Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of PowerShell with common obfuscation flags (-W Hidden, -nop, -nol) that attempt to load and execute a script directly from the user's local Temp directory. The detection specifically monitors for processes launched by command interpreters like cmd.exe or batch files, which is a common indicator of a malware dropper or stager.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands that exhibit characteristics frequently associated with malicious activity, such as reflective assembly loading, compression/decompression operations, use of specific known obfuscation markers, encoded commands, or execution originating from suspicious parent processes like explorer.exe or cmd.exe.
Detects known PowerShell dropper and embedded StealC payload binaries used in the ClickFix infection chain via exact SHA256 hash equality only
Detects known PowerShell dropper and embedded StealC payload binaries used in the ClickFix infection chain via exact SHA256 hash equality only
This rule monitors for suspicious PowerShell command-line activity originating from Windows Explorer (explorer.exe) or embedded within RunMRU registry modifications. It detects obfuscated or hidden command execution patterns, such as base64 encoding, the use of -EncodedCommand, Invoke-Expression, or execution policy bypass flags, which are commonly associated with malicious scripts and fileless malware execution.
Detects instances where explorer.exe initiates cmd.exe with suspicious command-line patterns often associated with malicious script execution or evasion. These include caret-based obfuscation, mixed-case PowerShell invocations, or base64-like blobs, alongside indicators of common malicious file paths or execution policy bypass flags.
Detects instances where explorer.exe initiates cmd.exe with suspicious command-line patterns often associated with malicious script execution or evasion. These include caret-based obfuscation, mixed-case PowerShell invocations, or base64-like blobs, alongside indicators of common malicious file paths or execution policy bypass flags.
Detects a rapid, multi-stage intrusion sequence on a single host involving discovery, lateral movement, and high-volume file modifications. The rule identifies anomalous behavior where diverse reconnaissance and lateral movement commands are executed within a compressed timeframe, characteristic of automated or LLM-driven orchestration of ransomware operations.
Detects post-exploitation shell activity spawned from the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe), narrowed to command lines carrying encoded/obfuscated PowerShell flags, remote-download cradles, or basic recon/persistence commands (whoami, certutil, bitsadmin, schtasks, reg add). This reduces noise from benign w3wp.exe-initiated automation while retaining the behavioral pattern seen in the Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX unauthenticated RCE chain (webshell/in-memory DLL execution dropping to a shell).
Detects attempts to disable or modify Windows Defender security features, such as Real-time Monitoring, Tamper Protection, or adding unauthorized exclusion paths via PowerShell cmdlets or direct registry modifications.
Detects attempts to disable or modify Windows Defender security features, such as Real-time Monitoring, Tamper Protection, or adding unauthorized exclusion paths via PowerShell cmdlets or direct registry modifications.
Detects the execution of PowerShell from a shortcut (.lnk) file, particularly when suspicious command-line arguments such as hidden windows, encoded commands, or bypass flags are utilized. This pattern is commonly associated with initial access via malicious attachments or shortcut files.
Detects the loading of .NET Common Language Runtime (clr.dll) and System.Management.Automation.dll into a process that is not a recognized PowerShell binary (e.g., powershell.exe, pwsh.exe). This behavior is associated with the 'PSInline' technique used by SloppyRAT, where PowerShell capabilities are invoked directly via COM objects to execute commands in memory. The rule further correlates this activity with the creation of files with a .png extension in temporary directories, which is consistent with the exfiltration staging behavior of the malware.
Detects the use of PowerShell to reflectively load .NET assemblies into memory, often associated with fileless malware execution. The rule monitors for common reflection-based methods (e.g., Assembly.Load, [System.Reflection.Assembly]) in conjunction with encoded command patterns or script execution.
Detects instances where a process that is not a known PowerShell host (powershell.exe, pwsh.exe, powershell_ise.exe) loads the System.Management.Automation.dll assembly, which is a strong indicator of an attempt to execute PowerShell code within a different process to evade detection.
Detects the invocation of common command-line interpreters (PowerShell or Windows Command Shell) via process creation events. This is a broad detection for administrative shell activity, which may also indicate malicious script execution or manual adversary interaction.
Detects the execution of base64 encoded PowerShell commands initiated by conhost.exe with the --headless flag. The decoded command contains specific suspicious patterns, including accessing environment variables, reading file content, and deleting files, which is characteristic of malicious scripts attempting to stealthily interact with the environment.
Detects Set-Alias or New-Alias cmdlet usage. Which can be use as a mean to obfuscate PowerShell scripts
Detects the execution of VelvetCake modular scripts by PowerShell, which involves downloading and executing scripts from %TEMP% via Invoke-Expression, and monitoring the C:\Users\Public directory for file staging and subsequent exfiltration. This rule captures the tactical loop of script execution, output file creation, and exfiltration preparation often observed in Operation Conflict Compass activity.
Detects the use of PowerShell with the EncodedCommand parameter to modify or create entries in the HKEY_CURRENT_USER Run registry keys, a technique used by the HEAVYGRAM malware for persistence.
This rule detects instances where Windows scripting engines (WScript or MSHTA) execute script files (WSF, VBS, HTA) which subsequently spawn a PowerShell process using encoded command arguments. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to mask malicious payloads and bypass execution policy or simple command-line monitoring.
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