Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the execution of AADInternals PowerShell toolkit commands. AADInternals is a known framework used for administration, enumeration, and exploitation of Azure Active Directory and Microsoft Entra ID, including the creation of backdoors and manipulation of federation settings.
Detects PowerShell command execution that uses bitwise XOR operations combined with the .NET [IO.File]::WriteAllBytes method. This pattern is commonly used by malware, such as AsyncRAT, to deobfuscate and drop secondary payloads or modules onto the file system during execution.
This rule detects command line patterns associated with common Impacket tools (wmiexec, psexec, smbexec) executed via Windows processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) or via network connections to ports 445 and 135 initiated by Python processes. These tools are frequently used by adversaries for lateral movement, remote service execution, and command execution on compromised systems.
Detects anomalous system reconnaissance activity performed using WMIC or PowerShell Get-WmiObject commands. The rule tracks distinct command-line executions per device and flags hosts where three or more unique reconnaissance commands are executed within a short timeframe, which is indicative of an adversary enumerating system configuration, hotfixes, or hardware details.
This rule detects potential remote command execution using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) via wmic.exe or PowerShell, as well as suspicious child processes spawned by the WMI provider host (wmiprvse.exe). It monitors for command lines utilizing the /node switch to target remote systems or invoking WMI methods to trigger execution, which are common patterns for lateral movement.
This rule detects PowerShell processes spawned directly or indirectly by LNK files that include command-line arguments indicative of anti-analysis, anti-VM, or reconnaissance techniques. These include querying for specific WMI classes (e.g., Win32_Process, Win32_ComputerSystem), checking for virtualization artifacts (e.g., 'virtualbox', 'vmware', 'qemu', 'sandboxie'), or querying security and hardware information (e.g., 'antivirusproduct', 'securitycenter2', 'getmac').
Detects the use of .NET reflection methods (such as Assembly.Load or LoadFrom) within command-line arguments of processes frequently abused for secondary execution (e.g., rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe) when initiated by common scripting or execution engines like PowerShell, cmd.exe, or mshta.exe. This pattern is indicative of fileless malware execution or reflective assembly loading commonly used to bypass traditional signature-based detection.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command line flags (such as hidden windows, bypass execution policies, or encoded commands) where the parent process is a shortcut (.lnk) file. This is a common technique used by attackers to execute malicious scripts via phishing or social engineering, where a user is tricked into clicking a malicious link file.
Detects the use of .NET reflection assembly loading techniques (e.g., Assembly.Load, [Reflection.Assembly]::Load) within the command line arguments of known LOLBAS (Living Off the Land Binary and Script) processes. This behavior is frequently associated with fileless malware execution or the loading of malicious assemblies directly into the memory space of trusted Windows binaries.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with common obfuscation or stealth-related flags (e.g., -enc, -nop, -w hidden) when initiated by CMD or from a LNK file, particularly when originating from Windows Explorer. This is a common pattern for malicious file execution and dropper activity.
Detects PowerShell command lines that perform environment validation by enumerating running processes for security software (AV/EDR/Analysis tools) and querying WMI for virtualization artifacts. This behavior is consistent with anti-analysis and anti-sandbox evasion techniques used by threat actors, such as Kimsuky, to identify and verify the execution environment before proceeding with malicious activity.
Detects the reflective loading of .NET assemblies into memory using APIs like Assembly.Load or Reflection.Emit, where no corresponding DLL file is written to the disk. This technique is often used by malware (such as the Stella_Gary backdoor) to execute code in a fileless manner and evade disk-based security detections.
Detects ClickFix-style social engineering attacks where users are prompted to copy and execute malicious commands in a shell environment. The rule triggers on process execution of terminal or shell binaries (zsh, sh, cmd.exe, powershell.exe) containing indicators of obfuscated execution or remote code downloading, such as piped shell commands (curl | sh/zsh) or PowerShell encoded command execution.
Detects the use of 'Localcertificate.zip' and associated PowerShell or certutil commands used to install a rogue root certificate authority into the Windows certificate store. This technique is often used by adversaries to enable TLS interception for credential and session theft.
Detects PowerShell or PowerShell ISE spawned directly from Windows Explorer (explorer.exe, covering both Start-menu launches and the Run dialog abused by ClickFix) whose command line carries a genuine obfuscation/evasion signal - true -EncodedCommand/-e usage, a hidden/minimized window flag, or a remote download cradle (IEX, Invoke-WebRequest, DownloadString, certutil, mshta, etc.) - while excluding invocations that point at an on-disk script file under a standard install path, since ClickFix payloads are inline one-liners rather than references to a local .ps1. Bare -NoProfile/-NoLogo flags no longer trigger alone, since they are common in legitimate automation.
Detects PowerShell or PowerShell ISE spawned directly from Windows Explorer (explorer.exe, covering both Start-menu launches and the Run dialog abused by ClickFix) whose command line carries a genuine obfuscation/evasion signal - true -EncodedCommand/-e usage, a hidden/minimized window flag, or a remote download cradle (IEX, Invoke-WebRequest, DownloadString, certutil, mshta, etc.) - while excluding invocations that point at an on-disk script file under a standard install path, since ClickFix payloads are inline one-liners rather than references to a local .ps1. Bare -NoProfile/-NoLogo flags no longer trigger alone, since they are common in legitimate automation.
Detects the silent installation of remote monitoring and management (RMM) software using 'msiexec.exe' initiated by scripting engines (powershell.exe, wscript.exe, or cscript.exe). The rule targets installations occurring in user-writable directories, such as Temp or Downloads, which are common staging locations for malicious droppers, while excluding known legitimate software deployment paths.
Detects a sequence of events where a user visits a Cloudflare Pages URL (*.pages.dev) and shortly after, a suspicious command (mshta, powershell, or curl) is executed. This pattern is consistent with the UNC5142 threat actor's TTP of using social engineering lures hosted on Cloudflare Pages to trick users into running malicious commands.
Detects instances where the SQL Server process (sqlservr.exe) initiates a child process that is a known command-line tool, script interpreter, or utility often used in living-off-the-land attacks, or when a child process is spawned from suspicious directory paths such as AppData, Temp, or Windows\Temp.
This rule monitors for web server exploit attempts (indicated by patterns like JNDI lookups or SQL injection sequences in URI/cookie data) that correlate with a surge in server-side errors (400+ status codes) and subsequent anomalous process creation or outbound network connections from the web server process.
Detects potential exploitation of a CrowdStrike Falcon remediation process vulnerability ('FalconFlank'). The rule identifies either direct execution of the PoC binary or the suspicious combination of a CrowdStrike remediation process loading an unsigned or untrusted DLL from a user-writable path followed by the same process spawning a command shell in the SYSTEM context within 15 minutes.
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