Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the use of PowerShell's 'WriteAllBytes' method to write a file to the user's Local AppData Temp directory, immediately followed by the creation of a known or suspicious executable file in that same location. This pattern is commonly indicative of a stage in a fileless-style malware attack or automated payload delivery.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that utilize a combination of 'Test-Path', 'Start-Sleep' (or 'sleep'), and arithmetic obfuscation (e.g., -lt (63+17)). This pattern is often used in malicious scripts to implement a delay while obfuscating the duration, a technique frequently seen in staging or persistence phases to evade sandbox analysis or signature-based detection.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that use character-based obfuscation to call 'CreateDirectory' and interact with the user's temporary environment folder. This pattern is commonly observed when scripts attempt to hide file staging or payload delivery paths from static analysis.
Detects the execution of PowerShell or PWSH with command-line arguments often used to obfuscate scripts or hide activity, such as encoded commands (-enc), base64 decoding, or running the process with a hidden window.
Detects instances where a shell process (powershell, cmd, mshta, or wscript) is spawned by a browser-related process (explorer, wt, or SearchHost) shortly after a user focuses on a web browser, followed by a network connection from that shell within a short time window. This pattern is indicative of potential web-based exploitation or file download and execution chains.
This rule monitors for specific PowerShell command-line patterns often associated with malicious activity, including 'ClickFix' clipboard-paste lures (using iex/irm with sleep timers), evasion techniques involving pscustomobject/ScriptBlock, and WinHttp COM object usage for stage-2 payload fetching. These patterns are characteristic of adversary attempts to bypass security controls and download secondary implants.
This rule detects the execution of powershell.exe with command-line arguments that utilize 'curl' to download a file from a specific remote IP address (103.86.86.244). This behavior is characteristic of adversaries using built-in Windows tools or redirected utilities to perform ingress tool transfer as part of a malicious payload delivery.
This rule detects the execution of powershell.exe with command-line arguments that utilize 'curl' to download a file from a specific remote IP address (103.86.86.244). This behavior is characteristic of adversaries using built-in Windows tools or redirected utilities to perform ingress tool transfer as part of a malicious payload delivery.
Detects instances where PowerShell is used to download an executable named 'svchost.exe' from an external IP address (103.86.86.244). The rule monitors for network connections to this IP, file creation events matching specific download patterns in fonts directories, and direct command-line arguments involving the suspicious IP and file path, indicating potential malware dropper activity.
Detects instances where PowerShell is used to download an executable named 'svchost.exe' from an external IP address (103.86.86.244). The rule monitors for network connections to this IP, file creation events matching specific download patterns in fonts directories, and direct command-line arguments involving the suspicious IP and file path, indicating potential malware dropper activity.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command-line arguments (e.g., encoded commands, hidden windows) initiated by mshta.exe, excluding instances where a .ps1 script file is involved. This pattern often indicates attempts to bypass execution policy or run obfuscated payloads in memory, which is a common behavior of malicious HTA files.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command-line arguments (e.g., encoded commands, hidden windows) initiated by mshta.exe, excluding instances where a .ps1 script file is involved. This pattern often indicates attempts to bypass execution policy or run obfuscated payloads in memory, which is a common behavior of malicious HTA files.
This rule detects inbound HTTP GET requests to a specific IP address (103.86.86.244) requesting a file named 'deploy.ps1'. This behavior is characteristic of adversaries using PowerShell one-liners (cradles) like 'irm' (Invoke-RestMethod) or 'iex' (Invoke-Expression) to fetch and execute malicious scripts directly from a remote C2 infrastructure.
This rule detects inbound HTTP GET requests to a specific IP address (103.86.86.244) requesting a file named 'deploy.ps1'. This behavior is characteristic of adversaries using PowerShell one-liners (cradles) like 'irm' (Invoke-RestMethod) or 'iex' (Invoke-Expression) to fetch and execute malicious scripts directly from a remote C2 infrastructure.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell to modify Microsoft Defender settings to disable real-time, behavior, and IOAV protection, while simultaneously adding a full-drive exclusion for the root directory (C:\). This behavior is characteristic of an adversary attempting to disable security monitoring to facilitate further malicious activity or avoid detection.
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell execution that attempts to download files from the internet using the Invoke-WebRequest cmdlet. It specifically looks for PowerShell processes launched with hidden and execution policy bypass flags, coupled with specific hardcoded malicious URL patterns associated with a known campaign (NotaFiscal/nfe_valid_access_key_2026_secure).
Detects a specific pattern of PowerShell execution involving the download of files from a remote endpoint using parameters associated with Brazilian tax documents (NotaFiscal) to the Desktop directory, followed by immediate execution. The rule looks for a combination of hidden window style, Invoke-WebRequest, specific URL parameters (dl.php, NFe identifiers), and subsequent Start-Process calls, which is indicative of malware dropper activity.
Detects suspicious PowerShell execution initiated by explorer.exe containing encoded commands, correlated with concurrent activity in the Windows RunMRU registry key or execution of rundll32.exe referencing 'WindowsUpdate.log'. This pattern is frequently used to mask malicious activity and maintain stealth during fileless execution or persistence operations.
Detects the use of PowerShell to download string content from the internet and execute it immediately using Invoke-Expression (IEX). This is a common pattern for fileless malware delivery and secondary stage payload execution.
Detects the use of PowerShell to download string content from the internet and execute it immediately using Invoke-Expression (IEX). This is a common pattern for fileless malware delivery and secondary stage payload execution.
Detects instances where the Windows Management Instrumentation service (wmiprvse.exe) launches suspicious command-line interfaces or interpreters (PowerShell, CMD, cscript, etc.), or executes scripts from sensitive/temporary directories. The rule includes exclusions for common management tools to reduce noise.
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