Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential PowerShell obfuscation techniques where the '-join' operator is used within the '-Value' parameter of 'Set-Alias' or 'New-Alias' cmdlets. This method is often employed by adversaries to hide the true command or object being aliased, making it harder to analyze the script's intent. The rule specifically looks for the combination of '-Alias' and ' -Value (-join(' within PowerShell script block text.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell scripts that contain the 'Get-Process' cmdlet. 'Get-Process' is used to retrieve information about running processes on a local computer. This activity is often performed by adversaries as part of the discovery phase to understand the system's environment and identify potential targets or interesting processes.
This rule detects the use of WMImplant, a PowerShell-based post-exploitation tool that leverages Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) for various malicious activities. It specifically looks for keywords and function names associated with WMImplant's capabilities within PowerShell script block logs, such as 'WMImplant', 'change_user', 'command_exec', 'disable_wdigest', 'enable_winrm', 'registry_mod', 'remote_posh', 'sched_job', 'service_mod', 'process_kill', 'active_users', 'basic_info', 'power_off', 'vacant_system', and 'logon_events'. Detection requires PowerShell Script Block Logging to be enabled.
Detects PowerShell command-line obfuscation techniques specifically associated with 'COMPRESS OBFUSCATION' often used by tools like Invoke-Obfuscation. This method typically involves compressing data and decompressing it in memory using .NET classes like `System.IO.Compression.DeflateStream` and `System.IO.StreamReader` combined with `new-object` and `text.encoding]::ascii`.
Detects obfuscated PowerShell execution via standard input (stdin) in scripts. This technique is often used by adversaries to evade detection by security tools that might inspect command-line arguments.
Detects code execution via Pester.bat (Pester - Powershell Modulte for testing)
Detects the usage of the PowerShell '::FromBase64String' cmdlet within a process command line, specifically looking for both direct string and UTF-16 LE encoded variations. This technique is commonly used by adversaries to deobfuscate or decode base64 encoded strings, often containing malicious payloads, within PowerShell scripts.
Detects suspicious PowerShell code that is UTF16 and base64 encoded, often used in command lines for obfuscation. The rule specifically looks for patterns indicative of obfuscated PowerShell, such as '-bxor 0x', '.Invoke() |', and format string patterns like '{1}{0}" -f' or '{0}{3}" -f' in their encoded forms.
Detects base64 encoded PowerShell commands that use 'Add-MpPreference' or 'Set-MpPreference' cmdlets to modify or tamper with Windows Defender Antivirus settings. This is a common technique used by adversaries to disable or reduce the effectiveness of endpoint security solutions.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell scripts where the script content is provided via a redirected input stream. This technique is often used by adversaries to execute malicious PowerShell code without writing it to a file, which can help evade detection. The rule specifically looks for PowerShell or pwsh executables being run with a command line containing '- <', which signifies input stream redirection.
Detects the execution of PowerShell scripts from user-specific AppData directories (Local or Roaming). This behavior is often indicative of malware or adversary activity attempting to evade detection by running scripts from less common or user-writable locations, rather than standard system paths.
This rule detects attempts to discover private key files using command-line tools such as `cmd.exe`, `powershell.exe`, or `findstr.exe`. It specifically looks for commands that include common private key file extensions like .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk, .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, and .asc. This activity is indicative of an adversary searching for insecurely stored credentials on a compromised system.
Detects keywords from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks
Detects the use of PSAsyncShell an Asynchronous TCP Reverse Shell written in powershell
PowerShell PSAttack
Sigma
Detects the use of PSAttack PowerShell hack tool
Detects the creation of files that indicator an interactive use of PowerShell in the SYSTEM user context
Detects the execution of PowerShell via the creation of a named pipe starting with PSHost
Detects remote access to the LSASS process via WinRM. This could be a sign of credential dumping from tools like mimikatz.
Detects the execution of the "net use" command to mount a WebDAV server and then immediately execute some content in it. As seen being used in malicious LNK files
Detects suspicious powershell command line parameters used in Empire
Detects the creation of a schtask via PowerSploit or Empire Default Configuration.
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