Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
4,464 detections
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Detects activity mentioned in Operation Wocao report
Detects all Emotet like process executions that are not covered by the more generic rules
Detects activity that could be related to Baby Shark malware
Detects potential APT FIN7 exploitation activity as reported by Google.
In order to obtain initial access, FIN7 used compromised Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) credentials to login to a target server and initiate specific Windows process chains.
In order to obtain initial access, FIN7 used compromised Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) credentials to login to a target server and initiate specific Windows process chains.
This query looks for processes that load an older version of the system.management.automation libraries. While not inherently malicious, downgrading to PowerShell version 2
can enable an attacker to bypass some of the protections afforded by modern PowerShell. It is worth noting that some tools and scripts perform this to enable
backwards compatibility, so the technique is not inherently malicious. You will likely need to filter the processes within your environment that legitimately use this
capability for this to be effective.
can enable an attacker to bypass some of the protections afforded by modern PowerShell. It is worth noting that some tools and scripts perform this to enable
backwards compatibility, so the technique is not inherently malicious. You will likely need to filter the processes within your environment that legitimately use this
capability for this to be effective.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Msiexec abuse.
Msiexec.exe is a Windows component that installs files with the .msi extension. These kinds of files are Windows installer packages, and are used by a wide array of legitimate software. However, malicious actors can re-purpose msiexec.exe for living-off-the-land attacks, where they use legitimate system binaries on the compromised device to perform attacks.
The following query detects activity associated with misuse of msiexec.exe, particularly alongside mimikatz, a common credential dumper and privilege escalation tool.
Reference - https://www.varonis.com/blog/what-is-mimikatz/
Msiexec.exe is a Windows component that installs files with the .msi extension. These kinds of files are Windows installer packages, and are used by a wide array of legitimate software. However, malicious actors can re-purpose msiexec.exe for living-off-the-land attacks, where they use legitimate system binaries on the compromised device to perform attacks.
The following query detects activity associated with misuse of msiexec.exe, particularly alongside mimikatz, a common credential dumper and privilege escalation tool.
Reference - https://www.varonis.com/blog/what-is-mimikatz/
Detects the presence of reversed PowerShell commands in the CommandLine. This is often used as a method of obfuscation by attackers
Detects suspicious ways to download files or content using PowerShell
Detects the creation of a schtasks that potentially executes a payload stored in the Windows Registry using PowerShell.
Detects the use of various web request commands with commandline tools and Windows PowerShell cmdlets (including aliases) via CommandLine
Detects PowerShell downgrade attack by comparing the host versions with the actually used engine version 2.0
Detects suspicious powershell invocations from interpreters or unusual programs
Detects calls to cmdlets that are used to export certificates from the local certificate store. Threat actors were seen abusing this to steal private keys from compromised machines.
This rule detects execution of a PowerShell code through the sqlps.exe utility, which is included in the standard set of utilities supplied with the MSSQL Server.
Script blocks are not logged in this case, so this utility helps to bypass protection mechanisms based on the analysis of these logs.
Script blocks are not logged in this case, so this utility helps to bypass protection mechanisms based on the analysis of these logs.
Detects the use of various CLI utilities exfiltrating data via web requests
Detects a suspicious command line execution that includes an URL and AppData string in the command line parameters as used by several droppers (js/vbs > powershell)
Detects suspicious ways to run Invoke-Execution using IEX alias
Detects the execution of obfuscated PowerShell commands that attempt to install MSI packages via the Windows Installer COM object (`WindowsInstaller.Installer`).
The technique involves manipulating strings to hide functionality, such as constructing class names using string insertion (e.g., 'indowsInstaller.Installer'.Insert(0,'W')) and correcting
malformed URLs (e.g., converting 'htps://' to 'https://') at runtime. This behavior is commonly associated with malware loaders or droppers that aim to bypass static detection
by hiding intent in runtime-generated strings and using legitimate tools for code execution. The use of `InstallProduct` and COM object creation, particularly combined with
hidden window execution and suppressed UI, indicates an attempt to install software (likely malicious) without user interaction.
The technique involves manipulating strings to hide functionality, such as constructing class names using string insertion (e.g., 'indowsInstaller.Installer'.Insert(0,'W')) and correcting
malformed URLs (e.g., converting 'htps://' to 'https://') at runtime. This behavior is commonly associated with malware loaders or droppers that aim to bypass static detection
by hiding intent in runtime-generated strings and using legitimate tools for code execution. The use of `InstallProduct` and COM object creation, particularly combined with
hidden window execution and suppressed UI, indicates an attempt to install software (likely malicious) without user interaction.
Detects the execution of powershell, a WebClient object creation and the invocation of DownloadFile in a single command line
Detects remote PowerShell sections by monitoring for wsmprovhost (WinRM host process) as a parent or child process (sign of an active PowerShell remote session).
Detects changing the PowerShell script execution policy to a potentially insecure level using the "-ExecutionPolicy" flag.
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