Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of PrintSpoofer or its derivatives, often used to perform privilege escalation on Windows systems by abusing the Print Spooler service. The rule also covers the download of the tool via PowerShell.
Detects instances where the legitimate Windows Character Map utility (charmap.exe) is spawned by suspicious processes or PowerShell, and subsequently loads clr.dll. This behavior is indicative of potential DLL sideloading or process injection techniques used by malware to execute arbitrary code within a trusted system process context.
Detects PowerShell or PowerShell ISE spawned directly from Windows Explorer (explorer.exe, covering both Start-menu launches and the Run dialog abused by ClickFix) whose command line carries a genuine obfuscation/evasion signal - true -EncodedCommand/-e usage, a hidden/minimized window flag, or a remote download cradle (IEX, Invoke-WebRequest, DownloadString, certutil, mshta, etc.) - while excluding invocations that point at an on-disk script file under a standard install path, since ClickFix payloads are inline one-liners rather than references to a local .ps1. Bare -NoProfile/-NoLogo flags no longer trigger alone, since they are common in legitimate automation.
Detects the BlueMoon exploit kit's post-exploitation activity, specifically identifying when a Chromium-based browser process (chrome.exe or msedge.exe) initiates command-line tools such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or curl.exe to download and execute a secondary payload named 'msgbox.exe' within the user's temporary directory.
Detects post-exploitation shell activity spawned from the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe), narrowed to command lines carrying encoded/obfuscated PowerShell flags, remote-download cradles, or basic recon/persistence commands (whoami, certutil, bitsadmin, schtasks, reg add). This reduces noise from benign w3wp.exe-initiated automation while retaining the behavioral pattern seen in the Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX unauthenticated RCE chain (webshell/in-memory DLL execution dropping to a shell).
Detects the use of PowerShell to download files from Vultr Object Storage, specifically targeting patterns associated with the HEAVYGRAM malware distribution. The rule monitors for PowerShell cradles (WebClient, DownloadFile), archive extraction commands, or the execution of a specific payload name (RuntimeSSH.exe) often linked to the Handala Hack threat activity.
Detects a suspicious sequence of PowerShell commands associated with HEAVYGRAM-related droppers. The rule identifies processes that attempt to bypass security protections by adding Windows Defender exclusion paths, followed by registry-based persistence mechanisms (Run keys) that target common malicious executables such as RuntimeSSH.exe or winappx.exe.
Detects a suspicious execution chain where wscript.exe spawns an encoded PowerShell process to download files from Vultr Object Storage. The rule specifically monitors for the download of decoy files (e.g., .pptx, .zip) followed by the execution of a file named RuntimeSSH.exe, which is associated with the HEAVYGRAM malware implant.
Detects instances where a Visual Studio Code (VS Code) extension host process launches potentially suspicious child processes, specifically command-line tools like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or calc.exe, within 30 seconds of the extension host starting.
This rule detects potentially malicious activity originating from code editors (VS Code, Electron-based applications) spawning suspicious child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, calc.exe) or the creation of a specific suspicious file 'EXTINSTALL_PWNED.txt' in the 'Users\Public' directory.
This rule detects activity associated with the exploitation of PaperCut vulnerabilities. It looks for connections to known malicious IP addresses, the presence of specific credential harvesting tools, reconnaissance commands (whoami, tasklist) executed by the PaperCut application (pc-app.exe), suspicious PowerShell downloads of AnyDesk, and unauthorized access to PaperCut configuration files or log files containing known exploit strings.
Detects modifications to the Windows RunMRU registry key that include suspicious strings such as 'powershell', 'curl', or long base64-encoded sequences. This behavior is indicative of the 'ClickFix' technique, where users are socially engineered to paste and execute malicious commands directly into the Windows Run dialog.
Detects attempts by PowerShell processes to modify the memory space of amsi.dll, a common technique used to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by patching its functions in-memory.
Detects the execution of PowerShell encoded commands that result in the installation of known remote monitoring and management (RMM) software. This pattern is indicative of attackers, specifically those associated with Ransom Busters or similar affiliates, establishing persistent remote access to compromised systems.
Detects the execution of PowerShell or Rundll32 processes with command-line arguments that reference Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI) components. This is a common indicator of an attempt to bypass or disable AMSI to facilitate the execution of malicious scripts or payloads.
Detects suspicious command-line entries within the Windows RunMRU registry key, which logs recently executed commands from the Run dialog (Win+R). This detection targets common ClickFix or copy-paste attack patterns, specifically identifying the presence of 'powershell', 'curl', or long base64-encoded strings.
Detects the execution of 'charmap.exe' from the Syswow64 directory where the process hierarchy indicates suspicious activity. The detection identifies a chain where PowerShell spawns 'conhost.exe', which in turn spawns a process from a temporary directory (interpreted as a renamed AutoIT executable) that then launches 'charmap.exe'. This pattern is indicative of a multi-stage obfuscated execution flow often used in malware dropper scenarios to bypass standard monitoring.
Detects the Kimsuky APT-C-55 'Stella_Gary' attack chain, where PowerShell is used to download a JavaScript verification script from an external C2 (InfinityFree), followed by the execution of that script via cscript.exe in temporary directories. This behavior is used to bypass anti-bot mechanisms and retrieve secondary payloads from hardcoded C2 infrastructure.
Detects PowerShell command execution patterns indicative of the VelvetCake malware module. The rule identifies scripts that enumerate files within the C:\Users\Public directory, calculate file metrics using [math]::Round, and stage discovered files for transmission over a raw TCP connection using System.Net.Sockets.TcpClient.
Detects the use of PowerShell to load .NET Windows Forms and Drawing assemblies to perform screen captures. This behavior is associated with the VelvetCake second-stage module, which uses these libraries to capture full display screenshots and save them as timestamped PNG files to temporary directories.
Detects the RevStealer malware family using an Electron-based loader to perform anti-sandbox host validation. The loader attempts to identify virtualized environments by querying GPU hardware information using wmic or PowerShell CIM/WMI commands before proceeding to disable security features or launch the payload.
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