Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects PowerShell script blocks containing a suspicious combination of Base64-like character sets and Cyrillic characters. This technique is often used in obfuscated payloads to evade static analysis signatures or to hinder human readability by inserting non-Latin characters within encoded content, which may trigger different parsing behaviors in various environments.
Detects the execution of Windows Terminal, PowerShell, or pwsh processes spawned directly by explorer.exe that do not originate from standard Start Menu search or navigation host processes. This pattern is indicative of the user triggering the 'Power User' (Win+X) menu, often associated with adversary attempts to leverage ClickFix-style social engineering lures that rely on the user interacting with specific UI elements.
FileFix lures append a real-looking file path after a '#' comment character so the Explorer address bar visually shows a benign path while the PowerShell prefix executes silently.
FileFix lures append a real-looking file path after a '#' comment character so the Explorer address bar visually shows a benign path while the PowerShell prefix executes silently.
Acronis TRU (Sept 2025) documented a FileFix campaign where a PowerShell loader downloads images from Bitbucket that conceal embedded malicious components, ultimately deploying a Go-based loader and StealC.
After the initial FileFix paste-and-execute step, observed campaigns chain into a secondary download of the real payload using LOLBins or PowerShell web clients.
Acronis reported a multilingual FileFix phishing site using anti-analysis techniques and advanced obfuscation, chaining into a Go-based loader with string encryption before deploying StealC.
FileFix JavaScript silently writes the malicious command to the clipboard the instant the lure button is clicked, producing a much shorter human-reaction interval between browser launch and shell spawn than a manually typed path would allow.
Detects the use of the WinGet 'configure' command to process PowerShell DSC configuration files. This method can be abused to execute arbitrary PowerShell code within a Script resource without explicitly invoking powershell.exe, potentially bypassing certain monitoring or security controls focused solely on the PowerShell executable.
Detects instances where cmd.exe spawns a PowerShell process with the '-executionpolicy bypass' argument. This pattern is commonly used by attackers to execute malicious scripts while circumventing Windows PowerShell execution policy restrictions.
Detects the creation of a 'SystemIn.lnk' persistence shortcut on Windows systems using PowerShell and the WScript.Shell COM object. This activity is associated with the QUICAgent backdoor, part of the QUICSILVER operation, which uses temporary PowerShell scripts to establish persistence.
Detects malicious PowerShell command chains often used in ClickFix campaigns. These commands typically move zip files from the user's Downloads directory to a temporary folder, extract them using the tar utility, and execute an embedded PowerShell script using conhost in headless mode. This technique is designed to bypass AMSI command-line inspection by offloading the actual payload execution to an extracted, unmonitored script.
Detects the use of PowerShell's Start-Sleep cmdlet with a duration of 3 minutes or longer within process command lines. This technique is commonly used by malware, such as ClickFix-style droppers, to bypass sandbox time-based analysis by delaying execution until the sandbox timeout period has elapsed.
Detects instances where WScript or CScript (Windows Script Host) spawns PowerShell with common obfuscation and persistence flags, specifically executing in a hidden, non-interactive, headless, and encoded command mode. This pattern is commonly used by malicious scripts (e.g., VBScript or JScript) to execute secondary payloads while minimizing visual indicators on the host.
Detects instances where explorer.exe (the Windows Shell) spawns a PowerShell process with suspicious flags, commonly associated with 'ClickFix' social engineering attacks where users are prompted to copy and paste malicious commands into the Windows Run dialog.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with common obfuscation or download flags (e.g., -EncodedCommand, IEX, DownloadString) specifically when the parent process is a common attack vector entry point such as Office applications, web browsers, or script hosts (wscript/cscript/mshta). This behavior is characteristic of phishing-based execution chains.
Detects execution of PowerShell processes employing common obfuscation and evasion techniques frequently associated with fileless malware loaders and malicious script execution. This includes the use of EncodedCommand, Base64 strings, IEX/Invoke-Expression download cradles, and stealth execution flags (e.g., hidden windows combined with non-interactive modes).
Detects suspicious PowerShell execution patterns involving encoded commands, hidden window styles, or common download cradles combined with code obfuscation techniques. This rule monitors PowerShell ScriptBlock Logging (Event ID 4104) for combinations of indicators often used by threat actors to evade detection, such as Base64-encoded strings, hidden execution flags, network download utilities, and script obfuscation techniques.
Detects suspicious execution of command-line utilities (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, conhost.exe) directly from Windows Explorer (explorer.exe), which is often indicative of fileless malware execution, downloader activity, or 'ClickFix' style social engineering attacks.
Detects suspicious execution of command-line utilities (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, conhost.exe) directly from Windows Explorer (explorer.exe), which is often indicative of fileless malware execution, downloader activity, or 'ClickFix' style social engineering attacks.
Detects suspicious execution of command-line utilities (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, conhost.exe) directly from Windows Explorer (explorer.exe), which is often indicative of fileless malware execution, downloader activity, or 'ClickFix' style social engineering attacks.
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