Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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The analytic detects the use of the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTCPOneLine utility, which initiates a callback to a remote Command and Control (C2) server. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on PowerShell processes that include specific .NET classes like Net.Sockets.TCPClient and System.Text.ASCIIEncoding. This activity is significant as it indicates potential remote control or data exfiltration attempts by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized remote access, data theft, or further compromise of the affected system.
This analytic detects the execution of suspicious PowerShell commands associated with Meterpreter modules, such as "MSF.Powershell" and "MSF.Powershell.Meterpreter". It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to capture and analyze the full command sent to PowerShell. This activity is significant as it indicates potential post-exploitation actions, including credential dumping and persistence mechanisms. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain extensive control over the compromised system, escalate privileges, and maintain long-term access, posing a severe threat to the environment.
The analytic detects the execution of the `Find-InterestingDomainAcl` cmdlet, which is part of the PowerView toolkit. This cmdlet is used to identify misconfigured or unusual Access Control Lists (ACLs) within a domain. Adversaries may use this to find privilege escalation opportunities or weak security configurations in Active Directory, potentially leading to unauthorized access or further exploitation.
This analytic detects Microsoft Office applications dropping or creating executables or scripts on a Windows OS. It leverages process creation and file system events from the Endpoint data model to identify Office applications like Word or Excel generating files with extensions such as ".exe", ".dll", or ".ps1". This behavior is significant as it is often associated with spear-phishing attacks where malicious files are dropped to compromise the host. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to code execution, privilege escalation, or persistent access, posing a severe threat to the environment.
The analytic detects the use of the `[Adsisearcher]` type accelerator in PowerShell to query Active Directory for root domain linked policies. This activity is identified by leveraging PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) and looking for specific keywords like `[adsisearcher]`, `SearchRooT`, and `gplink`. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt by adversaries or Red Teams to gain situational awareness and perform Active Directory Discovery, potentially aiding in further exploitation or lateral movement within the network.
The analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` or `cmd.exe` with command-line arguments that include `Get-ADUser` and `*-filter*`. This activity indicates an attempt to enumerate domain users, which is a common reconnaissance technique used by adversaries to gather information about Active Directory users for situational awareness and to identify high-value targets for subsequent attacks.
The analytic detects the execution of the Get-ForestTrust command via PowerShell or cmd.exe. This command is commonly used by adversaries to gather domain trust information, which is a reconnaissance effort to map out domain trusts. Identifying this activity is crucial as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts to map out domain trusts, which can inform further attacks. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to understand domain relationships, aiding in lateral movement and privilege escalation within the network.
This analytic detects the execution of a COM CLSID through PowerShell. It specifically looks for PowerShell script block logs (EventCode 4104) containing the string "*CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID*". This activity is significant because adversaries and malware, such as Conti ransomware, commonly use COM object creation via PowerShell for purposes like privilege escalation or bypassing User Account Control (UAC). Successful exploitation of this technique could lead to elevated privileges or persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
The analytic detects the installation of PowerShell Web Access using the Deployment Image Servicing and Management (DISM) tool. It identifies the execution of `dism.exe` with specific parameters related to enabling the WindowsPowerShellWebAccess feature. This activity is significant because enabling PowerShell Web Access can facilitate remote execution of PowerShell commands, potentially allowing an attacker to gain unauthorized access to systems and networks. If confirmed malicious, this action could lead to further exploitation and compromise of the affected system.
This analytic identifies the use of the "remotesigned" execution policy for PowerShell scripts. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions containing "remotesigned" and "-File". This activity is significant because the "remotesigned" policy allows locally created scripts to run without restrictions, posing a potential security risk. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could execute unauthorized scripts, leading to code execution, privilege escalation, or persistence within the environment.
The following analytic detects Microsoft Remote Assistance (msra.exe) spawning PowerShell.exe or cmd.exe as a child process. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where msra.exe is the parent process. This activity is significant because msra.exe typically does not spawn command-line interfaces, indicating potential process injection or misuse. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use this technique to execute arbitrary commands, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence on the compromised system.
The following analytic detects the use of the PowerShell cmdlet 'export-certificate' executed via the command line, indicating an attempt to export a certificate from the local Windows Certificate Store. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. Exporting certificates is significant as it may indicate credential theft or preparation for man-in-the-middle attacks. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to impersonate users, decrypt sensitive communications, or gain unauthorized access to systems and data.
The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` running the `Get-DomainPolicy` cmdlet, which is used to retrieve password policies in a Windows domain. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to gather domain policy information, which is crucial for planning further attacks. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive domain configurations, aiding in privilege escalation and lateral movement within the network.
The analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments invoking the `GetCurrent` method of the WindowsIdentity .NET class. This activity is significant as adversaries may use this method to identify the logged-in user on a compromised endpoint, aiding in situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain insights into user context, potentially facilitating further exploitation and lateral movement within the network.
The analytic identifies the execution of `powershell.exe` with the `Get-NetTcpConnection` command, which lists current TCP connections on a system. This activity may indicate an adversary or Red Team performing network reconnaissance or situational awareness, potentially aiding in lateral movement or further exploitation within the network.
The analytic detects the execution of the `Get-DomainOU` cmdlet, which is part of the PowerView toolkit. This cmdlet is used for Windows domain enumeration, specifically to gather information about organizational units within Active Directory. Adversaries may use this to map the domain structure, aiding in further exploitation, lateral movement, or privilege escalation. The detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104).
The following analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with the `Get-LocalUser` commandlet, which is used to query local user accounts. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. Monitoring this activity is significant because adversaries and Red Teams may use it to enumerate local users for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to identify potential targets for further exploitation or privilege escalation within the environment.
The analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments used to start a process on a remote endpoint by abusing the DCOM protocol, specifically targeting ShellExecute and ExecuteShellCommand. This activity indicates potential lateral movement and remote code execution attempts by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code remotely, escalate privileges, and move laterally within the network, posing a severe security risk.
The analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with arguments used to start a process on a remote endpoint via the WinRM protocol, specifically targeting the `Invoke-Command` cmdlet. This activity may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by adversaries.
The following analytic detects MSIExec spawning multiple discovery commands, such as Cmd.exe or PowerShell.exe. This behavior is identified using data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where MSIExec is the parent process. This activity is significant because MSIExec typically does not spawn child processes other than itself, making this behavior highly suspicious. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use these discovery commands to gather system information, potentially leading to further exploitation or lateral movement within the network.
The analytic detects the execution of the `Get-WmiObject` cmdlet with the `DS_User` class parameter via PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104). It identifies attempts to query all domain users using WMI. This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary or Red Team operation attempting to enumerate domain users for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further reconnaissance, enabling attackers to map out the network and identify potential targets for privilege escalation or lateral movement.
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