Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of PowerShell commands using '[scriptblock]::Create' in conjunction with character array decoding or large negative integer-array patterns. This technique is commonly used to deobfuscate and execute obfuscated PowerShell scripts at runtime.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands using '[scriptblock]::Create' in conjunction with character array decoding or large negative integer-array patterns. This technique is commonly used to deobfuscate and execute obfuscated PowerShell scripts at runtime.
Detects the use of PowerShell with a hidden window ('-w hidden') to execute the 'Add-MpPreference' cmdlet to configure Windows Defender exclusions. This combination is often indicative of malicious activity, such as attempting to bypass security controls stealthily following a UAC bypass or initial access.
Detects suspicious execution patterns involving msiexec where a PowerShell process launches or is the parent of an MSI installation occurring from the %TEMP% directory with a GUID-based filename, or when msiexec executes an application from within %AppData%\Local\Programs. This pattern is often associated with fileless malware, ClickFix-style social engineering attacks, or suspicious persistence/installation behavior.
This rule detects the creation, modification, or renaming of files within specific sensitive directories under Local AppData (such as ComponentTask33, INetCache/FilterManager, or Shell/RemoteTempPrimary) that are closely timed with the execution of a PowerShell script named '*_scatter.ps1'. This behavior is indicative of potential malicious staging, data dropping, or modular deployment associated with a specific script-based attack chain.
This rule detects instances where PowerShell is executed by a Windows Script Host process (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) using common suspicious command-line arguments. This pattern is frequently used by adversaries to execute obfuscated or bypassed PowerShell scripts while attempting to hide or proxy the execution through legitimate scripting host processes.
Detects the execution of regsvcs.exe when initiated by PowerShell, or when invoked with specific command line arguments indicating .NET reflection (GetType, GetMethod, method.Invoke) typically associated with fileless execution or proxying malicious code. The rule specifically targets instances involving .NET Framework directories.
Detects unauthorized access to web browser credential stores (e.g., Login Data, Cookies) by non-browser processes, such as scripting engines (PowerShell, WScript) or common LOLBins (MSBuild, InstallUtil). This behavior is indicative of credential theft or data exfiltration attempts by malicious software, including stealers like PureLog.
Detects access to sensitive cryptocurrency wallet files (e.g., wallet.dat, keystore) by processes typically associated with LOLBins (Living-off-the-land Binaries) like PowerShell, MSBuild, or non-executable utilities. This activity is indicative of credential theft or data staging for exfiltration of cryptocurrency assets.
Detects command execution patterns consistent with the ClickFix attack technique, where users are socially engineered into pasting and executing commands (often via the Windows Run dialog or web browsers) to bypass fake CAPTCHA prompts. The rule looks for common living-off-the-land binaries (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, etc.) spawned from browsers or explorer.exe executing suspicious downloader/execution cmdlets.
Detects instances where PowerShell is initiated via LNK files, specifically targeting PDF LNK attachments or known malicious script naming patterns (update1.vbs, update2.ps1) and common downloader cmdlets (e.g., IEX, Invoke-WebRequest). It also includes specific indicators for remote file downloads.
This rule correlates email attachment delivery events with subsequent process creation events on the recipient's endpoint. It identifies scenarios where a known document reader or mail client (Outlook, Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Adobe Acrobat/Reader) spawns a suspicious child process (PowerShell, CMD, WScript, CScript, MSHTA, Rundll32, or Regsvr32) shortly after a file is delivered via email to the same user. This detects the immediate execution phase of a phishing attack.
Detects a multi-stage malware execution pattern consistent with VelvetCake activity. This includes staging text-based files in C:\Users\Public, downloading PowerShell scripts to temporary directories, executing the script via PowerShell, and subsequently deleting both the staged text files (except for specific allowed filenames) and the payload script.
Detects PowerShell ScriptBlock events (4104) that exhibit characteristics of AI/LLM-generated code, specifically the presence of highly descriptive inline commentary combined with encoded commands or remote network download cradles. This pattern is often used by automated tools to generate syntactically randomized obfuscated scripts to evade detection.
This rule detects interactive or user-triggered execution of PowerShell carrying indicators of payload downloading, inline evaluation, or Base64 encoding. Because explorer.exe is the parent process, it typically signifies a payload delivered via email/web that a user opened directly such as an .lnk shortcut.
This rule detects suspicious activity where a node.exe process, often associated with a node-pty terminal emulation, launches common Windows command-line shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) from specific file paths or directories. This behavior is indicative of a Node.js-based Remote Access Trojan (RAT) or shell spawning mechanism being used to establish command and control or persistence on a Windows host.
Detects a sequence of suspicious process executions related to the 'RemoteAgent' application, specifically monitoring for MSI-based installations, NSSM service management, and API checks across a device. The rule aggregates distinct process events per device and flags if two or more distinct indicators are identified within a 14-day window.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with flags designed to bypass execution policies (-NoProfile, -NonInteractive, -ExecutionPolicy Bypass) directly spawned by a GitLab Runner process. This behavior is associated with the abuse of GitLab CI/CD runners as a Command and Control (C2) mechanism to execute unauthorized commands on build infrastructure.
Detects the modification of the registry value 'EnableScriptBlockLogging' to '0' (Disabled) under the PowerShell policy path. This action suppresses the generation of Windows Event ID 4104 (PowerShell Script Block Logging), which is a critical source for monitoring attacker-issued PowerShell commands and detecting post-exploitation activity.
Detects cmd.exe processes utilizing variable assignment and dynamic substring expansion to reconstruct and execute obfuscated PowerShell commands, a technique frequently observed in malicious LNK file decoy campaigns to evade static signature detection.
Detects the execution of PowerShell scripts containing a combination of Base64 encoding, compression (Deflate/Gzip), and UTF-32 decoding. This specific layering is commonly used to obfuscate malicious payloads and evade signature-based detection mechanisms in PowerShell environments.
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