Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of PowerShell with hidden flags and encoded commands spawned by a 'conhost.exe' process running in '--headless' mode. This specific process pattern is indicative of the obfuscated execution chain used by LausivLoader.
Detects instances where PowerShell is executed with encoded commands, seemingly spawned by a process masquerading as or related to the Microsoft Edge Update Task. The rule specifically monitors for process chains involving 'conhost.exe' with '--headless' arguments and subsequent PowerShell execution containing encoded commands, often associated with obfuscated activity.
This rule detects the execution of cmd.exe or powershell.exe where the command line arguments involve the deletion or renaming of specific file names potentially associated with unauthorized activities or malware components. It looks for common command-line utilities (del, ren) being used by command shells on specific files that may indicate artifact cleanup or staging.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that enumerate files within sensitive user directories such as Desktop, Downloads, Documents, or OneDrive, using common cmdlets like Get-ChildItem with recurrence or filtering. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to discover or stage files for exfiltration.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with command-line arguments that suggest programmatically capturing or redirecting console output using ScriptBlock techniques (Create, Console, In, ReadToEnd). This pattern is often associated with obfuscated script execution, in-memory payloads, or attempts to bypass logging by capturing output via .NET streams.
Detects the execution of files related to 'UBPPatch' or 'HTSPnew', specifically looking for PowerShell scripts (.psh) or executables (.exe) that match these potentially non-standard or obfuscated update/patch filenames. The rule also looks for command lines referencing 'Update.Lst', often associated with custom or unauthorized patch mechanisms.
Detects the invocation of the C# compiler (csc.exe) by PowerShell, where the command line includes specific references to .cmdline files. This pattern is commonly used in fileless execution techniques to compile and execute malicious code in memory after delivery.
Detects the use of PowerShell script interpreters that utilize .NET runtime methods, such as 'RunspaceFactory' and 'CreateRunspace', to dynamically create and execute scripts, pipelines, or invoke methods. This technique is often used by fileless malware and offensive security tools to bypass traditional command-line logging by interacting directly with the System.Management.Automation assembly.
Detects ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where users are lured to 'cloudrobots.cloud' and subsequently execute malicious commands via Windows shell tools (cmd, powershell, mshta, etc.). The rule correlates browser network events to a specific domain, subsequent process launches by explorer.exe, and suspicious registry modifications associated with the Windows RunMRU, which is often abused to store and execute commands pasted by victims.
Detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in PowerShell by using reflection to modify the 'amsiInitFailed' field within the 'AmsiUtils' class. This technique is commonly used by malicious scripts to disable AMSI scanning during their execution.
Detects suspicious PowerShell command lines that utilize both 'Invoke-Expression' (iex) and 'Invoke-RestMethod' (irm), often used to download and execute code directly from remote sources. The rule specifically monitors for known indicators like specific IP addresses, file paths, or the concurrent use of these cmdlets in a single command line.
Detects the creation of a shortcut (.lnk) file within the Windows startup folder using PowerShell. The rule monitors for PowerShell processes executing commands to create .lnk files (e.g., via WScript.Shell) or directly monitors file creation events targeting the startup directory. This behavior is indicative of malicious persistence mechanisms.
Detects the addition of exclusion paths to Microsoft Defender via PowerShell (Add-MpPreference or Set-MpPreference) initiated by non-Microsoft signed processes or specific messaging applications. This behavior is often indicative of malware attempting to exclude malicious payloads from security scanning.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with execution policy bypass flags that simultaneously attempts to use curl.exe and Copy-Item to interact with suspicious remote domains or obfuscated command line arguments, potentially indicating a malicious payload delivery and staging attempt.
Detects instances where a GitLab runner process (gitlab-runner.exe) spawns a PowerShell process with arguments typically used to execute scripts while bypassing security restrictions, such as -NoProfile, -NonInteractive, -ExecutionPolicy, and Bypass. This pattern is indicative of automated task execution or potential abuse if the runner environment is compromised.
Detects signs of malicious activity involving specific files (StreamServiceSharedBridge.ps1, ComponentTask33Agent) and behaviors, including PowerShell execution, scheduled task creation, script execution via wscript, and registry run key modification. These behaviors are indicative of persistence mechanisms and potentially suspicious command execution.
Detects the use of PowerShell to delete .js files located within the 'Downloads' directory. This behavior is commonly associated with cleanup of dropped malicious payloads or script-based malware artifacts.
Detects suspicious PowerShell command lines indicative of process termination or abnormal enumeration of .NET Framework process directories via WMI. This includes using Stop-Process against specific proxy execution binaries or using Get-CimInstance to inspect sensitive .NET framework directory structures, which may be associated with process hollowing or security product interference.
Detects the execution of PowerShell scripts that use Invoke-Expression and Invoke-RestMethod in combination with specific suspicious domains, file extensions, or indicators of web-based payload retrieval. This pattern is commonly used for staging and executing malicious payloads directly from the internet.
Detects the execution of PowerShell scripts containing specific obfuscation or encoding patterns. The rule identifies potential malicious intent by searching for hardcoded suspicious strings or common binary-to-string conversion methods used to hide script content from security monitoring.
Detects PowerShell instances executing 'Stop-Process' against known living-off-the-land binaries (LotLBin) or PowerShell processes explicitly terminating these specific binaries. This behavior is often associated with process hollowing, anti-forensics, or attempts to clear space for malicious code injection by terminating security or system-related tools.
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