Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects PEEP Secure Preferences integrity-hash forgery (protection.macs/super_mac) and known PEEP persistence scripts (patch_secure_prefs.ps1, install_silent.ps1, force_enable.ps1), anchored to actual Chrome/Edge profile paths rather than generic terms like 'protection' or 'developer_mode' that appear in unrelated admin tooling.
This rule monitors for specific PowerShell command-line patterns often associated with malicious activity, including 'ClickFix' clipboard-paste lures (using iex/irm with sleep timers), evasion techniques involving pscustomobject/ScriptBlock, and WinHttp COM object usage for stage-2 payload fetching. These patterns are characteristic of adversary attempts to bypass security controls and download secondary implants.
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using 'schtasks.exe' where the initiating process is a script interpreter such as 'mshta.exe' or 'powershell.exe'. This behavior is often associated with the execution of malicious payloads or the establishment of persistence.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell to modify Microsoft Defender settings to disable real-time, behavior, and IOAV protection, while simultaneously adding a full-drive exclusion for the root directory (C:\). This behavior is characteristic of an adversary attempting to disable security monitoring to facilitate further malicious activity or avoid detection.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell to modify Microsoft Defender settings to disable real-time, behavior, and IOAV protection, while simultaneously adding a full-drive exclusion for the root directory (C:\). This behavior is characteristic of an adversary attempting to disable security monitoring to facilitate further malicious activity or avoid detection.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell to modify Microsoft Defender settings to disable real-time, behavior, and IOAV protection, while simultaneously adding a full-drive exclusion for the root directory (C:\). This behavior is characteristic of an adversary attempting to disable security monitoring to facilitate further malicious activity or avoid detection.
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell execution that attempts to download files from the internet using the Invoke-WebRequest cmdlet. It specifically looks for PowerShell processes launched with hidden and execution policy bypass flags, coupled with specific hardcoded malicious URL patterns associated with a known campaign (NotaFiscal/nfe_valid_access_key_2026_secure).
Detects Evil-WinRM / WinRM-fs usage or wsmprovhost.exe-spawned PowerShell tied specifically to bird-agent backdoor artifacts (cplsupport, wtass, config.toml) or encoded/download-cradle command patterns, rather than any WinRM session, reducing noise from routine remote administration.
Detects anomalous activity originating from PostgreSQL processes, including the spawning of shells (cmd, powershell, sh, bash), access to sensitive files (e.g., /etc/shadow, SSH keys), and file creation outside the standard PostgreSQL data directories, which is consistent with the abuse of SQL functionality like pg_read_file() or lo_export().
Detects instances where common web server applications (e.g., Apache, Tomcat, IIS, Nginx) or Java runtime environments spawn suspicious child processes like command shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, sh, bash) or network utilities (wget, curl). This behavior often indicates exploitation of a web vulnerability, such as Remote Code Execution (RCE), allowing an adversary to execute commands or download further malicious payloads.
Detects modifications or creation of InprocServer32 COM registry keys by suspicious processes like mshta.exe or powershell.exe, which is indicative of COM Hijacking for persistence or privilege escalation.
Detects attempts to modify, disable, or exclude paths and processes from Microsoft Defender Antivirus using legitimate administrative utilities such as PowerShell, cmd, sc, and netsh. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to evade security monitoring.
Detects evidence of PowerShell AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) bypass attempts, including memory patching of amsiContext, usage of known malicious RC4 keys, or reflection-based tampering with AmsiUtils. These techniques are commonly used by attackers to disable AMSI scanning capabilities and execute malicious scripts undetected.
Detects evidence of PowerShell AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) bypass attempts, including memory patching of amsiContext, usage of known malicious RC4 keys, or reflection-based tampering with AmsiUtils. These techniques are commonly used by attackers to disable AMSI scanning capabilities and execute malicious scripts undetected.
Detects evidence of PowerShell AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) bypass attempts, including memory patching of amsiContext, usage of known malicious RC4 keys, or reflection-based tampering with AmsiUtils. These techniques are commonly used by attackers to disable AMSI scanning capabilities and execute malicious scripts undetected.
Detects a suspicious sequence of activities where PowerShell downloads or extracts specific zip files (node.zip, build.zip) to staging directories, followed by the execution of associated binaries like node.exe, winpty-agent.exe, or winpty.dll from those same locations. This behavior is indicative of an adversary staging and executing tooling within temporary user directories.
Detects Node.js or related helper processes executing shell commands (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) or other processes where the execution involves the 'withCreateProcessUser' argument. This often indicates attempts to bypass execution restrictions or run malicious payloads by utilizing Node.js as an execution proxy within unconventional or temporary directories.
Detects the execution of PowerShell commands that utilize base64-encoded strings, window style arguments for obfuscation, and subsequent decoding to reveal suspicious indicators such as network downloading commands or archive manipulation, indicative of potential fileless malware staging.
This rule detects potential reflective code injection or in-memory loading (fileless) where a DLL or PE image is loaded by mshta.exe or powershell.exe, but the module load event lacks a valid file path on disk (or indicates a device path). This behavior is often associated with the execution of malicious payloads such as the Amatera loader, where payloads are executed directly in memory to evade file-based security detections.
Detects attempts to modify, disable, or exclude paths and processes from Microsoft Defender Antivirus using legitimate administrative utilities such as PowerShell, cmd, sc, and netsh. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to evade security monitoring.
Detects modifications or creation of InprocServer32 COM registry keys by suspicious processes like mshta.exe or powershell.exe, which is indicative of COM Hijacking for persistence or privilege escalation.
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