Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the use of PowerShell to perform a web request to google.com to download a file named Document.pdf, followed by the immediate execution of that downloaded file using Start-Process.
Detects instances where powershell.exe appears to be launched by explorer.exe via parent process ID (PPID) spoofing. The rule identifies processes where the reported parent explorer.exe was created at or after the child powershell.exe, or within a suspiciously short timeframe, indicating that the parent PID association is likely fraudulent rather than a genuine explorer-initiated shell.
Detects the execution of obfuscated PowerShell commands (using -EncodedCommand, -WindowStyle Hidden, and -NonInteractive or -NoProfile flags) spawned by a process located within an Electron application's AppData directory. This pattern is commonly associated with malicious scripts or post-exploitation activities launched by Electron-based applications, excluding the Windows shell (explorer.exe).
This rule detects instances where PowerShell is launched with hidden window arguments by explorer.exe or mshta.exe, and the command line indicates interactions with specific file extensions (.vbs, .ps1) located within the AppData directory. This pattern is often indicative of malicious script execution, such as those used in Konni malware campaigns to drop and execute payloads.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands indicative of the VelvetCake variant of the Konni malware. The rule identifies the use of 'Net.WebClient.DownloadString' combined with 'Invoke-Expression' (iex) to execute scripts in memory, alongside specific command-line indicators such as the 'Areyou=cake' campaign marker or associated C2 domains.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that leverage specific tooling for scheduled task enumeration, commonly used for discovery or persistence management. The rule flags usage of 'Get-AccessibleScheduledTask' in conjunction with flags associated with tools like NtObjectManager or OleViewDotNet.
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell activity involving the enumeration and manipulation of COM objects and .NET assemblies, patterns often associated with reconnaissance or post-exploitation activities. It flags instances where PowerShell scripts utilize specific command-line arguments (e.g., Get-ComDatabase, Get-ComClass, Import-Win32Module, NtObjectManager) in conjunction, suggesting automated discovery of COM infrastructure or assembly loading.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command-line arguments (e.g., WebClient, hidden flags, or WebDAV paths) spawned directly from browser processes like chrome.exe or msedge.exe. This pattern is commonly associated with fileless delivery techniques where an attacker attempts to download and execute scripts directly from an internet-facing source.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands intended to gather system information, such as OS details, boot time, or video controller configurations. These techniques are often used during the discovery phase to profile a target machine before further malicious actions.
Detects when AI-powered development tools or coding assistants (such as Claude, Copilot, Gemini, or Codex) spawn suspicious child processes like command shells (cmd, powershell, bash, sh) or networking utilities (curl, wget, python). This behavior is highly atypical for integrated development environments and may indicate exploitation of the assistant's integration or malicious code execution.
Detects suspicious PowerShell execution patterns involving encoded commands, hidden window styles, or common download cradles combined with code obfuscation techniques. This rule monitors PowerShell ScriptBlock Logging (Event ID 4104) for combinations of indicators often used by threat actors to evade detection, such as Base64-encoded strings, hidden execution flags, network download utilities, and script obfuscation techniques.
Detects the execution of PowerShell or Windows Script Host (wscript/cscript) spawned by explorer.exe that utilize hidden window styles and target suspicious filenames or external paths, often indicative of a dropper or malicious script stage.
Detects instances where the PaperCut application server process (pc-app.exe) or its underlying Java processes (javaw.exe or java.exe) spawn command-line interpreters such as cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This behavior is indicative of potential post-exploitation activity, specifically Remote Code Execution (RCE) via vulnerabilities targeting PaperCut servers.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events where a process related to Electron (a framework often used for cross-platform desktop applications) executes a hidden, obfuscated PowerShell command, followed by a subsequent PowerShell command to modify Microsoft Defender settings by adding an exclusion path for the 'AppData' directory within 10 minutes of the first process.
This rule monitors for suspicious PowerShell command-line activity originating from Windows Explorer (explorer.exe) or embedded within RunMRU registry modifications. It detects obfuscated or hidden command execution patterns, such as base64 encoding, the use of -EncodedCommand, Invoke-Expression, or execution policy bypass flags, which are commonly associated with malicious scripts and fileless malware execution.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with hidden window style attempting to download Node.js related files (e.g., .msi or node.exe) from nodejs.org using common download cmdlets or utilities.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with hidden window style attempting to download Node.js related files (e.g., .msi or node.exe) from nodejs.org using common download cmdlets or utilities.
This rule detects potentially malicious child processes spawned by Visual Studio Code (Code.exe) when using VS Code tasks (tasks.json). It identifies suspicious CLI arguments often associated with downloading, executing, or obfuscating scripts (e.g., PowerShell, curl, python, mshta) that are not part of standard development workflows like npm, yarn, or git, which are explicitly filtered out as noise.
Detects mshta.exe spawning suspicious child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or reg.exe) that are characteristic of the ReverseRAT backdoor. The rule identifies common discovery commands or persistence attempts via Registry Run keys triggered from mshta.exe.
Detects potential ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where a victim is prompted to execute an encoded PowerShell command (often via copy-paste into a terminal). The rule specifically monitors PowerShell processes initiated by shell environments (explorer.exe, cmd.exe, or WindowsTerminal.exe) that execute encoded, hidden scripts to perform multiple suspicious network requests for files (e.g., .zip, .enc, .bin) from non-standard domains.
Detects AI coding assistants and LLM agent frameworks spawning shell processes or interpreters to execute potentially malicious commands. The rule monitors for suspicious activity often associated with download cradles, credential access, reconnaissance, or persistence, while excluding standard interactive terminal usage.
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