Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects anomalous command-line arguments and process injection behaviors associated with the Sogou IME protocol handler (biz_helper.exe). The rule monitors for malicious argument injection (e.g., embedded scripts, URLs pointing to non-Sogou domains) and correlates these events with suspicious child processes or network activity, consistent with techniques observed in the GRAYRABBIT / UNC3569 threat activity.
Detects the silent installation of remote monitoring and management (RMM) software using 'msiexec.exe' initiated by scripting engines (powershell.exe, wscript.exe, or cscript.exe). The rule targets installations occurring in user-writable directories, such as Temp or Downloads, which are common staging locations for malicious droppers, while excluding known legitimate software deployment paths.
Detects Evil-WinRM / WinRM-fs usage or wsmprovhost.exe-spawned PowerShell tied specifically to bird-agent backdoor artifacts (cplsupport, wtass, config.toml) or encoded/download-cradle command patterns, rather than any WinRM session, reducing noise from routine remote administration.
Detects execution of PowerShell.exe initiated by cplsupport.exe with hidden window styles and non-interactive, no-profile flags, which is often indicative of obfuscated command execution or malicious script activity.
Detects instances where common web server applications (e.g., Apache, Tomcat, IIS, Nginx) or Java runtime environments spawn suspicious child processes like command shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, sh, bash) or network utilities (wget, curl). This behavior often indicates exploitation of a web vulnerability, such as Remote Code Execution (RCE), allowing an adversary to execute commands or download further malicious payloads.
Detects suspicious execution of PowerShell or Mshta spawned from Explorer.exe. It looks for specific malicious indicators including references to known malicious domains, PowerShell encoding flags, hidden window arguments, or Mshta HTTP requests, which are common patterns for fileless malware or dropper execution.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command-line arguments (e.g., encoded commands, hidden windows) initiated by mshta.exe, excluding instances where a .ps1 script file is involved. This pattern often indicates attempts to bypass execution policy or run obfuscated payloads in memory, which is a common behavior of malicious HTA files.
Detects a suspicious sequence of activities where PowerShell downloads or extracts specific zip files (node.zip, build.zip) to staging directories, followed by the execution of associated binaries like node.exe, winpty-agent.exe, or winpty.dll from those same locations. This behavior is indicative of an adversary staging and executing tooling within temporary user directories.
Detects PEEP Secure Preferences integrity-hash forgery (protection.macs/super_mac) and known PEEP persistence scripts (patch_secure_prefs.ps1, install_silent.ps1, force_enable.ps1), anchored to actual Chrome/Edge profile paths rather than generic terms like 'protection' or 'developer_mode' that appear in unrelated admin tooling.
Detects instances where PowerShell is used to download an executable named 'svchost.exe' from an external IP address (103.86.86.244). The rule monitors for network connections to this IP, file creation events matching specific download patterns in fonts directories, and direct command-line arguments involving the suspicious IP and file path, indicating potential malware dropper activity.
This rule detects the execution of powershell.exe with command-line arguments that utilize 'curl' to download a file from a specific remote IP address (103.86.86.244). This behavior is characteristic of adversaries using built-in Windows tools or redirected utilities to perform ingress tool transfer as part of a malicious payload delivery.
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell execution that attempts to download files from the internet using the Invoke-WebRequest cmdlet. It specifically looks for PowerShell processes launched with hidden and execution policy bypass flags, coupled with specific hardcoded malicious URL patterns associated with a known campaign (NotaFiscal/nfe_valid_access_key_2026_secure).
This rule detects the use of PowerShell to modify Microsoft Defender settings to disable real-time, behavior, and IOAV protection, while simultaneously adding a full-drive exclusion for the root directory (C:\). This behavior is characteristic of an adversary attempting to disable security monitoring to facilitate further malicious activity or avoid detection.
This rule detects potential remote command execution using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) via wmic.exe or PowerShell, as well as suspicious child processes spawned by the WMI provider host (wmiprvse.exe). It monitors for command lines utilizing the /node switch to target remote systems or invoking WMI methods to trigger execution, which are common patterns for lateral movement.
Detects instances of the Windows utility RegSvcs.exe being executed from suspicious, user-writable directories (such as Temp or Public folders) or instances where RegSvcs.exe is used to spawn common command-line or scripting tools, which is a common indicator of living-off-the-land binary (LOLBin) abuse.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of activities indicative of potential lateral movement and credential access. It identifies the execution of PsExec (PSEXESVC.exe) in conjunction with volume shadow copy manipulation (vssadmin, wmic, or diskshadow to create or delete shadow copies) within a 30-minute window. It further correlates this activity with potential lateral movement commands (e.g., net.exe, query.exe, nslookup.exe) to assess the severity of the incident.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of activities indicative of potential lateral movement and credential access. It identifies the execution of PsExec (PSEXESVC.exe) in conjunction with volume shadow copy manipulation (vssadmin, wmic, or diskshadow to create or delete shadow copies) within a 30-minute window. It further correlates this activity with potential lateral movement commands (e.g., net.exe, query.exe, nslookup.exe) to assess the severity of the incident.
Detects the HEAVYGRAM malware utilizing the Telegram Bot API to download file attachments, followed by the extraction of an archive using PowerShell to a masqueraded directory (C:\ProgramData\Kee_Pass), and the subsequent execution of a binary masquerading as KeePass.exe.
Detects instances where a Visual Studio Code (VS Code) extension host process launches potentially suspicious child processes, specifically command-line tools like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or calc.exe, within 30 seconds of the extension host starting.
Detects uncommon or suspicious child processes spawning from a WSL process. This could indicate an attempt to evade parent/child relationship detections or persistence attempts via cron using WSL.
Detects uncommon or suspicious child processes spawning from a WSL process. This could indicate an attempt to evade parent/child relationship detections or persistence attempts via cron using WSL.
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