Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects a sequential multi-stage execution chain starting with msiexec.exe launching a hidden PowerShell script, followed by wscript.exe executing a VBScript agent, and finally node.exe executing a JavaScript file within a short time window. This pattern is indicative of a complex, multi-stage dropper or malware execution flow.
Detects instances where the Node.js runtime process (node.exe) spawns a command shell (cmd.exe) or PowerShell (powershell.exe). This pattern is frequently used by malicious Node.js-based applications, RATs, or web shells to execute arbitrary commands on a compromised host.
Detects suspicious command-line patterns typically used for downloading or executing malicious payloads, such as curl, base64 encoding, and PowerShell web requests, when spawned directly from Node.js or Visual Studio Code processes. This behavior is associated with supply chain compromises and loader activity (e.g., WaterPlum/Contagious Interview) targeting development environments.
Detects evidence of PowerShell execution occurring within a GitLab CI runner environment that exhibits characteristics of command-and-control (C2) activity. This rule monitors PowerShell Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104) for indicators such as specific CI environment variables (e.g., CI_PIPELINE_SOURCE=api, GIT_STRATEGY=none), static job names associated with known exploitation patterns (e.g., CI_JOB_NAME=run_command), and the dynamic execution of commands using Invoke-Expression (IEX) on environmental variables.
Detects the execution of PowerShell via a shortcut (.lnk) file that attempts to download and execute remote content using 'Invoke-WebRequest'. The command lines use common obfuscation techniques like 'Hidden' window style and 'Bypass' execution policy, targeting specific known malicious URL patterns or filename keywords.
Detects the WMI provider host (wmiprvse.exe) spawning common living-off-the-land binaries often associated with command execution or lateral movement.
Detects the use of BITSAdmin or PowerShell 'Start-BitsTransfer' to download files from non-reputable/non-Microsoft sources to suspicious directories such as Temp, AppData, or ProgramData, which is a common technique for ingress tool transfer during malware delivery.
Detects the use of BITSAdmin or PowerShell 'Start-BitsTransfer' to download files from non-reputable/non-Microsoft sources to suspicious directories such as Temp, AppData, or ProgramData, which is a common technique for ingress tool transfer during malware delivery.
Detects the creation of suspicious scheduled tasks using the Windows schtasks.exe utility. The rule flags tasks that are configured to run as SYSTEM, include PowerShell encoded commands, or target directories commonly used for persistence such as Temp, AppData, or Public.
Detects the abuse of Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute processes via wmic.exe or WmiPrvSE.exe, often combined with obfuscated command-line arguments such as encoded PowerShell or CMD commands.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with encoded commands (e.g., -EncodedCommand or -enc) combined with common download cradle indicators such as IEX, Net.WebClient, or DownloadString. This combination is highly indicative of fileless malware execution, initial access payload staging, or defense evasion techniques often employed by threat actors to bypass command-line monitoring.
Detects execution of PowerShell or Python scripts characterized by common patterns found in AI-generated code, including specific obfuscation techniques (base64, string manipulation), boilerplate error handling structures, verbose comments, and generic variable naming conventions. High scores indicate a higher probability of automated or obfuscated script execution.
Detects the use of PowerShell to remove the 'Zone.Identifier' NTFS Alternate Data Stream from a file, effectively bypassing Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) security protections. This behavior is often associated with the 'Unblock-File' cmdlet and is used by adversaries to execute downloaded malicious files without security warnings.
This rule detects potential ClickFix/InstallFix attacks where a user is socially engineered to copy and paste a malicious command from a website that mimics a legitimate developer tool installation (e.g., Claude Code, NotebookLM). The detection flags the use of common download-and-execute cmdlets (e.g., irm, iwr, iex) within common Windows shell interpreters while excluding known legitimate vendor install domains.
This rule detects potential ClickFix/InstallFix attacks where a user is socially engineered to copy and paste a malicious command from a website that mimics a legitimate developer tool installation (e.g., Claude Code, NotebookLM). The detection flags the use of common download-and-execute cmdlets (e.g., irm, iwr, iex) within common Windows shell interpreters while excluding known legitimate vendor install domains.
Detects a sequence of potentially malicious local command execution (via PowerShell, cmd, or mshta) that mirrors the 'ClickFix' social engineering pattern, followed by an OAuth application consent grant or device-code authorization by the same user within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass MFA by tricking a user into authorizing a malicious application after establishing local execution on their endpoint.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with command-line arguments that suggest programmatically capturing or redirecting console output using ScriptBlock techniques (Create, Console, In, ReadToEnd). This pattern is often associated with obfuscated script execution, in-memory payloads, or attempts to bypass logging by capturing output via .NET streams.
Detects the 'ClickFix' attack pattern where explorer.exe (typically via a Run dialog interaction) spawns a command shell (PowerShell, cmd, or mshta) using obfuscated flags combined with execution indicators (download/execution), which then subsequently spawns a secondary child process. This chain provides high-confidence evidence of malicious intent compared to isolated process executions.
Detects the 'ClickFix' attack pattern where explorer.exe (typically via a Run dialog interaction) spawns a command shell (PowerShell, cmd, or mshta) using obfuscated flags combined with execution indicators (download/execution), which then subsequently spawns a secondary child process. This chain provides high-confidence evidence of malicious intent compared to isolated process executions.
This rule detects PowerShell processes (including pwsh and ISE) referencing Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) related classes and methods in their command line arguments. This is a common indicator of an attempt to interact with or manipulate AMSI, often used to bypass or disable security scanning during the execution of malicious scripts.
This rule detects PowerShell processes (including pwsh and ISE) referencing Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) related classes and methods in their command line arguments. This is a common indicator of an attempt to interact with or manipulate AMSI, often used to bypass or disable security scanning during the execution of malicious scripts.
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