration. The detection looks for suspicious parameter combinations and query patterns that may indicate unauthorized database access, data theft, or malicious database operations. Threat actors may prefer using PowerShell Invoke-Sqlcmd over sqlcmd.exe as it provides a more flexible programmatic interface and can better evade detection.
Detects attempts to access the PowerShell console history file (ConsoleHost_history.txt) or retrieve its path. This activity can indicate an adversary attempting to gather plaintext credentials or perform reconnaissance on previously executed commands.
The following analytic detects the use of the EncodedCommand parameter in PowerShell processes. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to identify variations of the EncodedCommand parameter, including shortened forms and different command switch types. This activity is significant because adversaries often use encoded commands to obfuscate malicious scripts, making detection harder. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute hidden code, potentially leading to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or persistent threats within the environment. Review parallel events to determine legitimacy and tune based on known administrative scripts.
Detects HijackLoader attempting to perform anti-virtual machine (VM) checks by querying for VirtualBox-specific registry keys from a PowerShell process that also initiates a network connection. This combination of behaviors is indicative of sandbox evasion.
Detects the initial PowerShell download cradle associated with ClickFix/CORNFLAKE.V3 campaigns. This activity is often the result of a user being tricked into pasting and running a command from a malicious website.
This detection identifies potential FakeCAPTCHA/ClickFix clipboard hijacking campaigns by looking for PowerShell execution with hidden window parameters and distinctive strings related to fake CAPTCHA verification. These campaigns use social engineering to trick users into pasting malicious PowerShell commands from their clipboard, typically delivering information stealers or remote access trojans.
This analytic detects the execution of PowerShell commands to install unsigned AppX packages using Add-AppxPackage or Add-AppPackage cmdlets with the -AllowUnsigned flag. This activity is significant as adversaries may use unsigned AppX packages to install malicious applications, bypass security controls, or establish persistence. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to install unauthorized applications that may contain malware, backdoors, or other malicious components.
This rule detects a suspicious file download from a known web server or SQL related process which has been identified in the GhostRedirector campaign.
Detects the execution of an executable or script file from the NETLOGON share. This behavior was observed during the deployment of the Obscura ransomware and is a strong indicator of lateral movement or malicious deployment via Group Policy.
Detects processes associated with AI Waifu RAT or common Living-off-the-Land Binaries (LOLBins) making network connections to localhost. This behavior is indicative of the AI Waifu RAT's C2 and staging mechanisms, which use local ports for command execution and payload delivery.
Detects hard IoCs and activity associated with a trojanized installer of Velociraptor incident response tool making callbacks to C2 domains from workers[.]dev and tunneling with Visual Studio Code (code.exe). The detection looks for the creation of hard IoCs from this malicious Velociraptor installer V2.msi, followed by network connections to known C2 domains and the execution of related processes, including PowerShell (with support for detecting encoded commands to install code.exe) and msiexec activity tied to malicious domains.
Detects data exfiltration performed by the Vice Society ransomware gang using a custom built PowerShell script. More precisely, the script enumerates the volumes mounted on the system, then starts crawling the different directories before initiating the data exfiltration over HTTP by creating multiple different jobs. As PowerShell script block logs the script execution into multiple events, the detection aggregates the different log chunks using the ScriptBlockId and then ensure that at least 3 of the 4 detection strings are found.
Detects scenarios where an attacker deployed an encoded PowerShell payload via a process execution. Some parameters are commented in case you would like to reduce false positives or make the rule more precise.
Detects the execution of PowerShell by (wscript.exe/cscript.exe), specifically targeting a PowerShell script in the C:\Temp directory. This behavior is consistent with the initial stages of the DarkCloud Stealer infection chain where a JS/WSF downloader executes a fetched PowerShell script.
Detects the creation of a new Windows service (EventID 7045) where the service's ImagePath contains suspicious command-line flags ('-c', '-r', '-k') often used with scripting engines, and the ImagePath itself references common scripting or proxy execution binaries such as cscript, mshta, powershell, pwsh, regsvr32, rundll32, or wscript. This combination indicates an attempt to install a service that executes a script or uses a living-off-the-land binary for malicious purposes, potentially for persistence or privilege escalation.
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