Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of an MSI file using PowerShell and the WMI Win32_Product class. This method can be used for defense evasion by leveraging a trusted system utility (PowerShell) and a legitimate WMI class to install software, potentially bypassing traditional application whitelisting or execution policies.
Detects PowerShell command lines that contain both the 'hidden' argument and specific Base64 encoded keywords. These keywords are often associated with malicious PowerShell scripts used for various post-exploitation activities, including process injection, memory manipulation, and remote thread creation. The rule aims to identify obfuscated and stealthy execution of malicious PowerShell.
Detects attempts to decompress Gzip archives using PowerShell's GZipStream::Decompress method. This technique can be used by adversaries to unpack malicious payloads that have been compressed to evade detection.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell cmdlets to exfiltrate email addresses. Specifically, it looks for PowerShell processes executing commands that include 'Add-PSSnapin', 'Get-Recipient', '-ExpandProperty', 'EmailAddresses', 'SmtpAddress', and '-hidetableheaders'. This combination of cmdlets is indicative of an attempt to enumerate and extract email addresses from a system, likely for exfiltration purposes.
This rule detects suspicious patterns in program names or command-line arguments that are commonly associated with malicious samples, hacktools, or exploit kits. It looks for specific keywords and file names in the 'Image' (executable path) and 'CommandLine' fields. Examples include CVE-related strings, common exploit/artifact names like 'poc.exe', 'meterpreter', and various PowerShell scripts often used in post-exploitation such as 'inject.ps1', 'Invoke-CVE', 'mimikatz.ps1', and 'powercat.ps1'.
Detects changes to the registry for the currently logged-in user to disable PowerShell module logging, script block logging, transcription, or script execution logging. This activity is often performed by adversaries to evade detection by hindering forensic analysis and logging capabilities.
Detects unusually long PowerShell command lines (1000 characters or more) which can be indicative of obfuscated or complex malicious scripts being executed. Attackers often use long command lines to evade detection by packing malicious code, base64 encoded commands, or other obfuscation techniques into a single line.
This rule detects the creation of a new Windows service where the ImagePath contains 'rundll32.exe', 'shell32.dll', 'shellexec_rundll', and 'powershell'. This specific combination is indicative of an attempt to execute obfuscated PowerShell code via rundll32.exe, a common technique for defense evasion and execution.
Detects when a Microsoft Office application (Excel, Publisher, Outlook, OneNote, PowerPoint, Word) loads a PowerShell core DLL. This behavior is highly suspicious as Office applications typically do not need to load PowerShell DLLs, and it can indicate an attempt to execute PowerShell code within the context of a trusted Office application, potentially for defense evasion or malicious scripting.
This rule detects the initiation of a remote PowerShell session by looking for specific strings in PowerShell Classic logs. Specifically, it identifies events where 'HostName=ServerRemoteHost' and 'wsmprovhost.exe' are present in the log data, indicating that a remote host is interacting via Windows Remote Management (WinRM) to execute PowerShell commands.
Detects PowerShell module creation where the module Contents are set to "function Get-VMRemoteFXPhysicalVideoAdapter". This could be a sign of potential abuse of the "RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe" binary which is known to be vulnerable to module load-order hijacking.
Detects PowerShell commands or scripts that attempt to disable the command history by removing the 'psreadline' module. This action is often performed by adversaries to evade detection and hinder forensic analysis by preventing their commands from being logged.
Detects the use of obfuscated PowerShell commands that leverage STDIN for execution, often associated with tools like Invoke-Obfuscation. The rule specifically looks for patterns where 'cmd' is used to launch PowerShell with input redirection or the 'noexit' parameter, combined with a reference to 'input' or 'noexit' within the script block text.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell code through the `sqltoolsps.exe` utility, which is part of Microsoft SQL Server Management Studio. This method can be used to bypass logging mechanisms for script blocks, making it a technique for defense evasion.
Detects suspicious base64 encoded and obfuscated "LOAD" keyword used in .NET "reflection.assembly" within process command lines. This technique is often used by malware to dynamically load assemblies, evading static analysis.
This rule detects the creation of a new Windows service (EventID 7045 from 'Service Control Manager') where the service's ImagePath contains specific PowerShell commands indicative of Invoke-Obfuscation's COMPRESS obfuscation technique. Specifically, it looks for the presence of 'new-object', 'text.encoding]::ascii', 'readtoend', and either ':system.io.compression.deflatestream' or 'system.io.streamreader' within the ImagePath. This combination suggests an attempt to decompress and execute obfuscated PowerShell code as part of a service.
Detects the creation of a new service where the ImagePath contains 'rundll32' and 'shell32.dll' along with obfuscation indicators like '&&', 'value', 'invoke', 'comspec', or 'iex'. This pattern is often used by adversaries to execute obfuscated PowerShell commands via rundll32, specifically leveraging 'shellexec_rundll'.
Detects the creation of memory dump files (.dmp, .hdmp) by common scripting or shell applications such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, cscript.exe, mshta.exe, pwsh.exe, or wscript.exe. Memory dumps can contain sensitive information like credentials, and their creation by these processes can be indicative of malicious activity, especially if not tied to a legitimate crash.
Detects obfuscated PowerShell execution leveraging `clip.exe` to retrieve commands from the clipboard. This technique is often used for defense evasion to hide malicious scripts.
This rule detects the creation of a new PowerShell remote session using the 'New-PSSession' cmdlet, specifically when targeting a remote computer via the '-ComputerName' parameter. This activity can be indicative of an adversary establishing remote access or moving laterally within a network.
Detects PowerShell scripts that utilize the "Compress-Archive" cmdlet to compress folders and files, storing the output in common temporary directories often used by adversaries for data staging prior to exfiltration. This behavior is indicative of an adversary preparing collected data for exfiltration by archiving it to minimize size and make it portable.
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