Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects instances where a Claude process accesses a 'SKILL.md' file, followed closely by a suspicious command execution on the same device. The rule specifically targets command-line activity that involves encoding, download-and-execute patterns, staging in sensitive directories, or communication with suspicious domains/IPs, which is indicative of a supply-chain or poisoned agent-skill file attack.
Detects attempts to disable or modify Windows Defender security features, such as Real-time Monitoring, Tamper Protection, or adding unauthorized exclusion paths via PowerShell cmdlets or direct registry modifications.
Detects suspicious process execution patterns associated with RMMCRAT, where the Windows SmartScreen process (smartscreen.exe) spawns cmd.exe, which subsequently launches PowerShell with specific parameters for piped input/output. This behavior is characteristic of malicious code injection and command-and-control activity.
Detects suspicious process execution patterns associated with RMMCRAT, where the Windows SmartScreen process (smartscreen.exe) spawns cmd.exe, which subsequently launches PowerShell with specific parameters for piped input/output. This behavior is characteristic of malicious code injection and command-and-control activity.
Detects suspicious process execution patterns associated with RMMCRAT, where the Windows SmartScreen process (smartscreen.exe) spawns cmd.exe, which subsequently launches PowerShell with specific parameters for piped input/output. This behavior is characteristic of malicious code injection and command-and-control activity.
Detects instances where FortiClient EMS management daemon processes (FCMDaemon.exe, FortiClient_Server.exe, or FCMWebServer.exe) spawn suspicious child processes often associated with living-off-the-land techniques, such as command shells, scripting interpreters, or system administrative utilities.
Detects instances where the Steam service (steamservice.exe) is executing suspicious child processes such as command interpreters or binaries located in unusual paths like Temp, Downloads, or AppData, often indicating an attempt to hide malicious activity under a trusted process.
Detects the execution of base64 encoded PowerShell commands initiated by conhost.exe with the --headless flag. The decoded command contains specific suspicious patterns, including accessing environment variables, reading file content, and deleting files, which is characteristic of malicious scripts attempting to stealthily interact with the environment.
Detects the use of PowerShell to perform COM database enumeration, often associated with OleViewDotNet or NtObjectManager tools, specifically looking for indicators of COM object querying such as InProcServer32 path identification.
Detects instances of PowerShell being launched directly by Windows Explorer (explorer.exe), which is indicative of a user interacting with the 'Run' dialog (Win+R). The rule specifically flags common ClickFix social-engineering patterns, such as hidden windows and the use of download/execution cmdlets (e.g., Invoke-WebRequest, Invoke-RestMethod) used to fetch and run remote payloads.
This rule detects malicious PowerShell execution originating from common Office or script-based parent processes (explorer.exe, mshta.exe, wscript.exe). The detection specifically looks for hidden command-line flags combined with indicators related to the Konni/VelvetCake campaign, such as specific artifact filenames (update1.vbs, update2.ps1) or remote downloads from raw.githubusercontent.com.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task named 'OneDriveUpdateScheduler' and the subsequent execution of 'update1.ps1' or 'update2.ps1' by 'explorer.exe'. This behavior is associated with the Konni/VelvetCake malware families, which use this technique to maintain persistence and C2 connectivity.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands initiated by LNK files, characteristic of Konni/VelvetCake spear-phishing campaigns. The rule monitors for PowerShell processes launched by shell applications (explorer, rundll32, etc.) using hidden windows and fetching specific malware-related filenames or downloading from AppData directories.
Detects post-exploitation shell activity spawned from the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe), narrowed to command lines carrying encoded/obfuscated PowerShell flags, remote-download cradles, or basic recon/persistence commands (whoami, certutil, bitsadmin, schtasks, reg add). This reduces noise from benign w3wp.exe-initiated automation while retaining the behavioral pattern seen in the Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX unauthenticated RCE chain (webshell/in-memory DLL execution dropping to a shell).
Detects suspicious PowerShell command lines that load a .dat file, decode its Base64 content, and execute it in-memory. This behavior is indicative of the 'TASK#STOMP' loader pattern, where malicious code is hidden in external files and invoked directly into memory to bypass traditional file-based security controls.
Detects suspicious PowerShell command lines that load a .dat file, decode its Base64 content, and execute it in-memory. This behavior is indicative of the 'TASK#STOMP' loader pattern, where malicious code is hidden in external files and invoked directly into memory to bypass traditional file-based security controls.
Detects suspicious PowerShell command lines that load a .dat file, decode its Base64 content, and execute it in-memory. This behavior is indicative of the 'TASK#STOMP' loader pattern, where malicious code is hidden in external files and invoked directly into memory to bypass traditional file-based security controls.
Detects the execution of PowerShell or Windows Script Host (wscript/cscript) spawned by explorer.exe that utilize hidden window styles and target suspicious filenames or external paths, often indicative of a dropper or malicious script stage.
Detects the execution of PowerShell or Windows Script Host (wscript/cscript) spawned by explorer.exe that utilize hidden window styles and target suspicious filenames or external paths, often indicative of a dropper or malicious script stage.
Detects the execution of PowerShell or Windows Script Host (wscript/cscript) spawned by explorer.exe that utilize hidden window styles and target suspicious filenames or external paths, often indicative of a dropper or malicious script stage.
Detects the execution of PowerShell or Windows Script Host (wscript/cscript) spawned by explorer.exe that utilize hidden window styles and target suspicious filenames or external paths, often indicative of a dropper or malicious script stage.
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