Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects execution and usage of the DSInternals PowerShell module. Which can be used to perform what might be considered as suspicious activity such as dumping DPAPI backup keys or manipulating NTDS.DIT files.
The DSInternals PowerShell Module exposes several internal features of Active Directory and Azure Active Directory. These include FIDO2 and NGC key auditing, offline ntds.dit file manipulation, password auditing, DC recovery from IFM backups and password hash calculation.
The DSInternals PowerShell Module exposes several internal features of Active Directory and Azure Active Directory. These include FIDO2 and NGC key auditing, offline ntds.dit file manipulation, password auditing, DC recovery from IFM backups and password hash calculation.
Detects suspicious PowerShell download command
Detects potentially suspicious child processes spawned by PowerShell.
Use this rule to hunt for potential anomalies initiating from PowerShell scripts and commands.
Use this rule to hunt for potential anomalies initiating from PowerShell scripts and commands.
Detects calls to WinAPI libraries from PowerShell scripts. Attackers can often leverage these APIs to avoid detection based on typical PowerShell function calls. Use this rule as a basis to hunt for interesting scripts.
Detects alternate PowerShell hosts potentially bypassing detections looking for powershell.exe
Detects suspicious .NET assembly executions. Could detect using Cobalt Strike's command execute-assembly.
Detects a process that initiated a network connection over ports 5985 or 5986 from a non-network service account.
This could potentially indicates a remote PowerShell connection.
This could potentially indicates a remote PowerShell connection.
Detects tools and process executions used by Greenbug in their May 2020 campaign as reported by Symantec
Detects activity mentioned in Operation Wocao report
Detects remote thread injection events based on action seen used by bumblebee
Detects presence of a potentially xor encoded powershell command
Detects Obfuscated use of Clip.exe to execute PowerShell
Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the following code block
Detects execution and usage of the DSInternals PowerShell module. Which can be used to perform what might be considered as suspicious activity such as dumping DPAPI backup keys or manipulating NTDS.DIT files.
The DSInternals PowerShell Module exposes several internal features of Active Directory and Azure Active Directory. These include FIDO2 and NGC key auditing, offline ntds.dit file manipulation, password auditing, DC recovery from IFM backups and password hash calculation.
The DSInternals PowerShell Module exposes several internal features of Active Directory and Azure Active Directory. These include FIDO2 and NGC key auditing, offline ntds.dit file manipulation, password auditing, DC recovery from IFM backups and password hash calculation.
Detects the execution of powershell, a WebClient object creation and the invocation of DownloadFile in a single command line
Finding base64 encoded PE files header seen in the command line parameters.
Tags: #fileLess #powershell.
Tags: #fileLess #powershell.
Looks for suspicious keyword additions to windows registry.
Author: Jouni Mikkola
References:
https://threathunt.blog/registry-hunts/
Author: Jouni Mikkola
References:
https://threathunt.blog/registry-hunts/
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Sysrv botnet evolution.
Sysrv is a Go-based botnet that targets both Windows and Linux servers, and steals resources to mine cryptocurrency.
The following query finds instances of the Java process being used to execute cmd.exe, and download and execute a PowerShell script.
Sysrv is a Go-based botnet that targets both Windows and Linux servers, and steals resources to mine cryptocurrency.
The following query finds instances of the Java process being used to execute cmd.exe, and download and execute a PowerShell script.
'This hunting query looks for hosts exporting a mailbox from an on-prem Exchange server, followed by
that same host removing the export within a short time window. This pattern has been observed by attackers
when exfiltrating emails from a target environment. A Mailbox export is unlikely to be a common command run so look for
activity from unexpected hosts and accounts.
Reference: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/'
that same host removing the export within a short time window. This pattern has been observed by attackers
when exfiltrating emails from a target environment. A Mailbox export is unlikely to be a common command run so look for
activity from unexpected hosts and accounts.
Reference: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/'
This query looks for common webserver process names and identifies any processes launched using a scripting language (cmd, powershell, wscript, cscript), common initial profiling commands (net \ net1 \ whoami \ ping \ ipconfig),or admin commands (sc). Note that seeing thisactivity doesn't immediately mean you have a breach, though you might consider reviewing and honing the where clause to fit your specific web applications.
Those who don't mind false positives should consider also adding database process names to this list as well (i.e. sqlservr.exe) to identify potential abuse of xp_cmdshell.
Those who don't mind false positives should consider also adding database process names to this list as well (i.e. sqlservr.exe) to identify potential abuse of xp_cmdshell.
This query detects attempts to add attacker devices as allowed IDs for active sync using the Set-CASMailbox command.
This technique was seen in relation to Solorigate attack but the results can indicate potential malicious activity used in different attacks.
- Note that this query can be changed to use the KQL "has_all" operator, which hasn't yet been documented officially, but will be soon.
In short, "has_all" will only match when the referenced field has all strings in the list.
- Refer to Set-CASMailbox syntax: https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/exchange/set-casmailbox?view=exchange-ps
This technique was seen in relation to Solorigate attack but the results can indicate potential malicious activity used in different attacks.
- Note that this query can be changed to use the KQL "has_all" operator, which hasn't yet been documented officially, but will be soon.
In short, "has_all" will only match when the referenced field has all strings in the list.
- Refer to Set-CASMailbox syntax: https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/exchange/set-casmailbox?view=exchange-ps
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