Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

4,464 detections

Detects execution of PowerShell.exe initiated by cplsupport.exe with hidden window styles and non-interactive, no-profile flags, which is often indicative of obfuscated command execution or malicious script activity.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
Detects suspicious execution of PowerShell or Mshta spawned from Explorer.exe. It looks for specific malicious indicators including references to known malicious domains, PowerShell encoding flags, hidden window arguments, or Mshta HTTP requests, which are common patterns for fileless malware or dropper execution.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Midnight Slayer
2 months ago
001
Detects modifications or creation of InprocServer32 COM registry keys by suspicious processes like mshta.exe or powershell.exe, which is indicative of COM Hijacking for persistence or privilege escalation.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
002
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using 'schtasks.exe' where the initiating process is a script interpreter such as 'mshta.exe' or 'powershell.exe'. This behavior is often associated with the execution of malicious payloads or the establishment of persistence.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
102
Detects the creation of a scheduled task using 'schtasks.exe' where the initiating process is a script interpreter such as 'mshta.exe' or 'powershell.exe'. This behavior is often associated with the execution of malicious payloads or the establishment of persistence.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
002
Detects the execution of PowerShell with suspicious command-line arguments (e.g., encoded commands, hidden windows) initiated by mshta.exe, excluding instances where a .ps1 script file is involved. This pattern often indicates attempts to bypass execution policy or run obfuscated payloads in memory, which is a common behavior of malicious HTA files.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
002
Detects suspicious execution of PowerShell or Mshta spawned from Explorer.exe. It looks for specific malicious indicators including references to known malicious domains, PowerShell encoding flags, hidden window arguments, or Mshta HTTP requests, which are common patterns for fileless malware or dropper execution.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
102
Detects suspicious execution of PowerShell or Mshta spawned from Explorer.exe. It looks for specific malicious indicators including references to known malicious domains, PowerShell encoding flags, hidden window arguments, or Mshta HTTP requests, which are common patterns for fileless malware or dropper execution.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
002
Detects instances where OpenVPN service binaries (openvpn.exe or openvpnserv.exe) spawn command-line interpreters (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) with suspicious command-line characters or potentially unbalanced quotes. This behavior may indicate an attempt to leverage OpenVPN for code execution or persistence, often seen in environments where VPN configurations are manipulated to run arbitrary scripts.
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Ankit Mehta@Secvyn
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
101
Detects a suspicious sequence of activities where PowerShell downloads or extracts specific zip files (node.zip, build.zip) to staging directories, followed by the execution of associated binaries like node.exe, winpty-agent.exe, or winpty.dll from those same locations. This behavior is indicative of an adversary staging and executing tooling within temporary user directories.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
001
Detects Node.js or related helper processes executing shell commands (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) or other processes where the execution involves the 'withCreateProcessUser' argument. This often indicates attempts to bypass execution restrictions or run malicious payloads by utilizing Node.js as an execution proxy within unconventional or temporary directories.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
001
Detects instances where common web server applications (e.g., Apache, Tomcat, IIS, Nginx) or Java runtime environments spawn suspicious child processes like command shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, sh, bash) or network utilities (wget, curl). This behavior often indicates exploitation of a web vulnerability, such as Remote Code Execution (RCE), allowing an adversary to execute commands or download further malicious payloads.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
002
Detects anomalous activity originating from PostgreSQL processes, including the spawning of shells (cmd, powershell, sh, bash), access to sensitive files (e.g., /etc/shadow, SSH keys), and file creation outside the standard PostgreSQL data directories, which is consistent with the abuse of SQL functionality like pg_read_file() or lo_export().
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detection & Hunting Community
2 months ago
002
Detects anomalous activity originating from PostgreSQL processes, including the spawning of shells (cmd, powershell, sh, bash), access to sensitive files (e.g., /etc/shadow, SSH keys), and file creation outside the standard PostgreSQL data directories, which is consistent with the abuse of SQL functionality like pg_read_file() or lo_export().
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
002
Detects anomalous activity originating from PostgreSQL processes, including the spawning of shells (cmd, powershell, sh, bash), access to sensitive files (e.g., /etc/shadow, SSH keys), and file creation outside the standard PostgreSQL data directories, which is consistent with the abuse of SQL functionality like pg_read_file() or lo_export().
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Arnold Chan@slaz
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
002
Detects suspicious PowerShell execution spawned by common development tools or shell environments like node, npm, or WSL. The rule evaluates the process lineage and scores the command line arguments for characteristics commonly used by malicious payloads, such as hidden execution, bypass flags, network download activity, or temporary file access, which are indicative of software supply chain attacks or automated malicious script execution.
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Tim Peck@timpeck
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
24053
Detects inline execution of PowerShell code from a file
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 months ago
003
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell execution that attempts to download files from the internet using the Invoke-WebRequest cmdlet. It specifically looks for PowerShell processes launched with hidden and execution policy bypass flags, coupled with specific hardcoded malicious URL patterns associated with a known campaign (NotaFiscal/nfe_valid_access_key_2026_secure).
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
000
This rule detects potentially malicious command-line activity involving powershell.exe or mshta.exe that is initiated by a web browser process (chrome.exe, msedge.exe, firefox.exe, or iexplore.exe). It monitors for indicators such as encoded commands, usage of Invoke-Expression, download cradles, hidden window flags, and specific known IOCs, correlating these events with recent browser activity to identify potential drive-by download or browser-based exploitation attempts.
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Arnold Chan@slaz
Defender - KQL
2 months ago
101
Detects command-line execution (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) originating from a python.exe process tree, correlated with long-running, frequent outbound public network connections from the same python.exe process. This behavior is consistent with the SynkLoader RAT module, where a loader uses a Python process to execute system commands and maintain persistent C2 channels.
Anitha A@aanitha
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
14028
Detects non-administrative access querying SCCM to enumerate user-device relationships, used by CISA's red team to identify which workstations belonged to high-value targets.
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Duo Tech@duotech
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Detections.ai Community
2 months ago
8015
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