Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potentially malicious command patterns involving PowerShell and the Windows Task Scheduler. It identifies suspicious uses of Microsoft Edge update task names, PowerShell commands executing encoded scripts, and specific external download patterns associated with potential dropper or downloader activity.
Detects persistence mechanisms used by a Golang RAT, specifically targeting the creation of a 'DailyFitnessTracker' registry value in the HKCU Run key using reg.exe or PowerShell, and the placement of 'FitnessMonitor.exe' into the Windows Startup folder.
Detects execution of APT36's RUSTYSHADE backdoor, typically delivered via a DriverInstaller executable or zip file, and specifically tracks downloads from Backblaze B2 storage buckets using PowerShell.
Detects the establishment of persistence by the RUSTYMOVE malware through the creation of a scheduled task via PowerShell. The rule specifically looks for a command line containing both 'Register-ScheduledTask' and the specific masqueraded name 'StandAloneOneDriveUpdater-2626', which mimics a legitimate OneDrive update process.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands by the RUSTYMOVE tool intended to enumerate external removable storage devices (USB, SD, MMC, IEEE1394). The rule monitors for the concurrent use of Get-Volume, Get-Partition, and Get-Disk cmdlets with specific BusType filtering patterns.
Detects malicious scheduled task creation using names intended to mimic Microsoft Edge update tasks. The rule identifies suspicious process activity including the spawning of conhost.exe with headless flags, PowerShell commands with encoded arguments, and attempts to fetch external scripts from the known malicious typosquatted domain indiatodays.org, all of which are characteristic of APT36 (Transparent Tribe) activity.
Detects a Golang-based remote access trojan (RAT) attributed to the Transparent Tribe (APT36) threat group. The rule identifies the malware based on distinctive fitness-themed C2 API endpoints, specific function names, hardcoded authentication secrets, and embedded Go runtime markers, while also monitoring for associated persistence registry keys and file paths.
Detects execution of processes associated with QuasarRAT or references to its configuration files, originating from or involving files and processes named 'UBPUpdater.exe' or 'UBPPatch.Psh'. Also identifies network connections via FTP or involving configuration files ('config.Ini') initiated by these specific processes, which may indicate malicious activity, command and control, or data exfiltration.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell commands that simultaneously perform reconnaissance for security analysis tools and virtual machine environment indicators. The presence of encoded, hidden, or non-interactive PowerShell flags in conjunction with these discovery actions is indicative of an adversary attempting to verify their execution environment to evade detection and analysis by security researchers or automated sandbox systems.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell commands that simultaneously perform reconnaissance for security analysis tools and virtual machine environment indicators. The presence of encoded, hidden, or non-interactive PowerShell flags in conjunction with these discovery actions is indicative of an adversary attempting to verify their execution environment to evade detection and analysis by security researchers or automated sandbox systems.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell commands that simultaneously perform reconnaissance for security analysis tools and virtual machine environment indicators. The presence of encoded, hidden, or non-interactive PowerShell flags in conjunction with these discovery actions is indicative of an adversary attempting to verify their execution environment to evade detection and analysis by security researchers or automated sandbox systems.
This rule detects the execution of PowerShell commands that simultaneously perform reconnaissance for security analysis tools and virtual machine environment indicators. The presence of encoded, hidden, or non-interactive PowerShell flags in conjunction with these discovery actions is indicative of an adversary attempting to verify their execution environment to evade detection and analysis by security researchers or automated sandbox systems.
This rule detects a correlation between host-level reconnaissance activity using WMI (via PowerShell or WMIC) to query system information, followed by network exfiltration to a known C2 IP address over a specific URI within a 10-minute window.
This rule detects a correlation between host-level reconnaissance activity using WMI (via PowerShell or WMIC) to query system information, followed by network exfiltration to a known C2 IP address over a specific URI within a 10-minute window.
Detects the silent installation of remote monitoring and management (RMM) software using 'msiexec.exe' initiated by scripting engines (powershell.exe, wscript.exe, or cscript.exe). The rule targets installations occurring in user-writable directories, such as Temp or Downloads, which are common staging locations for malicious droppers, while excluding known legitimate software deployment paths.
Detects the execution of common discovery commands like 'whoami' combined with system information gathering commands (tasklist, ver, uname) when initiated by an application named 'pc-app.exe'. This pattern is frequently observed during the reconnaissance phase of an attack.
Detects the use of obfuscated PowerShell commands that utilize .NET [Convert]::FromBase64String combined with character replacement string manipulation, a common technique to hide malicious payloads from simple static analysis.
Detects obfuscated PowerShell commands that utilize XOR operations combined with byte array manipulation and common file writing methods. This pattern is frequently used by malicious scripts to deobfuscate and drop payloads to disk.
Detects the use of PowerShell's 'WriteAllBytes' method to write a file to the user's Local AppData Temp directory, immediately followed by the creation of a known or suspicious executable file in that same location. This pattern is commonly indicative of a stage in a fileless-style malware attack or automated payload delivery.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with common obfuscation flags (-W Hidden, -nop, -nol) that attempt to load and execute a script directly from the user's local Temp directory. The detection specifically monitors for processes launched by command interpreters like cmd.exe or batch files, which is a common indicator of a malware dropper or stager.
Detects suspicious execution of files located in the AppData Local Temp directory initiated by PowerShell or using PowerShell-specific hidden window arguments. This behavior is commonly associated with dropper scripts or malware staging execution from a user's temporary folder.
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