Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects when common administrative or networking tools such as bash, sh, cmd.exe, powershell.exe, curl, or wget are initiated by Langflow application processes (python, uvicorn, gunicorn). This behavior is indicative of potential command injection or exploitation of the Langflow platform to execute unauthorized commands or download malicious payloads.
Detects non-standard processes, particularly fileless PowerShell, accessing Windows Token Broker cache (.tbres) files, a technique associated with ChocoShell credential/token theft.
Detects incoming web requests (via URI queries or form data) containing common OS command injection characters, shell metacharacters, or command execution patterns indicative of attempts to execute unauthorized commands on the underlying web server.
This rule detects a potential credential exfiltration attempt following the launch of a terminal (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, bash, zsh, sh) by common IDE processes (Code.exe, Cursor.exe, Antigravity.exe). It monitors for sensitive configuration or credential files (such as .env, .aws/credentials, or .config/gh) being accessed within two minutes of a terminal process being spawned by the development environment.
Detects instances where Veeam ONE Agent components (VeeamOneAgent, VeeamOneWebService, or VeeamOneReportingSvc) initiate common command and scripting interpreters like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, cscript.exe, or wscript.exe. This activity is often indicative of potential exploitation of the backup management software or administrative abuse.
Detects instances where the Node.js package manager (npm) or node process initiates suspicious child processes such as curl, powershell, or shell interpreters (bash/sh/cmd) containing command-line arguments indicative of downloading or executing remote content (e.g., GitHub raw URLs or pipes to interpreters). This behavior is characteristic of supply chain attacks or malicious installation scripts.
Detects instances where Java or Oracle-related processes (java.exe, oracle.exe, tnslsnr.exe) initiate suspicious command-line tools like cmd.exe or powershell.exe to execute commands typically associated with reconnaissance, such as whoami or tasklist. This is a strong indicator of post-exploitation activity where a compromised web server or database process is being used to conduct system discovery.
Detects a VBS script invoking PowerShell to decode a Base64 payload, write it to disk with a random name, and decompress it using IO.Compression.GzipStream into tmp*.bat.gz/tmp*.bat files, consistent with the AutoIT-based VIPKeylogger/MedusaHVNC infection chain.
Detects a multi-stage execution chain involving a malicious LNK file that triggers PowerShell. The rule specifically looks for PowerShell commands spawned by explorer.exe or mshta.exe that contain indicators of string deobfuscation (using .Replace), specific job-related keywords (CoreJob), or remote content retrieval (Net.WebClient.DownloadString). The detection correlates these process events with the presence of suspicious LNK files and decoy document files dropped within the temporary directory on the same endpoint.
Detects in-process LDAP enumeration of Active Directory through the .NET System.DirectoryServices classes, the [adsisearcher] type accelerator and DirectorySearcher, captured from PowerShell ScriptBlock logging in action_evtlog_message. Severity is assigned from the LDAP filter and requested attributes. CRITICAL covers queries after credential-bearing attributes (LAPS, gMSA, sIDHistory, GPP/SYSVOL paths) or DCSync replication rights. HIGH covers known attack-technique targeting: Tier Zero enumeration via adminCount, SPN enumeration for Kerberoasting, delegation attributes, and the UAC bitmask filters used for AS-REP roasting and unconstrained delegation. MEDIUM covers broad estate enumeration across groups, computers, GPOs, and OUs. Command-line context (suspicious parent process, encoded or hidden execution) is surfaced as separate fields for triage rather than folded into the score.
This rule detects malicious activity associated with the DOUBLECUP/CountLoader malware by correlating specific PowerShell execution patterns within a single process lineage. It flags process sequences where an encoded PowerShell command (using -enc or -encodedcommand) occurs in conjunction with suspicious .NET reflection (System.Reflection.Assembly) or ScriptBlock invocation within a 5-minute window. The rule explicitly excludes processes with valid digital signatures to reduce false positives from legitimate administrative software.
Detects PowerShell processes whose command line chains a main() function call directly into Invoke-Expression, consistent with CountLoader's module-fetch-and-execute pattern used by DOUBLECUP LaaS.
This rule detects a potential credential exfiltration attempt following the launch of a terminal (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, bash, zsh, sh) by common IDE processes (Code.exe, Cursor.exe, Antigravity.exe). It monitors for sensitive configuration or credential files (such as .env, .aws/credentials, or .config/gh) being accessed within two minutes of a terminal process being spawned by the development environment.
Detects instances where Veeam ONE Agent components (VeeamOneAgent, VeeamOneWebService, or VeeamOneReportingSvc) initiate common command and scripting interpreters like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, cscript.exe, or wscript.exe. This activity is often indicative of potential exploitation of the backup management software or administrative abuse.
This rule detects when common administrative or networking tools such as bash, sh, cmd.exe, powershell.exe, curl, or wget are initiated by Langflow application processes (python, uvicorn, gunicorn). This behavior is indicative of potential command injection or exploitation of the Langflow platform to execute unauthorized commands or download malicious payloads.
Detects instances where the Internet Information Services (IIS) worker process (w3wp.exe) initiates execution of suspicious binaries such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or other script interpreters, which may indicate web-based exploitation or lateral movement.
Correlates PowerShell in-memory .NET assembly reflection (System.Reflection.Assembly) with ScriptBlock creation in the same process within a 5-minute window, consistent with CountLoader's reflective payload-loading technique.
Detects PowerShell-driven download and execution of STAC4749 loader/backdoor payloads (ms_876*.exe, sekv*.exe, helper*.exe, 74fs*/7414fs*.exe, 45234ssdf403851640.exe, updater.exe, msupdate.exe) staged in AppData\Roaming or AppData\Local\Temp, or execution from known STAC4749 download domains/URLs.
Suspicious Script and Utility Execution
Cortex XDR
This rule detects the execution of common command-line interpreters and utility tools frequently abused by attackers for reconnaissance, execution, and post-exploitation activities. Monitored binaries include script interpreters (python.exe, powershell.exe, pwsh.exe, bash.exe, sh.exe) and command-line utilities (cat, grep, find).
Detects the execution of suspicious commands, PowerShell scripts, or LOLBins (Living-off-the-Land Binaries) - commonly seen in ClickFix and CrashFix campaigns - recorded in the Windows 'RunMRU' registry key.
Detects potential post-exploitation activity originating from the SharePoint worker process (w3wp.exe). The rule monitors for three primary indicators: w3wp.exe spawning command interpreters (cmd.exe or powershell.exe), unauthorized file modifications or creations within SharePoint web directories, and outbound network connections to public IP addresses initiated by w3wp.exe, which may indicate payload delivery or C2 communication. (CVE-2026-50522)
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